Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151 MITM

2016-06-09 Thread Alfie John via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, Jun 09, 2016 at 08:57:29AM +0200, Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > Are there any links to discussions on how authentication may be done? > > I'm currently working on the Auth-BIP which is not worth reviewing it > right now (I will post it to the mailing list once it has been reach

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151 MITM

2016-06-08 Thread Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev
Hi > On Thu, Jun 09, 2016 at 01:24:09AM +, Gregory Maxwell wrote: >> Reduction to plaintext isn't an interesting attack vector for an active >> attacker: they can simply impersonate the remote side. >> >> This is addressed via authentication, where available, which is done by a >> separate spe

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151 MITM

2016-06-08 Thread Alfie John via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, Jun 09, 2016 at 01:24:09AM +, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > Reduction to plaintext isn't an interesting attack vector for an active > attacker: they can simply impersonate the remote side. > > This is addressed via authentication, where available, which is done by a > separate specification

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151 MITM

2016-06-08 Thread Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Jun 8, 2016 at 11:47 PM, Alfie John via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Hi folks, > > Overall I think BIP 151 is a good idea. However unless I'm mistaken, what's to > prevent someone between peers to suppress the initial 'encinit' message during > negotiation, causing both to fallback to plaintext? >

[bitcoin-dev] BIP 151 MITM

2016-06-08 Thread Alfie John via bitcoin-dev
Hi folks, Overall I think BIP 151 is a good idea. However unless I'm mistaken, what's to prevent someone between peers to suppress the initial 'encinit' message during negotiation, causing both to fallback to plaintext? Peers should negotiate a secure channel from the outset or backout entirely w