Re: getting a later-version of BIND on various linux OS's
oops - sorry - I totally missed THIS page: https://packages.debian.org/sid/amd64/bind9/download ...so it seems that there is a way. Still, I'm getting weird errors about: E: The repository 'http://ftp.debian.org/debian sig Release' does not have a Release file. N: Updating from such a repository can't be done securely, and is therefore disabled by default. ...but I'll work through those and ask a follow-up if I get stuck. Sorry for the noise - I can't believe I missed that extra page. Rob McEwen On 11/9/2020 2:18 AM, Rob McEwen wrote: Several weeks ago, Mark Andrews gave me an excellent suggestion about a particular BIND feature, but it is a somewhat recent feature that started to exist on a version of BIND that isn't yet distributed in the default/main BIND distributions for many of the most common linux-based operating systems. I think the particular feature that was mentioned - came into existence around BIND 9.13? Unfortunately, many of the major linux operating systems haven't reached 9.13 yet. So, for example, I'm currently trying to upgrade a Debian server to a more recent version of BIND - 9.16 - and I saw the following pages: https://packages.debian.org/sid/bind9 https://www.isc.org/blogs/bind-9-packages/ But I can't seem to find any simple way to do this - or maybe I missed something on that page? - from what I've seen, for Debian, it requires that the BIND source code (and various dependencies) be downloaded, and then BIND has to be compiled. Or so it seems. I tried that, but kept running into errors - something about "Libressl not found" - even though I really did already have the SSL package installed that it said it needed. It was a downward-spiral mess I couldn't seem to resolve. So here is the question - is there an */easier/simpler/* way to get the most common linux operating systems (Debian, Ubuntu, CentOs, etc) - to a later version of BIND - beyond what auto-installs when you issue a command like "apt-get install bind9" - but /without/ having to download and compile the source code? -- Rob McEwen, invaluement ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list ISC funds the development of this software with paid support subscriptions. Contact us at https://www.isc.org/contact/ for more information. bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users -- Rob McEwen https://www.invaluement.com +1 (478) 475-9032 ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list ISC funds the development of this software with paid support subscriptions. Contact us at https://www.isc.org/contact/ for more information. bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
getting a later-version of BIND on various linux OS's
Several weeks ago, Mark Andrews gave me an excellent suggestion about a particular BIND feature, but it is a somewhat recent feature that started to exist on a version of BIND that isn't yet distributed in the default/main BIND distributions for many of the most common linux-based operating systems. I think the particular feature that was mentioned - came into existence around BIND 9.13? Unfortunately, many of the major linux operating systems haven't reached 9.13 yet. So, for example, I'm currently trying to upgrade a Debian server to a more recent version of BIND - 9.16 - and I saw the following pages: https://packages.debian.org/sid/bind9 https://www.isc.org/blogs/bind-9-packages/ But I can't seem to find any simple way to do this - or maybe I missed something on that page? - from what I've seen, for Debian, it requires that the BIND source code (and various dependencies) be downloaded, and then BIND has to be compiled. Or so it seems. I tried that, but kept running into errors - something about "Libressl not found" - even though I really did already have the SSL package installed that it said it needed. It was a downward-spiral mess I couldn't seem to resolve. So here is the question - is there an */easier/simpler/* way to get the most common linux operating systems (Debian, Ubuntu, CentOs, etc) - to a later version of BIND - beyond what auto-installs when you issue a command like "apt-get install bind9" - but /without/ having to download and compile the source code? -- Rob McEwen, invaluement ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list ISC funds the development of this software with paid support subscriptions. Contact us at https://www.isc.org/contact/ for more information. bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: rbldnsd and DNSSEC compatibility issues - any suggestions?
