Re: How to Setup a Name Servers visible on Internet?

2011-06-16 Thread Eric Kom
Good Morning all,


I changed some settings in my zones data files but still have a same
complaints: has 0 SOA records, has no NS records and not loaded due to
errors.

please see below my zone files:

File: /var/cache/bind/metropolitanbuntu.co.za

;$ORIGIN metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
$TTL 3H
metropolitanbuntu.co.za.IN  SOA
ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.postmaster.metropolitanbuntu.co.za. (
3   ; serial
8H  ; refresh
2H  ; retry
4W  ; expire
1D) ; default_TTL
;
metropolitanbuntu.co.za.IN  NS
ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
metropolitanbuntu.co.za.IN  NS
ns2.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
;
metropolitanbuntu.co.za.IN  MX  10
mail.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
;
metropolitanbuntu.co.za.IN  TXT "Metropolitan College
DNS Server."
;
localhost   IN  A   127.0.0.1
ns1 IN  A   41.134.194.90
ns2 IN  A   41.134.194.91
ns1 IN  A   10.0.0.80
ns2 IN  A   10.0.0.82
www IN  A   10.0.0.81
www IN  A   10.0.0.82
mailIN  A   10.0.0.84
backup  IN  A   10.0.0.102
;
ftp IN  CNAME   www
img IN  CNAME   www
*   IN  CNAME   www
imapIN  CNAME   mail
pop IN  CNAME   mail
pop3IN  CNAME   mail
smtpIN  CNAME   mail

 File: /var/cache/bind/0.0.10.in-addr.arpa


$TTL 38400
0.0.10.in-addr.arpa.IN  SOA ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
postmaster.metropolitanbuntu.co.za. (
3   ; serial
8H  ; refresh
2H  ; retry
4W  ; expire
1D) ; default_TTL
;
0.0.10.in-addr.arpa.IN  NS  ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
0.0.10.in-addr.arpa.IN  NS  ns2.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
;
80  IN  PTR ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
82  IN  PTR ns2.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
81  IN  PTR www.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
102 IN  PTR backup.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
108 IN  PTR printer-server.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
31  IN  PTR ldap.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.

File: /var/cache/bind/194.134.41.in-addr.arpa

$TTL 38400
194.134.41.in-addr.arpa.IN  SOA
ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.postmaster.metropolitanbuntu.co.za. (
3   ; serial
3600; refresh
900 ; retry
1209600 ; expire
43200)  ; default_TTL
;
194.134.41.in-addr.arpa.IN  NS  ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
194.134.41.in-addr.arpa.IN  NS  ns2.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
;
90  IN  PTR ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
91  IN  PTR ns2.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.


Thanks in advance

On 14/06/2011 19:18, Mark Elkins wrote:
> Eric,
> 
> Did you know that UniForum SA (the CO.ZA administrators) provide free
> DNS classes for people that live in South Africa? (Intro and Advanced).
> 
> So you'd need to get over to Johannesburg and/or Cape Town and pay for
> some accommodation - but the courses are free. You can see and book for
> the courses via the CO.ZA Web site. Courses are run twice a year.
> 
> 
> On Tue, 2011-06-14 at 14:25 +0200, eric...@kom.za.net wrote:
>> On 14/06/2011 10:15, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jun 14, 2011 at 09:58:36AM +0200,
>>>  eric...@kom.za.net  wrote
>>>  a message of 80 lines which said:
>>>
 sorry for that, please see below the content for my reverse file 
 data:

 File: /var/cache/bind/metropolitanbntu.co.za.inv:
>>> ...
 41.134.194.90.  IN  PTR ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
>>>
>>> Then, BIND is perfectly right, 41.134.194.90 does not belong to
>>> 0.0.10.in-addr.arpa...
>>>
 10.0.0.80.  IN  PTR ns1.metropolitanbuntu.co.za.
>>>
>>> More subtle here: you should have learn about PTR records before
>>> trying it (may I suggest Liu & Albitz' book?) 10.0.0.80 should have
>>> been written just 80 (thus forming the name 80.0.0.10.in-addr.arpa).
>>>
>> Thank you in advance!
>>
>> I order the book and waiting for the delivery,
>>
>> I also fund a PDF copy on internet.
>>
> [outputs deleted]
> 


