On Wednesday, November 16, 2016 9:01:00 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> So, conceptually, another way to deal with this is to hardcode a blockhash
> where we allow blocks in a chain ending with that blockhash to _not_ follow
> BIP65, up until that blockhash, and any blockchain without that
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 6:16 PM, Eric Voskuil wrote:
> On 11/16/2016 05:50 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote:
>
> > So are checkpoints good now?
> > I believe we should get rid of checkpoints because they seem to be
> misunderstood as a security feature rather than as an optimization.
On 11/16/2016 05:50 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote:
> If you were trying to point out that buried softforks are similar to
> checkpoints in this regard, I agree.
Yes, that was my point.
> So are checkpoints good now?
> I believe we should get rid of checkpoints because they seem to be
misunderstood as
On 11/16/2016 05:24 PM, Alex Morcos wrote:
> huh?
> can you give an example of how a duplicate transaction hash (in the same
> chain) can happen given BIP34?
"The pigeonhole principle arises in computer science. For example,
collisions are inevitable in a hash table because the number of possible
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 5:58 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This sort of statement represents one consequence of the aforementioned
> bad precedent.
>
> Are checkpoints good now?
>
So far in this discussion, and in a thread that has forked off,
huh?
can you give an example of how a duplicate transaction hash (in the same
chain) can happen given BIP34?
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 7:00 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On 11/16/2016 03:58 PM, Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov
Also, it's important to take note of the motivation behind not banning
duplicate tx hashes outright. Doing so would require that spent tx
hashes are retained forever. A pruning node will have no way of knowing
whether a new tx duplicates the hash of a preceding tx. Any
implementation that does
> This means that all future transactions will have different txids...
rules do guarantee it.
No, it means that the chance is small, there is a difference.
If there is an address collision, someone may lose some money. If there
is a tx hash collision, and implementations handle this differently,
On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 12:10 AM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Both of these cases resulted from exact duplicate txs, which BIP34 now
> precludes. However nothing precludes different txs from having the same
> hash.
>
The only way to have two
On 11/16/2016 06:18 AM, Thomas Kerin wrote:
> BIP30 actually was given similar treatment after a reasonable amount of
> time had passed.
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/main.cpp#L2392
BIP30 was the resolution to a catostrophic protocol flaw that would
impact any block whether
No, BIP30 prevents duplicate tx hashes in the case where the new tx hash
duplicates that of a preceding tx with unspent outputs.
There was one such case that had already become buried in the chain at
the time, so it was exempted from validation. There was another case of
a duplicate hash, but
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 2:58 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> This sort of statement represents one consequence of the aforementioned bad
> precedent.
>
> Are checkpoints good now?
Checkpoints are not necessary for consensus and work is being done
I would suggest that, before discussing how best to fork the chain to meet this
objective, we consider the objective.
The implementers have acknowledged that this does not represent a performance
improvement. Especially given that this was apparently not initially
understood, that alone is
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 09:32:24AM -0500, Alex Morcos via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I think we are misunderstanding the effect of this change.
> It's still "OK" for a 50k re-org to happen.
> We're just saying that if it does, we will now have potentially introduced
> a hard fork between new client and
Here is my thinking.
The BIP process is about changes to a living project which is the bitcoin
prptocol.
This specific BIP got accepted and we know in the blockchain that
this event (the acceptance) is recorded.
Before a certain block the rules were one way, after they were changed.
I have no
I think we are misunderstanding the effect of this change.
It's still "OK" for a 50k re-org to happen.
We're just saying that if it does, we will now have potentially introduced
a hard fork between new client and old clients if the reorg contains
earlier signaling for the most recent ISM soft fork
BIP30 actually was given similar treatment after a reasonable amount of
time had passed.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/main.cpp#L2392
You are also missing BIP50: 'March 2013 Chain For Post-Mortem', which
neither benefited nor improved bitcoin, but did document an event for
On Wed, Nov 16, 2016 at 1:58 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Are checkpoints good now? Are hard forks okay now?
>
I think that at least one checkpoint should be included. The assumption is
that no 50k re-orgs will happen, and that assumption
This sort of statement represents one consequence of the aforementioned bad
precedent.
Are checkpoints good now? Are hard forks okay now?
What is the maximum depth of a reorg allowed by this non-machine consensus?
Shouldn't we just define a max depth so that all cruft deeper than that can
Since "buried deployments" are specifically in reference to historical
consensus changes, I think the question is more one of human consensus than
machine consensus. Is there any disagreement amongst Bitcoin users that
BIP34 activated at block 227931, BIP65 activated at block 388381, and BIP66
Actually this does nothing to provide justification for this consensus rule
change. It is just an attempt to deflect criticism from the fact that it is
such a change.
e
> On Nov 15, 2016, at 9:45 AM, Btc Drak wrote:
>
> I think this is already covered in the BIP text:-
>
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