Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-08 Thread Tony Finch
Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng. lkc...@ksu.edu wrote: On 2015-07-31 06:33, Tony Finch wrote: The DNSSEC records come from the zone data like any other records. You don't need any special DNSSEC configuration to act as a secondary for a signed zone - it just works. Is that the case now? I

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-07 Thread Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng.
On 2015-08-07 09:50, Heiko Richter wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Am 07.08.2015 um 07:16 schrieb Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng.: On 2015-08-06 19:26, Heiko Richter wrote: Though back then I was still building bind 32-bit, and the hardware as much slower. A full signing

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-07 Thread Heiko Richter
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Am 07.08.2015 um 07:16 schrieb Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng.: On 2015-08-06 19:26, Heiko Richter wrote: Though back then I was still building bind 32-bit, and the hardware as much slower. A full signing was more than 10x longer than our current

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng.
On 2015-08-06 19:26, Heiko Richter wrote: Though back then I was still building bind 32-bit, and the hardware as much slower. A full signing was more than 10x longer than our current hardwarewhich can get it done in just under a minute. (usually) The need for speed is some people expect

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Casey Deccio
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 7:55 PM, Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng. lkc...@ksu.edu wrote: Ok, so way back thenthey were running servers that didn't support NSEC3 RRs and it had nothing to do with what algorithm we were using5 for RSASHA1 or 7 for RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1. DNSSEC introduces: new

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Carl Byington
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 2015-08-07 at 02:46 +0200, Heiko Richter wrote: Sadly automated KSK rollover isn't supported by most registrars, Yes, but I only need one registrar to support it :) I have python code that uses the gkg.net API to do automated KSK generation

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Heiko Richter
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Am 07.08.2015 um 03:36 schrieb Carl Byington: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, 2015-08-07 at 02:46 +0200, Heiko Richter wrote: Sadly automated KSK rollover isn't supported by most registrars, Yes, but I only need one

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Heiko Richter
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Am 07.08.2015 um 01:55 schrieb Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng.: On 2015-08-06 17:54, Heiko Richter wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Am 07.08.2015 um 00:23 schrieb Lawrence K. Chen, P.Eng.: On 2015-07-31 06:33, Tony Finch

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Dave Warren
On 2015-08-06 17:26, Heiko Richter wrote: Root is signed with RSASHA256 at the moment. There is no sence in having a more secure algorithm because anybody who can't crack that algorithm may just attack the weakest link in the chain above you. This only holds while assuming similar key rotation

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-08-06 Thread Heiko Richter
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Am 07.08.2015 um 02:35 schrieb Dave Warren: On 2015-08-06 17:26, Heiko Richter wrote: Root is signed with RSASHA256 at the moment. There is no sence in having a more secure algorithm because anybody who can't crack that algorithm may just attack

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-31 Thread David Newman
On 7/31/15 4:33 AM, Tony Finch wrote: David Newman dnew...@networktest.com wrote: On 7/30/15 10:37 AM, Evan Hunt wrote: On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:30:33AM -0700, David Newman wrote: Hidden primary (not authoritative for this zone): Key still in zone I think what you mean here is that the

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-30 Thread David Newman
On 7/30/15 10:37 AM, Evan Hunt wrote: On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:30:33AM -0700, David Newman wrote: After that second procedure (and also chown'ing the keyfiles to the bind user), the command 'dig +dnssec +multi dnskey example.com' gives different results depending on which nameserver gets the

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-30 Thread Evan Hunt
On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 07:29:29PM -0700, David Newman wrote: It's a static zone. The zone file did not have the key in it. ... oh, it's inline-signing. Unfortunately, by its nature, inline-signing gives you less direct control over the signed side of the zone. There are two ways you can go

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-30 Thread David Newman
On 7/30/15 9:06 AM, Evan Hunt wrote: On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 07:29:29PM -0700, David Newman wrote: It's a static zone. The zone file did not have the key in it. ... oh, it's inline-signing. Sorry, I also didn't mention that this is a hidden primary server, which may be relevant below...

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-30 Thread Evan Hunt
On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 10:30:33AM -0700, David Newman wrote: After that second procedure (and also chown'ing the keyfiles to the bind user), the command 'dig +dnssec +multi dnskey example.com' gives different results depending on which nameserver gets the query: Hidden primary (not

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-29 Thread Evan Hunt
On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 05:56:20PM -0700, David Newman wrote: 29-Jul-2015 17:18:19.439 general: warning: dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset: error reading private key file example.com/RSASHA256/36114: file not found Delete that key from the DNSKEY rrset in the zone and reload. If it's a dynamic

Re: do not stupidly delete ZSK files

2015-07-29 Thread David Newman
On 7/29/15 6:24 PM, Evan Hunt wrote: On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 05:56:20PM -0700, David Newman wrote: 29-Jul-2015 17:18:19.439 general: warning: dns_dnssec_keylistfromrdataset: error reading private key file example.com/RSASHA256/36114: file not found Delete that key from the DNSKEY rrset in