Re: DNSSEC: support for single keys?

2013-09-12 Thread Gilles Massen
On 09/12/2013 12:46 AM, Mark Andrews wrote: In message 523080dd.6010...@restena.lu, Gilles Massen writes: I'm seeing weird things (multiple RRSIGs when enabling NSEC3) so I'd like to know if these are likely to be bugs or if I'm in unchartered territory... Fixed in the next maintainence

DNSSEC: support for single keys?

2013-09-11 Thread Gilles Massen
Hi, Do you know if Bind with auto-dnssec maintain + inline-signing is supposed to work with a single key (i.e. not a KSK + ZSK)? I'm seeing weird things (multiple RRSIGs when enabling NSEC3) so I'd like to know if these are likely to be bugs or if I'm in unchartered territory... Gilles --

inline signing fails with A record

2013-04-25 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello, I have a weird issue with a zone configured with auto-dnssec maintain and inline-signing yes. The zone is maintaned with dynamic updates. If I add, say, a TXT record, it appears in the signed zone just fine. A records are ignored. They do appear in the unsigned zone just fine, but the

Adding foreign DNSKEY with inline-signing

2013-04-09 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello, I'd like to change the DNS operator for a signed domain, where the parent does not allow a DS that is not pointing to an active DNSKEY (thus the double-DS procedure won't work). As a result I'd need to insert the old DNSKEYs in the new zone. However, bind tries to do something with them,

Re: truncated responses vs. minimal-responses?

2012-12-03 Thread Gilles Massen
On 11/30/2012 01:30 PM, Matus UHLAR - fantomas wrote: On 28.11.12 18:38, Tony Finch wrote: Yes it does. For example, have a look at responses to queries for dotat.at in mx for various buffer sizes and observe that RRsets are dropped but the TC bit is not set. Nice to see. I'm seeing

Re: Exclude a domain from DNSSEC validation, like Unbound's domain-insecure.

2012-04-30 Thread Gilles Massen
On 30/4/12 13:56 , Chris Thompson wrote: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-livingood-negative-trust-anchors-01 Being actively discussed on DNSOP list It *was* being actively discussed there, up until about 10 days ago. Since then the participants seem to have stopped, maybe from sheer

Re: DNSSEC and CVE-2012-1033 (Ghost domain names)

2012-02-09 Thread Gilles Massen
On 9/2/12 21:38 , Casey Deccio wrote: Is it because the resolver, even if sticky, re-queries the parent when the negative TTL of the (missing) DS records ends? And chokes when it receives back a NXDOMAIN? Actually, what I have observed in my limited testing is that the

Re: bind makes RRSIG disappear?

2011-02-07 Thread Gilles Massen
Evan, Thanks for outlining this - it's much clearer now. BIND will try to maintain the signatures in a zone if the zone is configured to be dynamic--i.e, if it has an update-policy or allow-update option. It won't create signatures where there were none, but it will try to keep existing

bind makes RRSIG disappear?

2011-02-06 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello, I have a very peculiar behavior: a zone, signed by OpenDNSSEC and pushed to Bind 9.7.2-P3 by scp was working fine. But now, completely out of the blue, Bind decides to claim some authority over the zone: the SOA RRSIG (only that one) is scrapped, and this is logged: 06-Feb-2011

Re: bind makes RRSIG disappear?

2011-02-06 Thread Gilles Massen
Chris, thanks for the hint, but: On 6/2/11 19:20 , Chris Thompson wrote: On Feb 6 2011, Gilles Massen wrote: I have a very peculiar behavior: a zone, signed by OpenDNSSEC and pushed to Bind 9.7.2-P3 by scp was working fine. But now, completely out of the blue, Bind decides to claim some

Re: bind makes RRSIG disappear?

2011-02-06 Thread Gilles Massen
Mark, On 02/06/2011 10:41 PM, Mark Andrews wrote: Mark Andrews writes: Does your configuration also have an allow-update setting (other than none) for it, maybe only for the instance that is giving you trouble? In that case BIND will take it that you want it to do resigning as the RRSIGs

Re: . SOA: got insecure response

2010-07-23 Thread Gilles Massen
Finally I caught one query/server that produces the . SOA: got insecure response; parent indicates it should be secure log each time: dig @ns ladeco.com. MX does this every time, where ns runs bind 9.7.1-P2, with only the root TA configured. The server serving that domain returns not exactly

Re: . SOA: got insecure response

2010-07-22 Thread Gilles Massen
Mark, Named has to deal with multually incompatible senarios. DNSSEC which requires EDNS and nameservers and firewalls which drop EDNS requests so named has to turn off EDNS to get answers back. Occasionally a set of answers will take too long to get back to named or are lost due to network

. SOA: got insecure response

2010-07-21 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello, Since enabling the root TA in my resolver, I keep seeing from time to time: 21-Jul-2010 08:52:27.929 dnssec: debug 3: validating @0x134fe7e8: . SOA: attempting insecurity proof 21-Jul-2010 08:52:27.929 dnssec: debug 3: validating @0x134fe7e8: . SOA: insecurity proof failed 21-Jul-2010

Re: manage managed-keys?

