Re: [bitcoin-dev] Zero-knowledge proofs e.g. Schnorr are incompatible with address signing without compromise

2022-07-28 Thread Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
--- Original Message --- On Thursday, July 28th, 2022 at 11:51 AM, Ali Sherief wrote: > The way I understood the BIP, was that a user can do batch recovery or > single-key recovery. Can you explain how it is possible to recover a public > key from a single-key signature, because a few

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Zero-knowledge proofs e.g. Schnorr are incompatible with address signing without compromise

2022-07-28 Thread Ali Sherief via bitcoin-dev
> Yes, that's an intentional design choice in BIP340, see note 5: > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki#cite_ref-5-0. > The choice is either batch verifiability or public key recovery. The way I understood the BIP, was that a user can do batch recovery or single-key

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Zero-knowledge proofs e.g. Schnorr are incompatible with address signing without compromise

2022-07-28 Thread Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
--- Original Message --- On Thursday, July 28th, 2022 at 3:27 AM, Ali Sherief via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Essentially, zero-knowledge proofs such as Schnorr are not compatible with > address message signing - the public key cannot be retrieved from the address > or the signature, so the

[bitcoin-dev] Zero-knowledge proofs e.g. Schnorr are incompatible with address signing without compromise

2022-07-28 Thread Ali Sherief via bitcoin-dev
Here is an except of the BIP-notatether-messageverify thread, where I contemplate how to implement address/message signing support for Taproot i.e. Schnorr signatures, in my post at: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5407517.msg60642144#msg60642144 (stripped of bbcode formatting) ==