Hello,
On 7/13/2017 9:17 AM, Hampus Sjöberg wrote:
> In softforks, I would argue that 100% of all nodes and miners need to
> upgrade to the new rules.
> This makes sure that trying to incorrectly spend an "AnyOneCanSpend"
> will result in a hardfork, instead of a temporary (or permanent)
>
Greg is still conflating two different usages of the word "theft":
1. Whether the soft fork rules have been followed, and
2. Whether the WT^ submitted by a majority hashrate matches the one
calculated by sidechain nodes.
In his message he claims to uniquely adopt definition #2, saying
(emphasis
The confusion below stems from his conflation of several different ideas.
I will try to explicitly clarify a distinction between several types of
user (or, "modes" of use if you prefer):
[DC#0] -- Someone who does not upgrade their Bitcoin software (and is
running, say, 0.13). However, they
Paul,
I'm assuming it's OK with you that I pick up from where we left off in the
"Scaling Roadmap" thread [1], so as to be on-topic per your request. (For
others reading, part of my reply to the previous email in this thread is here
[2]).
For reference, I said:
> Isn't it different in the
>Miners who are able to deal with the bandwidth caused by drivechain coffee
transactions will profit from these transactions, whereas smaller and more
geographically distributed miners will not. Those miners will, in turn,
build faster ASICs and buy more electricity and drive out smaller
> They would certainly not be cheap, because they are relatively more
expensive due to the extra depreciation cost.
This depends on how long you expect to keep money on a side chain and how
many transactions you plan on doing. Inflation is a great way of paying
PoS / PoB miners - that cannot
Hi Erik,
I don't think that your design is competitive. Why would users tolerate
a depreciation of X% per year, when there are alternatives which do not
require such depreciation? It seems to me that none would.
Paul
On 6/20/2017 9:38 AM, Erik Aronesty wrote:
> - a proof-of-burn sidechain is
- a proof-of-burn sidechain is the ultimate two-way peg. you have to burn
bitcoin *or* side-chain tokens to mine the side chain. the size of the
burn is the degree of security.i actually wrote code to do randomized
blind burns where you have a poisson distribution (non-deterministic
Hi Erik,
As you know:
1. If a sidechain is merged mined it basically grows out of the existing
Bitcoin mining network. If it has a different PoW algorithm it is a new
mining network.
2. The security (ie, hashrate) of any mining network would be determined
by the total economic value of the
Hi Greg,
Responses below:
On 6/18/2017 5:30 PM, Tao Effect wrote:
> In Drivechain, 51% of miners have total control and ownership over all
> of the sidechain coins.
It would not be accurate to say that miners have "total" control. Miners
do control the destination of withdrawals, but they do
In Drivechain, 51% of miners have total control and ownership over all of the
sidechain coins. The vision of Drivechain is to have many blockchains "plugged
in" to the main chain.
Today, well over 51% of miners are under the jurisdiction of a single
government.
Thus the effect of Drivechain
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