On 9/11/2020 2:46 AM, Mark Andrews wrote: validate-except (I typo’d it the second time, unfortunately expect and except are both valid words). I got so far down the rabbit trail with your other points, somehow I missed that. Thanks. This should solve my problem! If you actually used a zone names with a DNAME Great suggestion! I didn't know about that. However, since i use CloudFlare' DNS for my authoritative DNS - which is critical for prevention of DDOS attacks - and they don't actually support DNAME, my hands are tied. (or so it SEEMS - see my question about a possible workaround at the end of this email) My actual direct query service involves my own rbldnsd servers in 42 cities around the world (all hiding behind secret host names that a criminal couldn't easily find) - and those are pointed to by NS records in my CloudFlare DNS, so then the actual direct DNS queries, and the vast majority of my DNS traffic for direct queries to my own DNSBL, goes to those 42 servers around the world, NOT to CloudFlare - but CloudFlare is the starting point - the first query goes to CloudFlare, then the DNS server doing the asking "knows" for a while to use one of my own servers, and not bother CloudFlare with any more traffic for a while. (again, this is for my direct query service - for my smaller subscribers - my servers can handle THAT traffic) But since CloudFlare is the authoritative server for invaluement.com, that is where the DNAME you're suggesting would need to be setup. Since they don't support that, I'm not able to implement that at this time. SEE: https://community.cloudflare.com/t/dname-records-on-cloudflare/16642/4 ...also, them not supporting it - makes me a little nervous about others not supporting it. But maybe that fear is unreasonable since it is only the "revolvers" that need this feature, not authoritative-only services? This is something that DNS caching servers like BIND, have been supporting for decades, correct? Please tell don't tell me that _only_ a very _recent_ version of BIND does this correctly. ;) That would probably kill this idea! *POSSIBLE WORKAROUND?:* So assuming that DNAME is widely supported by many DNS caching servers, old and new... I wonder if I could do something similar to what I do for my direct query service, using NS records to delegate this to another BIND DNS server that I would run on my own server - so for "example.invaluement.com" - I'd create a BIND instance on my own server hosting "example.invaluement.com" as the authoritative server for that zone, implementing the DNAME records you suggested. Then put a NS record on my cloudflare telling the world that THIS server is the authoritative server for "example.invaluement.com" (with TTL for some hours). Do you think that would work? -- Rob McEwen https://www.invaluement.com +1 (478) 475-9032 ___ Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe from this list ISC funds the development of this software with paid support subscriptions. Contact us at https://www.isc.org/contact/ for more information. bind-users mailing list bind-users@lists.isc.org https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
Re: rbldnsd and DNSSEC compatibility issues - any suggestions?
Mark,
You gave me the "let them eat cake" answer I anticipated. Also, this
isn't fixing a problem that my services produce - it is preventing a
problem that a potential MISTAKE from a large customer would cause - the
type of mistake that is inevitable at some point, but likely
short-lived. That's on them, not me. But I can sleep well at night
knowing that such MISuse of my service isn't going to take out an entire
datacenter for hours (with MANY innocent bystanders taken out, too!)
with a DOS attack due to those queries NOT ending with a valid/public
domain name, thus making such an attack impossible. (again, just
referring to our very largest customers' DNSBL queries).
I did a search for "bind9 validate-expect named.conf" (but not in
quotes) - and shockingly LITTLE came up that specifically references
that - pages came up regarding everything else under the sun involving
BIND, but I didn't see anything specifically about that. Do you have a
link for that? I'll try to research that more to try to figure out what
exactly you were suggesting.
Rob McEwen
On 9/11/2020 1:32 AM, Mark Andrews wrote:
On 11 Sep 2020, at 15:04, Rob McEwen wrote:
Mark,
The whole usage of DNS by the anti-spam industry in our DNSBLs - is somewhat a
hack on the DNS system from the start - I guess if you think that is wrong,
maybe you should take that up with Paul Vixie?
And Paul will tell you to use a name you control. We did that with
DLV.ISC.ORG. We are still absorbing that traffic despite there being no
entries in the zone for several years now. We knew we would have to do that
going in.
And the whole purpose for MANY of us DNSBLs using ".local" in the first place - was precisely to PREVENT the queries from possibly leaking out of our
largest customers LANs - because in many cases, that would an essential denial of service attack against us (and our hosters, etc). For example, some DNSBL
customers literally have a billion mailboxes. I have a couple of customers with a few hundreds million mailboxes. I'm pretty sure Spamhaus has a few with a
billion. Do you have any idea how many emails are processed per second for a billion mailboxes? (especially mid-morning during a business day!) It's enough to
where it takes multiple rbldnsd servers each serving thousands of queries per second. To keep up with that volume, these MUST be locally-hosted rbldsnd
servers. In that situation, if/when there is a slight DNS mistake - such as some software update mistakenly rerouting DNS to something like "8.8.8.8"
- as OFTEN (stupidly!) happens - and then, in the case of Spamhaus' customers with a billion mailboxes - that traffic will massively hit both Google and
"spamhaus.org" DNS servers - or even if the forwarder got deleted mistakenly, the same will still happen for "spamhaus.org" DNS servers.
