Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Mark Andrews
> On 15 Apr 2021, at 11:35, @lbutlr wrote: > > On 14 Apr 2021, at 01:48, Anand Buddhdev wrote: >> This is a short-sighted opinion. If just one authoritative server sends >> out REFUSED responses towards an innocent, it won't matter. But if 1000 >> authoritative servers all send out REFUSED

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread
On 14 Apr 2021, at 01:48, Anand Buddhdev wrote: > This is a short-sighted opinion. If just one authoritative server sends > out REFUSED responses towards an innocent, it won't matter. But if 1000 > authoritative servers all send out REFUSED responses towards an innocent > IP address, their

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Peter Coghlan
Tony Finch wrote: >Peter Coghlan wrote: >> Instead, isn't it the case that bind knows what domains it is authoritative >> for (or which ones it is supposed to be authoritative for) and bind is >> therefore in the ideal position to know which queries are abusive and which >> are not rather than

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Tony Finch
Peter Coghlan wrote: > > I wouldn't describe it as background radiation or probes. It doesn't seem > to be caused by misconfigured or faulty resolvers or anything of that nature. Hmm, maybe air pollution would be a better metaphor? What I mean is the kind of continuous low levels of abuse

Re: Ask for automated KSK roll with DS checking

2021-04-14 Thread Greg Rivers via bind-users
On Wednesday, 14 April 2021 15:00:38 CDT Bob Harold wrote: > Does anyone have an automated KSK roll process, that checks for the DS > record at the parent, that they can share? > > As far as I can tell, the automated signing in BIND will roll the KSK if I > set the timing in the policy file, but

Ask for automated KSK roll with DS checking

2021-04-14 Thread Bob Harold
Does anyone have an automated KSK roll process, that checks for the DS record at the parent, that they can share? As far as I can tell, the automated signing in BIND will roll the KSK if I set the timing in the policy file, but it won't check the DS record, so it will happily break DNSSEC if

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Sten Carlsen
Thanks Sten > On 14 Apr 2021, at 19.47, Carl Byington via bind-users > wrote: > > Signed PGP part > On Wed, 2021-04-14 at 12:58 -0400, Paul Kosinski via bind-users wrote: > > Interesting, although we host different domains, in and from different > > geographic areas, we got the same queries

Re: No logging of failed queries

2021-04-14 Thread Chuck Aurora
On 2021-04-14 04:38, Gaurav Kansal wrote: Is there a way, by which we can log denied statement w.r.t. view somewhere in logging ? The thing is, your view did not deny anything. Your non-.IN client simply does not match the match-clients list for that view. On 14/04/21 1:48 am, ma...@isc.org

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Peter Coghlan
Tony Finch wrote: > Peter Coghlan wrote: > > > > I have a nameserver which is authoritative for three or four domain names. > > It receives around 1000 queries per day that could be regarded as plausably > > legitimate. It receives around ten times that number of absive queries per > > day from

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Carl Byington via bind-users
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On Wed, 2021-04-14 at 12:58 -0400, Paul Kosinski via bind-users wrote: > Interesting, although we host different domains, in and from different > geographic areas, we got the same queries as yours on the same day, > with some at about the same time

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Paul Kosinski via bind-users
Interesting, although we host different domains, in and from different geographic areas, we got the same queries as yours on the same day, with some at about the same time (we're EDT). 13-Apr-2021 02:19:58.468 security: info: client 76.20.145.58#3074 (sl): query (cache) 'sl/ANY/IN' denied

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Tony Finch
sth...@nethelp.no wrote: > > Agree that you should be able to ignore them. But as a practical matter, > ignoring them *may* result in the question being asked again and again, > while REFUSED *may* stop the client from asking more. REFUSED leads to retries too: if the client is a legit resolver

Re: FW: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Alessandro Vesely
On Wed 14/Apr/2021 00:37:22 +0200 Richard T.A. Neal wrote: Julien Salort wrote: Reading this thread, I considered simply enabling the fail2ban named-refused jail, but they advise against it because it would end up blocking the victim rather than the attacker. I'm happy to be corrected by

Re: FW: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Jim Popovitch via bind-users
On Wed, 2021-04-14 at 08:07 +, Richard T.A. Neal wrote: > > Just out of interest, because I run some services on OVH, I know what > that term means. When you rent a dedicated server from OVH you are > assigned a single IPv4 address. Let's assume that you then want to use > VMware or Hyper-V

Re: No logging of failed queries

2021-04-14 Thread Gaurav Kansal
Hi Mark, Is there a way, by which we can log denied statement w.r.t. view somewhere in logging ? Regards, Gaurav On 14/04/21 1:48 am, ma...@isc.org wrote: Real world configurations would have a catch all view after the more specific views. Add one. -- Mark Andrews On 13 Apr 2021, at

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread sthaug
> I'm not talking of DNS *resolvers* here. I'm talking of authoritative > servers. If my authoritative server is authoritative for zones A, B and > C, then I should only get queries for those zones from legitimate > resolvers and clients. Queries for any other zones should *not* be > coming to my

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Ondřej Surý
Anand, I understand that this topic is something you feel passionate about, but alas, it’s more complicated than just dropping REFUSED answers. Any lame delegation would be then susceptible to cache poisoning. Also it would be a protocol violation. A small well-maintained authoritative server

FW: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Richard T.A. Neal
Paul Kosinksi wrote: > Interesting observation. I just did lookups on 4 recent (< 24 hrs ago) > 'sl/ANY/IN' queries logged by our BIND and got: > ...1 OVH Hosting IP (Montreal) > The whois info for the OVH IP contains the line: > Comment: Failover IPs Just out of interest, because I run some

Re: Preventing a particular type of nameserver abuse

2021-04-14 Thread Anand Buddhdev
On 14/04/2021 00:29, @lbutlr wrote: >> A legitimate client, following a normal chain of referrals, has *no* >> reason to query a server for zones it is not authoritative for. > > Well, that's not really true. A mobile user might have their device > configured to always check their corporate DNS