"want bitcoin to be money and money means different things for people in this world"
I think we can all agree that a property of money is fungibility, and by its very definition NFTs are not fungible and thus not money. On Wed, Mar 29, 2023 at 4:56 PM alicexbt via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Hi Zac, > > Let me share what those parasites achieved: > > - Fees paid: 150 BTC > - Lot of users and developers trying bitcoin that either never tried or > gave up early in 2013-15 > - Mempools of nodes of being busy on weekends and got lots of transactions > - PSBT became cool and application devs are trying their best to use it in > different ways > - Some developers exploring taproot and multisig > - AJ shared things how covenants could help in fair, non-custodial, > on-chain auction of ordinals that is MEV resistant although I had shared it > earlier which involves more steps: > https://twitter.com/1440000bytes/status/1634368411760476161 > - Investors exploring about funding projects > - Bitcoin more than Bitcoin and people excited about it > > We can have difference of opinion, however I want bitcoin to be money and > money means different things for people in this world. Please respect that > else it will become like Linux, something used by 1% of world. > > /dev/fd0 > floppy disk guy > > Sent with Proton Mail secure email. > > ------- Original Message ------- > On Wednesday, March 29th, 2023 at 12:40 PM, Zac Greenwood via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > I’m not sure why any effort should be spent on theorizing how new > opcodes might be used to facilitate parasitical use cases of the blockchain. > > > > If anything, business models relying on the ability to abuse the > blockchain as a data store must be made less feasible, not more. > > > > Zac > > > > > > On Fri, 24 Mar 2023 at 20:10, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Mar 07, 2023 at 10:45:34PM +1000, Anthony Towns via > bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > > I think there are perhaps four opcodes that are interesting in this > class: > > > > > > > > idx sPK OP_FORWARD_TARGET > > > > -- sends the value to a particular output (given by idx), and > > > > requires that output have a particular scriptPubKey (given > > > > by sPK). > > > > > > > > idx [...] n script OP_FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE > > > > -- sends the value to a particular output (given by idx), and > > > > requires that output to have almost the same scriptPubKey as this > > > > input, _except_ that the current leaf is replaced by "script", > > > > with that script prefixed by "n" pushes (of values given by [...]) > > > > > > > > idx OP_FORWARD_SELF > > > > -- sends the value to a particular output (given by idx), and > > > > requires that output to have the same scriptPubKey as this input > > > > > > > > amt OP_FORWARD_PARTIAL > > > > -- modifies the next OP_FORWARD_* opcode to only affect "amt", > > > > rather than the entire balance. opcodes after that affect the > > > > remaining balance, after "amt" has been subtracted. if "amt" is > > > > 0, the next OP_FORWARD_* becomes a no-op. > > > > > > The BIP 345 draft has been updated [0] [1] and now pretty much defines > > > OP_VAULT to have the behaviour specced for OP_FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE > above, > > > and OP_VAULT_RECOVER to behave as OP_FORWARD_TARGET above. Despite > > > that, for this email I'm going to continue using the OP_FORWARD_* > > > naming convention. > > > > > > Given the recent controversy over the Yuga labs ordinal auction [2], > > > perhaps it's interesting to consider that these proposed opcodes come > > > close to making it possible to do a fair, non-custodial, on-chain > auction > > > of ordinals [3]. > > > > > > The idea here is that you create a utxo on chain that contains the > ordinal > > > in question, which commits to the address of the current leading > bidder, > > > and can be spent in two ways: > > > > > > 1) it can