Even if those servers can handle the traffic - it might overwhelm a local router in between, or overwhelm the particular DNS server to which this traffic is
assigned. This then turns into a NIGHTMARE DOS attack for such DNSBLs. Therefore, the ENTIRE point of using such zone names (".local",
".dnsbl", etc) internally - is to PREVENT the queries from possibly ever leaving the LAN. That is why, for these largest customers, using hostnames
that end in our own domain names - is not an option. (and when it does work, it is often a "let them eat cake" option - where only the largest
Internet companies with billions in revenue - can afford to handle such traffic - so please, don't respond with a "let them eat cake" answer!) But
that overall point about how DNSBLs work in such situations... seems lost on you.
The very reason I used ".dnsbl" as an example - is because I did a little research after before last email - and it
turns out that - maybe in response to the RFC you pointed out that took a position against using ".local" - Spamhaus
then (apparently) switched to using ".dnsbl" - (or maybe they were using ".dnsbl" all along? - I can't keep
track over every other DNSBL - but ".local" was popular for many DNSBLs for many years.) Spamhaus doesn't use that for
their direct query service - but it appears that they're using that for the instructions for their customers who RSYNC the data.
Therefore, you just harshly criticized me for suggesting doing what Spamhaus ALREADY does - so I guess I'm in good company!
Two wrongs don’t make a right. If you think queries will leak then provision
services to absorb those leaks. The root operators shouldn’t have to absorb
that traffic. RFC 1918 DNS traffic leaked and services where stood up to
absorb that leaking traffic. There is nothing stopping you from doing
something similar. Absolutely nothing.
Really - your purism - and harsh realities of large DSNBL operations - are not
compatible.
No, its taking ownership o
Re: rbldnsd and DNSSEC compatibility issues - any suggestions?
Mark,
The whole usage of DNS by the anti-spam industry in our DNSBLs - is
somewhat a hack on the DNS system from the start - I guess if you think
that is wrong, maybe you should take that up with Paul Vixie?
And the whole purpose for MANY of us DNSBLs using ".local" in the first
place - was precisely to PREVENT the queries from possibly leaking out
of our largest customers LANs - because in many cases, that would an
essential denial of service attack against us (and our hosters, etc).
For example, some DNSBL customers literally have a billion mailboxes. I
have a couple of customers with a few hundreds million mailboxes. I'm
pretty sure Spamhaus has a few with a billion. Do you have any idea how
many emails are processed per second for a billion mailboxes?
(especially mid-morning during a business day!) It's enough to where it
takes multiple rbldnsd servers each serving thousands of queries per
second. To keep up with that volume, these MUST be locally-hosted
rbldsnd servers. In that situation, if/when there is a slight DNS
mistake - such as some software update mistakenly rerouting DNS to
something like "8.8.8.8" - as OFTEN (stupidly!) happens - and then, in
the case of Spamhaus' customers with a billion mailboxes - that traffic
will massively hit both Google and "spamhaus.org" DNS servers - or even
if the forwarder got deleted mistakenly, the same will still happen for
"spamhaus.org" DNS servers. Even if those servers can handle the traffic
- it might overwhelm a local router in between, or overwhelm the
particular DNS server to which this traffic is assigned. This then turns
into a NIGHTMARE DOS attack for such DNSBLs. Therefore, the ENTIRE point
of using such zone names (".local", ".dnsbl", etc) internally - is to
PREVENT the queries from possibly ever leaving the LAN. That is why, for
these largest customers, using hostnames that end in our own domain
names - is not an option. (and when it does work, it is often a "let
them eat cake" option - where only the largest Internet companies with
billions in revenue - can afford to handle such traffic - so please,
don't respond with a "let them eat cake" answer!) But that overall point
about how DNSBLs work in such situations... seems lost on you.
