Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2024-01-02 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jan 02, 2024 at 11:12:05AM +, Gloria Zhao wrote: > Hi Peter, > > > You make a good point that the commitment transaction also needs to be > included > > in my calculations. But you are incorrect about the size of them. > > > With taproot and ephemeral anchors, a typical commitment

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2024-01-02 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Jan 02, 2024 at 11:12:05AM +, Gloria Zhao wrote: > Hi Peter, > > > You make a good point that the commitment transaction also needs to be > included > > in my calculations. But you are incorrect about the size of them. > > > With taproot and ephemeral anchors, a typical commitment

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2024-01-02 Thread Gloria Zhao via bitcoin-dev
Hi Peter, > You make a good point that the commitment transaction also needs to be included > in my calculations. But you are incorrect about the size of them. > With taproot and ephemeral anchors, a typical commitment transaction would have > a single-sig input (musig), two taproot outputs, and

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-21 Thread Gloria Zhao via bitcoin-dev
Hi Peter, Thanks for spending time thinking about RBF pinning and v3. > Enter Mallory. His goal is to grief Alice by forcing her to spend more money than she intended... > ...Thus the total fee of Mallory's package would have > been 6.6 * 1/2.5 = 2.6x more than Alice's total fee, and to get her

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Dec 20, 2023 at 03:16:25PM -0500, Greg Sanders wrote: > Hi Peter, > > Thanks for taking the time to understand the proposal and give thoughtful > feedback. > > With this kind of "static" approach I think there are fundamental > limitations because > the user has to commit "up front" how

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev
Hi Peter, Thanks for taking the time to understand the proposal and give thoughtful feedback. With this kind of "static" approach I think there are fundamental limitations because the user has to commit "up front" how large the CPFP later will have to be. 1kvB is an arbitrary value that is two

Re: [bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Dec 20, 2023 at 07:13:22PM +, Gloria Zhao wrote: > The "damage" of the pin can quantified by the extra fees Alice has to pay. > > For a v3 transaction, Mallory can attach 1000vB at 80sat/vB. This can > increase the cost of replacement to 80,000sat. > For a non-v3 transaction, Mallory

[bitcoin-dev] V3 Transactions are still vulnerable to significant tx pinning griefing attacks

2023-12-20 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
V3 transactions(1) is a set of transaction relay policies intended to aim L2/contracting protocols, namely Lightning. The main aim of V3 transactions is to solve Rule 3 transaction pinning(2), allowing the use of ephemeral anchors(3) that do not contain a signature check; anchor outputs that _do_