An update, after some feedback, and me using the odd hour here and there to try
to push this idea forward a bit:
1. I think (though I'm not 100% certain) that you can get rid of the fidelity
bond requirement entirely with an eltoo/D-R-O type mechanism, assuming APOAS.
2. With a relaxation of
> if you have a counterparty who is malicious and they *take action* to
steal, then they can present you with two alternatives
Generally I don't think this is the case. In this case, these are
time-sensitive operations. There is no time to negotiate after the
malicious party has taken action.
> Justice. Also, there's no incentive for the honest party to not punish -
> presumably their software would automatically punish, and why go through any
> effort to stop it? A 1 cent bribe certainly wouldn't be enough. Maybe a $10
> bribe might get someone somewhere to install hacked up
> what is the incentive for the honest party to punish?
Justice. Also, there's no incentive for the honest party to not punish -
presumably their software would automatically punish, and why go through
any effort to stop it? A 1 cent bribe certainly wouldn't be enough. Maybe a
$10 bribe might get
Hi Billy,
I read through the description. I think systems like this *mostly* fail due to
game theory.
With punishment-by-burn you have various issues that make it to my mind pretty
unstable, too unstable to use for any serious system. To be fair, this isn't
cut-and-dried. So let me unpack:
(I
There was a protocol someone mentioned a while back called Sabu that had
the same goals. As i recall, it had some pretty promising constructs, but
would have a critical vulnerability that could be exploited by miners. This
is the write up:
Hello list,
I took the time to write up this rather out-there idea:
Imagine you wanted to send a coin just like email, i.e. just transfer data to
the counterparty.
Clearly this is in general entirely impossible; but with what restrictions and
assumptions could you create a toy version of it?
