>Even when several of the experts involved in the document you refer has my
respect and admiration, I do not agree with some of their conclusions
I'm one of the co-authors of that study. I'd be the first to agree with
your conclusion
and argue that the 4MB size suggested in that paper should not
Because there's no consensus on the contents of the mempool, this approach
is unsafe and will lead to forks. It also opens a new attack vector where
people can time the flood of new transactions with the discovery of a block
by a competitor, to orphan the block and to fork the chain.
The
> The entire point of the definition of eventually consistency is that your
> computer system is running continously and DO NOT have a final state, and
> therefore you must be able to describe the behavior when your system either
> may give responses to queries across time that are either
There seems to be a perception out there that Bitcoin is eventually
consistent. I wrote this post to describe why this perception is completely
false.
Bitcoin Guarantees Strong, not Eventual, Consistency
http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/03/01/bitcoin-guarantees-strong-not-eventual-consistency/
At the 3rd Bitcoin Workshop being held in conjunction with the Financial
Cryptography Conference in Barbados, my group will be presenting a new idea
for improving Bitcoin wallet security and deterring thefts today.
The write-up is here:
Ittay Eyal and I just put together a writeup that we're informally calling
Bitcoin-United for preserving the value of coins following a permanent fork:
http://hackingdistributed.com/2015/12/30/technique-to-unite-bitcoin-factions/
Half of the core idea is to eliminate double-spends (where
On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Do you specifically mean selfish mining as defined in Emin Gün
> Sirer/Ittay Eyal's paper? Keep in mind that attack is only a significant
> issue in a scenario - one malicious miner with
There's quite a bit of confusion in this thread.
Peter is referring to block withholding attacks. Ittay Eyal (as sole
author -- I was not involved in this paper [1]) was the first
to analyze these attacks and to discover a fascinating, paradoxical
result. An attacker pool (A) can take a certain
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 8:28 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> There are a number of techniques that can be used to detect block
> withholding attacks that you are not aware of. These techniques usually
> have the characteristic that if known they can be avoided, so obviously
> those
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Thanks Peter for the careful, quantitative work.
I want to bring one additional issue to everyone's consideration, related
to the choice of the Lempel-Ziv family of compressors.
While I'm not familiar with every single compression engine tested, the
Lempel-Ziv family of compressors are generally
Hi everyone,
Thanks to everyone for a very friendly and scientifically-oriented
discussion. We have collated all the issues that have been raised related
to NG, and placed them in context, here:
http://hackingdistributed.com/2015/11/09/bitcoin-ng-followup/
Overall, NG has a unique insight:
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