] Straight Flag Day (Height) Taproot Activation
Concept nack.
This has no advantage over bip8(true).
Bip9(false) is just bip9.
Thr only reasonable argument against bip8(true) is "some people may do
bip8(false) instead", which is a stypid argument applyable to any activation
method.
Concept nack.
This has no advantage over bip8(true).
Bip9(false) is just bip9.
Thr only reasonable argument against bip8(true) is "some people may do
bip8(false) instead", which is a stypid argument applyable to any
activation method.
People against taproot should want code to forbid its activatio
On Wed, Mar 03, 2021 at 11:49:57AM -0500, Matt Corallo wrote:
> On 3/3/21 09:59, Anthony Towns wrote:
> > A couple of days ago I would have disagreed with this; but with Luke
> > now strongly pushing against implementing lot=false, I can at least see
> > your point...
> Right. It may be the case th
On 3/3/21 09:59, Anthony Towns wrote:
I think it would be worthwhile to also update getblocktemplate so that
miners signal uptake for something like three or four retarget periods
prior to activation, without that signalling having any consensus-level
effect. That should allow miners and busin
On Sun, Feb 28, 2021 at 11:45:22AM -0500, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Given this, it seems one way to keep the network in consensus would be to
> simply activate taproot through a traditional, no-frills, flag-day (or
> -height) activation with a flag day of roughly August, 2022. Going bac
I think it has been shown that an understanding of reasonableness is not
universal, making any assertion about it as a collective goal kind of
self-defeating. The question is what is achievable, not what is reasonable. I’m
not making any value judgements here. Simply pointing out that anything o
In the attempt to change consensus rules there is a simple set of choices:
1) hard fork: creates a chain split
2) soft fork: creates a chain split
3) 51% attack: does not create a chain split
The presumption being that one can never assume 100% explicit adoption of any
rule change.
A 51% attack
Glad you asked! Yes, your goal here is #4 on the list of goals I laid out at [1], which I referenced and specifically
addressed each of in the OP of this thread.
[1]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-January/017547.html
On 2/28/21 15:19, Eric Voskuil wrote:
In the a
SPV mining has been curtailed somewhat to only apply for a brief period of time (based on public statements) since the
last time SPV mining caused a fork. Indeed, if you can make other miners mine on top of an invalid block, you can make
money by reducing the difficulty, but that is true as much
Miners still can generate invalid blocks as a result of SPV mining, and it
could be profitable to do "bad block enhanced selfish mining" to take
advantage of it.
Hard to analyze exactly what that looks like, but...
E.g., suppose 20% is un-upgraded and 80% is upgraded. Taking 25% hashrate
to mine
Note further that mandatory signaling isn't "just" a flag day - unlike a Taproot flag day (where miners running Bitcoin
Core unmodified today will not generate invalid blocks), a mandatory signaling flag day blatantly ignores goal (3) from
my original post - it results in any miner who has not ta
I agree with much of the logic presented by Matt here.
BIP8 was intended to be simpler to agree on to maintain consensus, yet we
find ourselves in a situation where a "tiny" parameter has the potential to
cause great network disruption and confusion (rationality is not too useful
a concept here gi
I think you may have misunderstood my proposal. I'm not suggesting some people run BIP 8(true), some run BIP8(false),
and some run a client which has a flag day, I'm suggesting a flag day activation instead of any BIP8-based activation.
Replies to your further points inline.
Matt
On 2/28/21 12
On Sunday 28 February 2021 16:45:22 Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> many individuals are committing themselves to running
> incompatible consensus rules.
Yet that is exactly what you propose herein...
> Given this, it seems one way to keep the network in consensus would be to
> simply activ
As anyone reading this list is aware, there is significant debate around the activation method for the proposed Taproot
soft fork. So much so, and with so much conviction, that many individuals are committing themselves to running
incompatible consensus rules. Obviously, such commitments, were th
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