I have but one point to make in a brief catch-up read over.
With the current protocol the fix to a network split is simple, the longest
chain win. But with the moving checkpoint I'm proposing we have a problem if
both chains began to differ more than N blocks ago, the forks are permanent. So
s (24 hours) and there are 2 permanent forks longer than N, nodes
> > from one branch could delete their local history so they would join the
> > other branch.
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> >
> > --
> > *From:* Alistair Mann
>
Hi all,
Very good points. I did some clarifications in a private conversation, the new
rule is making the moving checkpoint valid only if the difference in blocks
between the main chain and the new fork is smaller than X blocks, like for
example 3 days of blocks, so after a long network split
reposted due to wrong email address:
I'd just like to repeat something I said years ago but is undoubtedly lost
now:
>
> ### Today's low cost for sybil attacks
>
> A paper on JoinMarket [Möser, Malte and Rainer Böhme. “Join Me on a
> Market for Anonymity.” (2016).] calculates the requirement of
Attack 1:
I partition (i.e. eclipse) a bunch of nodes from the network this partition
contains no mining power . I then mine 145 blocks for this partition. I
don't even need 51% of the mining power because I'm not competing with any
other miners. Under this rule this partition will hardfork from
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:50 PM Emil Engler via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> The current situation is that the moderation is slow and takes around
> >24h for a E-Mail to be on the mailing list
It really shouldn't be 24 hours. Our strategy was to have a few
moderators in different timezones to cover
В Thu, 01 Aug 2019 19:01:06 +
Andrew Chow wrote:
> I spoke to some people OOB and they said that they didn't really like
> the idea of having a prefix string (partially because they've already
> implemented some proprietary types by simply squatting on unused
> types). Matching the prefix
On 31/07/2019 16:50, Dmitry Petukhov wrote:
> В Tue, 30 Jul 2019 22:39:14 +0100
> Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
>> This is where a sacrifice of V bitcoins creates a
>> bond of value V^2. The formula provides a strong incentive for
>> profit-motivated makers to use all their fidelity