2010-07-19 Thread Gilles Massen
Evan, Evan Hunt wrote: How do you manage managed-keys? BIND 9.7.2 will introduce a command rndc secroots that dumps a list of the current trust anchors for each view to a file. Thanks, good to know. To remove a key from managed-keys.bind, just remove the initial key for that name from

manage managed-keys?

2010-07-17 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello, How do you manage managed-keys? I there a way to ask bind which key (for a given zone) is actually in use? Or is there a possibility to get rid of a trust anchor that found it's way into managed-keys.bind (short of stopping bind and editing managed-keys.bind)? Best, Gilles -- Fondation

reason for expected covering NSEC3, got an exact match ?

2010-07-13 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello, I have a signed zone (dnssec.lu) with NSEC3 / no optout, signed through OpenDNSSEC. The zone contains a wildcard with a TXT and A record. Each time the server is queried for something where the QNAME is matched by the wildcard, but the QTYPE is not, named logs a warning: expected covering

Re: reason for expected covering NSEC3, got an exact match ?

2010-07-13 Thread Gilles Massen
Kalman Feher wrote: It looks like normal NSEC to me, unless you are referring to an isolated copy of the domain not accessible to the public: Yes, indeed, sorry about that. I should keep my playgrounds tidier. The actual zone is located on nssec.restena.lu, and is publicly queriable (even with

Re: reason for expected covering NSEC3, got an exact match ?

2010-07-13 Thread Gilles Massen
Kalman Feher wrote: Ok now I see it. The response appears ok, but the log entry is odd. I see the same on my test box (9.7.1 not patched to P1 yet). I saw this on earlier 9.7 as well. A brief thread on this occurred earlier in the year (archived here):

Re: bind says 'clocks are unsynchronized' but they are not

2010-07-08 Thread Gilles Massen
Hi Nico, Could it be that the signature of the AXFR message is created at request time on the master (actually when the answer is build), but the validation on the client side is obviously only made at the end of the transfer? The RFC2845 suggests that this is possible, but I'm not fluent enough

Re: return address for failed DNSSEC validation

2010-03-11 Thread Gilles Massen
Mark Andrews wrote: Obviously there are parallels to NXDOMAIN rewriting. However, the major difference I see is that NXDOMAIN is a clear message, known by the OSs and applications, that has basically one meaning. SERVFAIL is more like 'didn't work. go figure.' And the good thing is that

Re: return address for failed DNSSEC validation

2010-03-11 Thread Gilles Massen
Kevin Darcy wrote: The fundamental requirement is that the requestor needs to know that their query FAILED. When you send back a helpful, answerful response for a failure, either under NXDOMAIN redirection or your proposal, then you essentially deceive the client and confuse any

return address for failed DNSSEC validation

2010-03-10 Thread Gilles Massen
Hello all, If a the validation of a signed RR fails, the answer from the validating resolver to the requestor is SERVFAIL, if I understood correctly. To the average end user who isn't aware that DNS exists this translates to it's broken. Possibly even my ISP is broken if the neighbor's ISP does

Re: disable ipv6 in config?

2009-07-30 Thread Gilles Massen
Is there a way to prevent Bind (9.6) from using ipv6 transport for making queries, by an entry in the config file rather than by 'named -4'? Well, i think that is OS-specific issue than bind issue. At once, that was discussed in here, i remember. Ask to Mark. I don't think it's OS

Re: idsable ipv6 in config?

2009-07-30 Thread Gilles Massen
JINMEI Tatuya / 神明達哉 wrote: Is there a way to prevent Bind (9.6) from using ipv6 transport for making queries, by an entry in the config file rather than by 'named -4'? No. Ok, thanks. In that case I would humbly suggest to enhance the syntax of query-source[-6v] and transfer-source[-v6]

Re: idsable ipv6 in config?

2009-07-30 Thread Gilles Massen
JINMEI Tatuya / 神明達哉 wrote: Is there a way to prevent Bind (9.6) from using ipv6 transport for making queries, by an entry in the config file rather than by 'named -4'? No. Ok, thanks. In that case I would humbly suggest to enhance the syntax of query-source[-6v] and transfer-source[-v6]

Re: idsable ipv6 in config?

2009-07-30 Thread Gilles Massen
Mark Andrews wrote: -4 shuts down any v6 service. We would like BIND to be able to *reply* to v6 queries without *generating* them. (For the record, I have the same issue than Gilles.) ::/0 - NULL ULA::/48 - default router Would allow ula local traffic but catch the