Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-11-02 Thread Johan Torås Halseth via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Oct 28, 2019 at 6:16 PM David A. Harding wrote: > A parent transaction near the limit of 100,000 vbytes could have almost > 10,000 outputs paying OP_TRUE (10 vbytes per output). If the children > were limited to 10,000 vbytes each (the current max carve-out size), > that allows relaying

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-28 Thread David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Oct 28, 2019 at 10:45:39AM +0100, Johan Torås Halseth wrote: > Relay cost is the obvious problem with just naively removing all limits. > Relaxing the current rules by allowing to add a child to each output as > long as it has a single unconfirmed parent would still only allow free > relay

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-28 Thread Johan Torås Halseth via bitcoin-dev
> > > I don’te see how? Let’s imagine Party A has two spendable outputs, now > they stuff the package size on one of their spendable outlets until it is > right at the limit, add one more on their other output (to meet the > Carve-Out), and now Party B can’t do anything. Matt: With the proposed

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-28 Thread Johan Torås Halseth via bitcoin-dev
It essentially changes the rule to always allow CPFP-ing the commitment as long as there is an output available without any descendants. It changes the commitment from "you always need at least, and exactly, one non-CSV output per party. " to "you always need at least one non-CSV output per party.

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-27 Thread David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, Oct 24, 2019 at 03:49:09PM +0200, Johan Torås Halseth wrote: > [...] what about letting the rule be > > The last transaction which is added to a package of dependent > transactions in the mempool must: > * Have no more than one unconfirmed parent. > [... subsequent email ...] > I

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-27 Thread Jeremy via bitcoin-dev
Johan, The issues with mempool limits for OP_SECURETHEBAG are related, but have distinct solutions. There are two main categories of mempool issues at stake. One is relay cost, the other is mempool walking. In terms of relay cost, if an ancestor can be replaced, it will invalidate all it's

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-25 Thread Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
I don’te see how? Let’s imagine Party A has two spendable outputs, now they stuff the package size on one of their spendable outlets until it is right at the limit, add one more on their other output (to meet the Carve-Out), and now Party B can’t do anything. > On Oct 24, 2019, at 21:05, Johan

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-24 Thread Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
I may be missing something, but I'm not sure how this changes anything? If you have a commitment transaction, you always need at least, and exactly, one non-CSV output per party. The fact that there is a size limitation on the transaction that spends for carve-out purposes only effects how many

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-10-24 Thread Johan Torås Halseth via bitcoin-dev
Reviving this old thread now that the recently released RC for bitcoind 0.19 includes the above mentioned carve-out rule. In an attempt to pave the way for more robust CPFP of on-chain contracts (Lightning commitment transactions), the carve-out rule was added in

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-02-13 Thread Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev
Matt Corallo writes: >>> Thus, even if you imagine a steady-state mempool growth, unless the >>> "near the top of the mempool" criteria is "near the top of the next >>> block" (which is obviously *not* incentive-compatible) >> >> I was defining "top of mempool" as "in the first 4 MSipa", ie.

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-01-08 Thread Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
I responded to a few things in-line before realizing I think we're out of sync on what this alternative proposal actually implies. In my understanding is it, it does *not* imply that you are guaranteed the ability to RBF as fees change. The previous problem is still there - your counterparty

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-01-08 Thread Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev
Matt Corallo writes: > Ultimately, defining a "near the top of the mempool" criteria is fraught > with issues. While it's probably OK for the original problem (large > batched transactions where you don't want a single counterparty to > prevent confirmation), lightning's requirements are very

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2019-01-07 Thread Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
Sorry for the late reply. Hmm, I included the old RBF-pinning proposal as a comparison. Personally, I find it both less clean and less convincingly secure. Ultimately, defining a "near the top of the mempool" criteria is fraught with issues. While it's probably OK for the original problem

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2018-12-04 Thread Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev
Matt Corallo writes: > As an alternative proposal, at various points there have been > discussions around solving the "RBF-pinning" problem by allowing > transactors to mark their transactions as "likely-to-be-RBF'ed", which > could enable a relay policy where children of such transactions

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning)

2018-12-02 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Bob, Would `SIGHASH_SINGLE` work? Commitment transactions have a single input but multiple outputs. Regards, ZmnSCPxj Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ On Sunday, December 2, 2018 11:08 PM, Bob McElrath wrote: > I've long thought about using