If miners leave transactions out of a block they do pay a cost by not being
rewarded those fees. If they include their own spam transactions to get
back the fee they gain nothing. Since blocks can have fees resulting in
hundreds of thousands of dollars, it would seem unlikely that miners incur
a
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Slight correction to email I just posted titled "NIST 8202 Blockchain
Technology Overview"
The date in top of email states Jan 20, corrected date is Jan 28th which can be
validated
also by verifying my signature (gpg includes timestamp when
Miners accept less than the optimal (i.e. highest net fee) set of
transactions all the time. The reason is that it takes too much time to
compute the optimal set. All other things being equal, the miner who is
more efficient at computing a set is more profitable.
Intentionally not accepting the
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January 20 2018
(I am also forwarding this message to the bitcoin mailing list just in case
there
are other technological errors that could use correction in this draft paper or
anything that should be added with my comments.)
To the authors of
As you point out, depending on the mempool, sometimes a miner makes more
fee by including A and B, while other times a miner makes more fee by
including C (the replacement for A and B) and D (a hypothetical transaction
that cannot be fit into a block that contains A and B but can be fit into a
I don't think this is a realistic concern. The incentive compatibility
_already_ exists (just in reverse: miners are refusing transactions that would
increase their total fees in the next block), and as the mempool is already
generally competitive enough it's actually worse the way it is.
But
On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 05:43:34PM +0100, Sjors Provoost via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Peter Todd wrote:
> > In fact I considered only requiring an increase in fee rate, based on the
> > theory that if absolute fee went down, the transaction must be smaller and
> > thus
> > miners could overall earn
If the miner wants to force fees up, why would he fill up a block with
placeholder high fee transactions, instead of simply cutting off
transactions paying less fee than he is willing to take? Is there any
evidence someone is doing such a thing for whatever reason?
2018-01-27 6:45 GMT-02:00
I can see how merging after the fact could be more practical than appending
existing transactions.
I think what Moral Agent suggested is the same as your original proposal,
namely dropping rule 3. Only fee per weight unit increase from rule 4 would
matter.
The minimum per WU increase could be
It seems in a document that I was referenced with this very question that the
unit for creating invoices on Lightning is millisatoshi. Do we really need to
invoice for 1000 millisatoshi for a 1 sat transaction?
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