-- 
Your Truly

Eric Kom

2 Hennie Van Till, White River, 1240
eric...@kom.za.net | eric...@namekom.co.za | eric...@erickom.co.za
www.kom.za.net | www.kom.za.org | www.erickom.co.za

Key fingerprint: 513E E91A C243 3020 8735 09BB 2DBC 5AD7 A9DA 1EF5


0xA9DA1EF5.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys


signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP di

Re: question about thehartford.com domain

2011-06-16 Thread Mark Andrews

In message <4dfa62ca.7060...@gmail.com>, David Sparro writes:
> On 6/15/2011 7:41 PM, M. Meadows wrote:
> >
> > The DNS admins at thehartford.com seem to feel that this nameserver
> > mismatch is working as expected.
> >
> > So I'm just wondering if anyone still feels that the nameserver mismatch
> > seen with the digs in earlier parts of this email thread may present a
> > problem to servers requesting name resolution for address records in the
> > "thehartford.com" domain.
> >
> 
> It will be fine as long as nothing goes wrong.  It may not be as robust 
> as they think it is because it means that depending on the state of my 
> cache, I may need to be able to get an answer from one of NS1 or NS2 
> *AND* one of hfdns3, hfdns4, simns3, or simns4 simultaneously.
> This creates an additional potential point of failure.

The last sentence of this paragraph from RFC 1034 was not written
for no reason.  Registries and registrants need to obey it.  It is
not optional and failure to do so causes operational problems.

As the last installation step, the delegation NS RRs and
glue RRs necessary to make the delegation effective should
be added to the parent zone.  The administrators of both
zones should insure that the NS and glue RRs which mark
both sides of the cut are consistent and remain so.

COM is being negligent by not ensuring that these checks get performed
and mis-matches get corrected.  The current COM operators took over
operations well after RFC 1034 was written.  They have no excuse for
not doing this regardless of the costs.  We shouldn't have to pay for
their lack of due diligence.

Mark

> -- 
> Dave
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Re: question about thehartford.com domain

2011-06-16 Thread Kevin Darcy


On 6/15/2011 7:41 PM, M. Meadows wrote:


The DNS admins at thehartford.com seem to feel that this nameserver 
mismatch is working as expected. Here's some of the feedback we 
received from them when we questioned the setup:


~

We use load balancers for the majority of our internet facing URLs. We 
have multiple datacenters. We typically have our URLs defined in 
multiple datacenters. Each datacenter has a pair of redundant load 
balancers. Typically each URL we have is defined in each datacenter 
with its own address. The active load balancer in a particular 
datacenter 'owns' one of the NS servers you see when you lookup our 
authoritative name servers, ie: ns1 or ns2.thehartford.com. There is 
a 'floating' address shared between the active and failover load 
balancers that is associated with ns1 or ns2.thehartford.com.


hfdns3, hfdns4, simns3, simns4 are the addresses for the specific bind 
processes running on the actual physical devices.


NS1.thehartford.com will be shared between hfdns3 and hfdns4. 
NS2.thehartford.com between the simns3 and simns4 name servers.


~

So I'm just wondering if anyone still feels that the nameserver 
mismatch seen with the digs in earlier parts of this email thread may 
present a problem to servers requesting name resolution for address 
records in the "thehartford.com" domain.


Do they understand that the in-zone NS records *override* the delegation 
NS records (see RFC 2181) when seen, so they're forcing the rest of the 
Internet to refresh all 8 records (4 NSes and 4 As) potentially as often 
as every 120 seconds? That seems rather inconsiderate.


Also, what's the point of having load-balancer VIPs in your delegation 
records, if they're just going to be overwritten, in cache, with the 
real IPs of the BIND processes anyway? Are they really getting their 
money's worth from those load-balancers, which aren't used most of the 
time for this particular function?


Load-balancer or no load-balancer, I think the Best Practice of "Under 
normal circumstances, your delegation records should match your in-zone 
records" still applies here. The only exception to that general rule is 
when you're migrating from one set of nameservers to another.




- Kevin

From: sun-g...@live.com
To: mich...@rancid.berkeley.edu
Subject: RE: question about thehartford.com domain
Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2011 12:59:32 -0400
CC: bind-users@lists.isc.org


Just wanted to say thanks to everyone for the quick feedback!
We appreciate your assistance on this.

