Hello respected parties of the bitcoin network,
The point, as put forward by Jeremy is, economic rationality sometimes leads to
breaking the ’social contract’ set earlier in history.
Beyond its implications to RBF discussion, following economic rationality,
rather than trying to uphold the
...and the easiest way to avoid Bitcoin being a system that doesn't
arbitrarily
change rules, is to rely on economically rational rules that aren't
likely to
change!
Yes, I think many people on this thread have been making the same point.
This is the basis of the Nash Equilibrium, from
On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 04:54:00PM -0700, Jeremy Rubin wrote:
> The difference between honest majority and longest chain is that the
> longest chain bug was something acknowledged by Satoshi & patched
>
The difference between honest majority and longest chain is that the
longest chain bug was something acknowledged by Satoshi & patched
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/40cd0369419323f8d7385950e20342e998c994e1#diff-623e3fd6da1a45222eeec71496747b31R420
.
OTOH, we have more explicit
On Mon, Oct 17, 2022 at 08:23:20AM +0200, John Carvalho via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Simply, 0conf acceptance can be monitored and enforced by the merchant and
> exposure to doublespends can be both mitigated and limited in size per
> block. It is less expensive to be double-spent occasionally than to
On Sun, Oct 16, 2022 at 01:35:54PM -0400, Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> The Bitcoin white paper says:
>
> The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in
> majority decision
> making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be
> subverted
On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 10:30:26AM -0400, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> It is most certainly the case that one can construct situations where not
> mining on the tip is going to be the prefered strategy. But even if that
> happens on occasion, it's not like the protocol immediately
I had one other idea on the topic. Namely, in the last section
"calculation", Satoshi talks more about what he/she/they consider to be
bad actors. The idea that someone is not doing "tip mining" does not
mean they are dishonest.
We consider the scenario of an attacker trying to generate
not sure if this is helpful, but when i'm code reviewing a change to
an existing, functioning and very complex system, i rarely go back to
"first principles" to analyze that change independently, and instead
try to decide if it's better or worse than what we have now
I agree that it's
not sure if this is helpful, but when i'm code reviewing a change to an
existing, functioning and very complex system, i rarely go back to "first
principles" to analyze that change independently, and instead try to decide
if it's better or worse than what we have now
you can introduce a new
I think the issue with
I still think it is misguided to think that the "honest" (i.e. rule
> following) majority is to just be accepted as an axiom and if it is
> violated, well, then sorry. The rules need to be incentive compatible for
> the system to be functional. The honest majority is only
On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 9:07 AM Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> However, what *is* important about what Satoshi wrote is that it is sort
> of the "social contract" of what Bitcoin is that we can all sort of
> minimally agree to. This makes it
Hello John,
On 17.10.22 02:23, John Carvalho via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Simply, 0conf acceptance can be monitored and enforced by the merchant and
exposure to doublespends can be both mitigated and limited in size per block.
It is less expensive to be double-spent occasionally than to have a
Hi Jeremy,
Thanks for the reply. I do find the semantics of mempool and block org
interesting (although there's a lot on the topic I don't know).
E.g., suppose:
Block N: Fees = 10, reward = 1
Mempool: Fees = 2
Mining block N+1 with the mempool leads to reward 2+1 = 3, reorging
leads to
Building on the most work chain is perhaps not rational in many normal
circumstances that can come up today under the stated reference strategy:
1) Take highest paying transactions that fit
2) Mine on tips
E.g., suppose:
Block N: Fees = 10, reward = 1
Mempool: Fees = 2
Mining block N+1 with
Good points, Russell.
I think maybe for that particular property, one can partition the types of
rules one can put into the "honest rules" without compromising the system.
For example, your "keys deleted" property is one that is surely bad, but it
can be broken down into a many different
>From my limited academic interactions, people generally take the "honest"
to mean following the rules (regardless of how bad it is for you to follow
those rules). This has in turn led to some blockchain designs based on
their own absurd set of rules, and simply waiving away their issues by
Simply, 0conf acceptance can be monitored and enforced by the merchant and
exposure to doublespends can be both mitigated and limited in size per
block. It is less expensive to be double-spent occasionally than to have a
delayed checkout experience. Responsible 0conf acceptance is both rational
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining
representation in majority decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it
could be subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially
one-CPU-one-vote. The majority
decision is
The Bitcoin white paper says:
The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in
majority decision
making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be
subverted by anyone
able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote.
The
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