be updated to a new bidder, if the bid is raised by at least > > > K satoshis, in which case the previous bidder is refunded their > > > bid; or, > > > > > > 2) if there have been no new bids for a day, the current high bidder > > > wins, and the ordinal is moved to their address, while the funds > > > from their winning bid are sent to the original vendor's address. > > > > > > I believe this can be implemented in script as follows, > > > assuming the opcodes OP_FORWARD_TARGET(OP_VAULT_RECOVER), > > > OP_FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE(OP_VAULT), OP_FORWARD_PARTIAL (as specced > above), > > > and OP_PUSHCURRENTINPUTINDEX (as implemented in liquid/elements [4]) > > > are all available. > > > > > > First, figure out the parameters: > > > > > > * Set VENDOR to the scriptPubKey corresponding to the vendor's address. > > > * Set K to the minimum bid increment [5]. > > > * Initially, set X equal to VENDOR. > > > * Initially, set V to just below the reserve price (V+K is the > > > minimum initial bid). > > > > > > Then construct the following script: > > > > > > [X] [V] [SSS] TOALT TOALT TOALT > > > 0 PUSHCURRENTINPUTINDEX EQUALVERIFY > > > DEPTH NOT IF > > > 0 10000 FORWARD_PARTIAL > > > 0 FROMALT FORWARD_TARGET > > > 1 [VENDOR] FWD_TARGET > > > 144 > > > ELSE > > > FROMALT SWAP TUCK FROMALT > > > [K] ADD GREATERTHANOREQUAL VERIFY > > > 1 SWAP FORWARD_TARGET > > > DUP FORWARD_PARTIAL > > > 0 ROT ROT > > > FROMALT DUP 3 SWAP FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE > > > 0 > > > ENDIF > > > CSV > > > 1ADD > > > > > > where "SSS" is a pushdata of the rest of the script ("TOALT TOALT TOALT > > > .. 1ADD"). > > > > > > Finally, make that script the sole tapleaf, accompanied by a NUMS point > > > as the internal public key, calculate the taproot address corresponding > > > to that, and send the ordinal to that address as the first satoshi. > > > > > > There are two ways to spend that script. With an empty witness stack, > > > the following will be executed: > > > > > > [X] [V] [SSS] TOALT TOALT TOALT > > > -- altstack now contains [SSS V X] > > > 0 PUSHCURRENTINPUTINDEX EQUALVERIFY > > > -- this input is the first, so the ordinal will move to the first > > > output > > > DEPTH NOT IF > > > -- take this branch: the auction is over! > > > 1 [VENDOR] FWD_TARGET > > > -- output 1 gets the entire value of this input, and pays to > > > the vendor's hardcoded scriptPubKey > > > 0 10000 FORWARD_PARTIAL > > > 0 FROMALT FORWARD_TARGET > > > -- we forward at least 10k sats to output 0 (if there were 0 sats, > > > the ordinal would end up in output 1 instead, which would be a > > > bug), and output 0 pays to scriptPubKey "X" > > > 144 > > > ELSE .. ENDIF > > > -- skip over the other branch > > > CSV > > > -- check that this input has baked for 144 blocks (~1 day) > > > 1ADD > > > -- leave 145 on the stack, which is true. success! > > > > > > Alternatively, if you want to increase the bid you provide a stack with > > > two items: your scriptPubKey and the new bid [X' V']. Execution this > > > time looks like: > > > > > > [X] [V] [SSS] TOALT TOALT TOALT > > > -- stack contains [X' V'], altstack now contains [SSS V X] > > > 0 PUSHCURRENTINPUTINDEX EQUALVERIFY > > > -- this input is the first, so the ordinal will move to the first > > > output > > > DEPTH NOT IF ... ELSE > > > -- skip over the other branch (without violating minimalif rules) > > > FROMALT SWAP TUCK FROMALT > > > -- stack contains [X' V' X V' V], altstack contains [SSS] > > > [K] ADD GREATERTHANOREQUAL VERIFY > > > -- check V' >= V+K, stack contains [X' V' X] > > > 1 SWAP FORWARD_TARGET > > > -- output 1 pays to X (previous bidder's scriptPubKey), and the > > > entire value of this input goes there; stack contains [X' V'] > > > DUP FORWARD_PARTIAL > > > -- execute "V' FORWARD_PARTIAL", stack contains [X' V'] > > > 0 ROT ROT > > > -- stack contains [0 X' V'] > > > FROMALT DUP 3 SWAP FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE > > > -- execute "0 X' V' SSS 3 