Marty



> Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2011 08:25:00 -0700
> From: mich...@rancid.berkeley.edu
> To: sun-g...@live.com
> CC: bind-users@lists.isc.org
> Subject: Re: question about thehartford.com domain
>
>
>
> On Wed, 15 Jun 2011, M. Meadows wrote:
>
> > Question : our check of whois indicates that ns1.thehartford.com 
and ns2.thehartford.com are
> > the authoritative nameservers for thehartford.com. A dig with a 
+trace for
> > eftc.thehartford.com seems to indicate that they are indeed the 
auth nameservers. It?s
> > interesting, though, that an 
http://www.kloth.net/services/nslookup.php lookup for
> > thehartford.com query for NS records shows a non-authoritative 
answer of
> > hfdns3.thehartford.com, hfdns4.thehartford.com, 
simns3.thehartford.com, simns3.thehartford.com

> > and simns4.thehartford.com. We?re unsure what?s going on with that.
>
> Instead of doing 'dig +trace eftc.thehartford.com', do 'dig +trace ns
> thehartford.com', and you'll see the problem.
>
> This is a classic authority mismatch, as others have pointed out.
>
> michael
>

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Re: question about thehartford.com domain

2011-06-16 Thread David Sparro

On 6/15/2011 7:41 PM, M. Meadows wrote:


The DNS admins at thehartford.com seem to feel that this nameserver
mismatch is working as expected.

So I'm just wondering if anyone still feels that the nameserver mismatch
seen with the digs in earlier parts of this email thread may present a
problem to servers requesting name resolution for address records in the
"thehartford.com" domain.



It will be fine as long as nothing goes wrong.  It may not be as robust 
as they think it is because it means that depending on the state of my 
cache, I may need to be able to get an answer from one of NS1 or NS2 
*AND* one of hfdns3, hfdns4, simns3, or simns4 simultaneously.

This creates an additional potential point of failure.

--
Dave
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Re: ksk in a volume

2011-06-16 Thread Tony Finch
Niobos  wrote:
>
> However, I don't see any security-benefits in this scenario: If the attacker
> gets hold of the credentials to update the zone dynamically, he can do so in
> both cases (KSK online or offline). If your server is compromised, he can
> add/remove records in both cases. In case of ZSK compromise, you can
> generate&sign new ZSKs in both cases. In case of KSK compromise, you generate
> new KSKs and upload them to the parent. The only difference is that in the
> offline case, KSK compromise is a little less likely.

Getting the DS in the parent updated is much more difficult than a crash
ZSK rollover. The reason for protecting the KSK more than the ZSK is to
avoid the pain of having to deal with someone else in case of compromise.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finchhttp://dotat.at/
Shannon, Rockall: South or southwest 5 to 7. Rough or very rough, occasionally
high for a time. Rain or showers. Moderate or good.
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Re: ksk in a volume

2011-06-16 Thread Niobos

On 2011-06-15 15:51, Noel Rocha wrote:

In this situation:
- KSK signed ZSK(DNSKEY RR).
- ZSK signing others RR of zone.

I don't see reason for the KSK be present in operations unless
add/delete RR DNSKEY.
I had the same idea roughly a year ago. And while you're right, it 
doesn't change much in practice. I'll explain my case, and assume it 
applies to you as well.


Since you allow dynamic updates, the ZSKs need to be online. I think we 
can all agree on this.
In theory, you could still sign the ZSKs "manually" with the KSK once 
not-too-often and keep the KSK offline in between. You believe this 
makes your zone more secure.


However, I don't see any security-benefits in this scenario: If the 
attacker gets hold of the credentials to update the zone dynamically, he 
can do so in both cases (KSK online or offline). If your server is 
compromised, he can add/remove records in both cases. In case of ZSK 
compromise, you can generate&sign new ZSKs in both cases. In case of KSK 
compromise, you generate new KSKs and upload them to the parent. The 
only difference is that in the offline case, KSK compromise is a little 
less likely.


So in the end, I decided to leave my KSK online and have BIND 
automatically perform ZSK rollovers for me (KSKs are needed for this, 
although you could pre-calculate all needed RRSIGs during all stages of 
the rollover if you really want to)


Greets,
Niobos

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