The very reason I used ".dnsbl" as an example - is because I did a
little research after before last email - and it turns out that - maybe
in response to the RFC you pointed out that took a position against
using ".local" - Spamhaus then (apparently) switched to using ".dnsbl" -
(or maybe they were using ".dnsbl" all along? - I can't keep track over
every other DNSBL - but ".local" was popular for many DNSBLs for many
years.) Spamhaus doesn't use that for their direct query service - but
it appears that they're using that for the instructions for their
customers who RSYNC the data. Therefore, you just harshly criticized me
for suggesting doing what Spamhaus ALREADY does - so I guess I'm in good
company!
Really - your purism - and harsh realities of large DSNBL operations -
are not compatible.
And no - you NEVER gave me an answer - and guess what? While I have
tremendous respect for RFCs in general, and try hard to follow them -
they are NOT perfect - on rare occasion, some of them SHOULD be broken
and DO have errors or situations that they didn't anticipate. This one
of those. RFCs were written by humans. Humans make mistakes.
And it's too bad that the maintainers of BIND didn't anticipate that
there might be local-data situations where sys admins should be given
the ability to turn DNSSEC off for a particular zone. Your answers are
helping me to understand HOW/WHY such decisions were made. But
rigidity/purity doesn't always equal wisdom/intelligence. In this case,
it doesn't.
Rob McEwen, invaluement
On 9/10/2020 10:23 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
On 11 Sep 2020, at 11:13, Rob McEwen wrote:
Mark,
Most invaluement subscribers do direct queries - to hostnames that end with my
own valid domain names that don't have this DNSSEC issue - those are the ONE
ones that make use of public DNS and are broadcast across the internet.
Our usage of ".local" zones for those who are RSYNC'ing our data - dates back to something like
2007, and the RFC you referred to is from 2013. By the time this RFC had been published, we'd already had
customer using the ".local" for 6 years. At the time that came out in 2013, I assessed whether I
needed to get my clients to change that, but it didn't seem to effect anyone. Again, those of our subscribers
who RSYNC our data and use the ".local" zone names - are just using that for 100% local usage, and
are not trying to broadcast it across the internet. And in many of THOSE cases, if the BIND and RBLDND are on
the same computer, as is often the case, it doesn't even
Re: rbldnsd and DNSSEC compatibility issues - any suggestions?
Mark,
Most invaluement subscribers do direct queries - to hostnames that end
with my own valid domain names that don't have this DNSSEC issue - those
are the ONE ones that make use of public DNS and are broadcast across
the internet.
Our usage of ".local" zones for those who are RSYNC'ing our data - dates
back to something like 2007, and the RFC you referred to is from 2013.
By the time this RFC had been published, we'd already had customer using
the ".local" for 6 years. At the time that came out in 2013, I assessed
whether I needed to get my clients to change that, but it didn't seem to
effect anyone. Again, those of our subscribers who RSYNC our data and
use the ".local" zone names - are just using that for 100% local usage,
and are not trying to broadcast it across the internet. And in many of
THOSE cases, if the BIND and RBLDND are on the same computer, as is
often the case, it doesn't even go out to the LAN - this is all on one
single computer.
So are you claiming that if I simply changed the zone naming form ending
in ".local" - to something else - such as ".dnsbl" - then all my
problems would go away? And the forwarder will start working? (even
though rbldnsd doesn't do DNSSEC)
That would be EXCELLENT news! Or, if that doesn't actually fix my
problem, do you have any suggestions that actually address my actual
question?
Rob McEwen
On 9/10/2020 7:37 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
.local is for mDNS (RFC 6762). Do not use it for other purposes as you are
hijacking the namespace.
The best solution is to NOT change the name of the zones from those that you
use publicly. That way they have the correct DNSSEC chain of trust down from
the root. If you want to use different zone names then create delegations to
empty unsigned zones (SOA and NS records only) like those done for
10.IN-ADDR.ARPA in a zone you control. That breaks the DNSSEC chain of trust
at the delegation point. If you later decide you want to sign these zones you
can do so and link them into the DNSSEC chain of trust. Just sign both the
rbldsnd-formatted files and the empty zones.
