On 2022-11-07 11:17, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
We can ensure with high probability that the transaction can be
cancelled/mined
at some point after N blocks by pre-signing a transaction, with
nLockTime set
sufficiently far into the future, spending one or more inputs of the
transaction
On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 05:55:59PM -0500, Antoine Riard wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> > We can ensure with high probability that the transaction can be
> > cancelled/mined
> > at some point after N blocks by pre-signing a transaction, with nLockTime
> > set
> > sufficiently far into the future,
Hi Peter,
> We can ensure with high probability that the transaction can be
> cancelled/mined
> at some point after N blocks by pre-signing a transaction, with nLockTime set
> sufficiently far into the future, spending one or more inputs of the
> transaction with a sufficiently high fee that it
On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 03:17:29PM -0500, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> tl;dr: We can remove the problem of Rule #5 pinning by ensuring that all
> transactions in the mempool are always replaceable.
With Rule #5 solved, let's look at the other pinning attack on multi-party
transactions:
