Re: [bitcoin-dev] Testing censorship resistance of bitcoin p2p network

2023-02-17 Thread Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev
On Sat, Feb 18, 2023 at 02:03:15AM +0200, Peter Todd wrote: > On February 18, 2023 1:35:34 AM GMT+02:00, Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev > >You could try statically analyze `` to determine whether the > >IF branch could ever be taken. For example there is no path through > >the "inscription

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Testing censorship resistance of bitcoin p2p network

2023-02-17 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On February 18, 2023 1:35:34 AM GMT+02:00, Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev >You could try statically analyze `` to determine whether the >IF branch could ever be taken. For example there is no path through >the "inscription script" that would result in all the crap being dropped >by the end of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Testing censorship resistance of bitcoin p2p network

2023-02-17 Thread Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev
On Fri, Feb 17, 2023 at 11:35:34PM +, Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > If you ban any of these specific script fragments then spammers will > just use `IF ENDIF` and provide the `FALSE` as a zero push. > And banning *this* would ban legitimate use cases. > I realize this is

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Testing censorship resistance of bitcoin p2p network

2023-02-17 Thread Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev
On Fri, Feb 17, 2023 at 03:56:31PM +0100, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > [0]: https://gist.github.com/luke-jr/4c022839584020444915c84bdd825831 > > I wonder how far should that rule go: SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS. > Because "OP_FALSE OP_IF OP_ENDIF" is effectively the same as >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Refreshed BIP324

2023-02-17 Thread Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
On Friday, February 17th, 2023 at 10:51 AM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I think it's probably less complex to close some of the doors? > 2) are short ids available/meaningful to send prior to VERACK being > completed? Ah, I hadn't considered this nuance. If we don't care about

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Refreshed BIP324

2023-02-17 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, Feb 16, 2023 at 05:43:22PM +, Dhruv M via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Problem: > - 1 byte message type IDs are lacking a co-ordination mechanism when multiple > in-flight BIPs are proposing new message types as the id space is reduced > form 12 ASCII bytes to 1 byte. > - 1 byte IDs are

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Testing censorship resistance of bitcoin p2p network

2023-02-17 Thread vjudeu via bitcoin-dev
> [0]: https://gist.github.com/luke-jr/4c022839584020444915c84bdd825831 I wonder how far should that rule go: SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS. Because "OP_FALSE OP_IF OP_ENDIF" is effectively the same as "OP_NOP", and putting NOPs in many places is considered non-standard. The same is

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Debate: 64 bytes in OP_RETURN VS taproot OP_FALSE OP_IF OP_PUSH

2023-02-17 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Sat, Feb 04, 2023 at 07:11:35PM -0500, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Since bytes in the witness are cheaper than bytes in the script pubkey, > there is a crossover point in data size where it will simply be cheaper to > use witness data. Given today's standardness constraints,

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Debate: 64 bytes in OP_RETURN VS taproot OP_FALSE OP_IF OP_PUSH

2023-02-17 Thread Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
Hi Claus, Thanks but I am not sure to understand the solution, how the transaction will look like and will it be standard ? Regards Aymeric Le 16/02/2023 à 20:59, Claus Ehrenberg a écrit : > I propose to require all data to be in the op_return output PLUS add a > required op_return_hash

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Debate: 64 bytes in OP_RETURN VS taproot OP_FALSE OP_IF OP_PUSH

2023-02-17 Thread Claus Ehrenberg via bitcoin-dev
I propose to require all data to be in the op_return output PLUS add a required op_return_hash field, which is checked by consensus. So that node can re-validate the chain without having to store/download/look at the contents of op_return data. The benefit of that little redundancy is that