If you absolutely must continue to hijack the .local namespace, which is
allocated for a different purpose, then add validate-except entries to
named.conf
Mark
On 11 Sep 2020, at 01:56, Rob McEwen wrote:
I manage an anti-spam DNSBL and I've been running into an issue in recent years
- that I'm FINALLY getting around to asking about. I just joined this list to
ask this question. Also, I checked the archives, but couldn't find an answer -
at least, not one I understood.
So basically, while most of our users do direct queries and don't have this issue - some
of our larger subscribers RSYNC the rbldsnd-formatted files, and then they typically run
rbldnsd on the same server as their BIND server that is answering their DNSBL queries.
Then, their invaluement zone names will all end with "invaluement.local".
Typically, their RBLDNSD server is set up to listen on 127.0.0.2 - and then they use BIND
for answering their DNSBL queries, and so they tell BIND to get its answers for THOSE
invaluement dnsbl queries by doing a DNS forwarder, telling bind to get the answers for
THOSE zones from 127.0.0.2 - as shown below:
zone "invaluement.local" in {
type forward;
forward only;
forwarders { 127.0.0.2; };
};
This works perfectly - so long as DNSSEC is turned off. And since most of our
subscribers are running a dedicated instance of BIND that is ONLY used for
DNSBL queries, they don't mind turning DNSSEC off.
But, occasionally, we have a customer who cannot turn DNSSEC off. So I was
hoping that THIS command would work:
dnssec-must-be-secure "invaluement.local" no;
But it doesn't seem to be helping at all. Is that command suppose to disable DNSSEC checking for a
particular zone? If yes, what did I do wrong? If not, what does "dnssec-must-be-secure"
set to "no" do?
I've heard that there is NOT a way to get this to work - and that such
subscribers much use DNS Delegation, instead. But I really wish this
could be done by simply turning off DNSSEC for a particular zone. That could be
useful for MANY various types of internal zones that need this. But if this is
that case, how would that DNS Delegation look, to get the above forwarding
example to work using delegation instead?
Thanks in advance for your help!
--
Rob McEwen, invaluement
___
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--
Rob McEwen
https://www.invaluement.com
+1 (478) 475-9032
__
rbldnsd and DNSSEC compatibility issues - any suggestions?
I manage an anti-spam DNSBL and I've been running into an issue in
recent years - that I'm FINALLY getting around to asking about. I just
joined this list to ask this question. Also, I checked the archives, but
couldn't find an answer - at least, not one I understood.
So basically, while most of our users do direct queries and don't have
this issue - some of our larger subscribers RSYNC the rbldsnd-formatted
files, and then they typically run rbldnsd on the same server as their
BIND server that is answering their DNSBL queries. Then, their
invaluement zone names will all end with "invaluement.local". Typically,
their RBLDNSD server is set up to listen on 127.0.0.2 - and then they
use BIND for answering their DNSBL queries, and so they tell BIND to get
its answers for THOSE invaluement dnsbl queries by doing a DNS
forwarder, telling bind to get the answers for THOSE zones from
127.0.0.2 - as shown below:
zone "invaluement.local" in {
type forward;
forward only;
forwarders { 127.0.0.2; };
};
This works perfectly - so long as DNSSEC is turned off. And since most
of our subscribers are running a dedicated instance of BIND that is ONLY
used for DNSBL queries, they don't mind turning DNSSEC off.
But, occasionally, we have a customer who cannot turn DNSSEC off. So I
was hoping that THIS command would work:
dnssec-must-be-secure "invaluement.local" no;
But it doesn't seem to be helping at all. Is that command suppose to
disable DNSSEC checking for a particular zone? If yes, what did I do
wrong? If not, what /does/ "dnssec-must-be-secure" set to "no" do?
I've heard that there is NOT a way to get this to work - and that such
subscribers much use DNS Delegation, instead. But I really wish this
could be done by simply turning off DNSSEC for a /particular/ zone. That
could be useful for MANY various types of internal zones that need this.
But if this is that case, how would that DNS Delegation look, to get the
above forwarding example to work using delegation instead?
Thanks in advance for your help!
-- Rob McEwen, invaluement
___
Please visit https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users to unsubscribe
from this list
ISC funds the development of this software with paid support subscriptions.
Contact us at https://www.isc.org/contact/ for more information.
bind-users mailing list
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https://lists.isc.org/mailman/listinfo/bind-users