SSS FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE" which checks > > > that output 0 spends at least V' satoshis back to the same > > > script (because that's how we defined SSS), except the first > > > three pushes (previously X V SSS) are replaced by X' V' SSS. > > > 0 > > > ENDIF > > > CSV > > > -- "0 CSV" requires nSequnce to be set, which makes the tx rbf'able, > > > which hopefully makes it harder to pin > > > 1ADD > > > -- ends with 1 on the stack; success! > > > > > > (The "SSS n SSS FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE" construct is more or less a quine, > > > ie a program that outputs its own source code) > > > > > > I think that script is about 211 witness bytes, with an additional 40 > > > witness bytes for X'/V', so when making a bid, your tx would be > > > something like: > > > > > > tx header, 10vb > > > input 0: 103vb for the old bid including witness and control block > > > input 1: 58vb for a taproot key path spend > > > output 0: 43vb for the new bid > > > output 1: 43vb for your change > > > > > > for a total of about 257vb -- slightly larger than a regular 2-in-2-out > > > transaction, but not terribly much. Mostly because input 0 doesn't > require > > > a signature -- it's size is effectively 6 pubkeys: X, X' VENDOR twice, > > > and the script code twice, along with a little extra to encode the > > > various numbers (10000, 144, K, V, V'). > > > > > > This approach seems pretty "MEV" resistant: you pay fees via input 1 if > > > your bid succeeds; if it doesn't, you don't pay any fees. A potential > > > scalper might want to put in an early low ball bid, then prevent > > > higher bidders from winning the auction, take control of the ordinal, > > > and resell it later, but unless they can prevent another miner from > > > mining alternative bids for 144 blocks, they will fail at that. The bid > > > is fixed by the bidder and committed to by the signature on input 1, so > > > frontrunning a bid can't do anything beyond invalidate the bid > entirely. > > > > > > Obviously, this is a pretty limited auction mechanism in various ways; > > > eg maybe you'd rather specify K as a percentage than an absoute > increment; > > > maybe you'd like to have the auction definitely finish by some > particular > > > time; maybe you'd like to be able to have the auction be able to > continue > > > above 21.47 BTC (2**31 sats); maybe you'd like to do a dutch auction > > > rather than an english auction. I think you can probably do all those > > > things with this set of opcodes and clever scripting, though it > probably > > > gets ugly. > > > > > > I don't think this is easily extensible to taro or rgb style assets, > > > as rather than being able to ensure the asset is transferred by > > > controlling the input/output positions, I think you'd need to build > > > up merkle trees and do point tweaks beyond what's supported by > > > OP_FORWARD_LEAF_UPDATE/OP_VAULT. Of course, without something like > > > OP_PUSHCURRENTINPUTINDEX I don't think you could do it for ordinals > > > either. > > > > > > Cheers, > > > aj > > > > > > [0] > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/7f747fba82675f28c239df690a07b75529bd0960/bip-0345.mediawiki > > > > > > [1] https://twitter.com/jamesob/status/1639019107432513537 > > > > > > [2] > https://cointelegraph.com/news/scammers-dream-yuga-s-auction-model-for-bitcoin-nfts-sees-criticism > > > > > > [3] Inscriptions remain a wasteful way of publishing/committing > > > to content, however! > > > > > > [4] > https://github.com/ElementsProject/elements/blob/master/doc/tapscript_opcodes.md > > > > > > [5] Setting K too low probably invites griefing, where a bidder may be > > > able to use rbf pinning vectors to prevent people who would be willing > > > to bid substantially higher from getting their bid confirmed on > > > chain. > > > _______________________________________________ > > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >
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