Re: [bitcoin-dev] Plausible Deniability (Re: Satoshilabs secret shared private key scheme)

On Sat, Jan 13, 2018 at 03:44:03AM +, nullius via bitcoin-dev wrote: > (I think that next, I may start writing my disks with headers for LUKS, > which I do not use...) > > Whereupon, I challenge plausible deniability designers to `dd` a 6TB disk > with pseudorandom bytes, then try walking it

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Plausible Deniability (Re: Satoshilabs secret shared private key scheme)

The same problems exist for users of whole disk encrypted operating systems. Once the device (or, the initial password authentication) is found, the adversary knows that there is something to see. The objective of plausible deniability is to present some acceptable (plausible) alternative while

[bitcoin-dev] Plausible Deniability (Re: Satoshilabs secret shared private key scheme)

On 2018-01-12 at 09:50:58 +, Peter Todd wrote: On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 12:43:48PM +, Perry Gibson wrote: Trezor's "plausible deniability" scheme could very well result in you going to jail for lying to border security, because it's so easy for them to simply brute

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 117 Feedback

Putting aside for the moment the concerns that Pieter and Rusty have raised about BIP 117 (concerns which I agree with), is BIP 117 even a viable soft fork to begin with? When it comes to soft forks of Script, in the past there have been two kinds. The first kind is soft-forking new script

Re: [bitcoin-dev] New Bitcoin Core macOS signing key

On 2018-01-12 at 08:54:12 +, Peter Todd wrote: While a clunky way to do it, you can use the `-signer` option to tell OpenSSL to write the signer's certificate to a file. That certificate can then be compared to the one from the repo, which was still in the repo as of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Satoshilabs secret shared private key scheme

On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 12:43:48PM +, Perry Gibson wrote: > >Trezor's "plausible deniability" scheme could very well result in you going > >to > >jail for lying to border security, because it's so easy for them to simply > >brute force alternate passwords based on your seeds. With that, they