Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread Tony Churyumoff via bitcoin-dev
Hi Henning, 1. The fees are paid by the enclosing BTC transaction. 2. The hash is encoded into an OP_RETURN. > Regarding the blinding factor, I think you could just use HMAC. How exactly? Tony 2016-08-08 18:47 GMT+03:00 Henning Kopp : > Hi Tony, > > I see some issues

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread Henning Kopp via bitcoin-dev
Hi Tony, I see some issues in your protocol. 1. How are mining fees handled? 2. Assume Alice sends Bob some Coins together with their history and Bob checks that the history is correct. How does the hash of the txout find its way into the blockchain? Regarding the blinding factor, I think you

[bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread Tony Churyumoff via bitcoin-dev
This is a proposal about hiding the entire content of bitcoin transactions. It goes farther than CoinJoin and ring signatures, which only obfuscate the transaction graph, and Confidential Transactions, which only hide the amounts. The central idea of the proposed design is to hide the entire

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Authentication BIP

2016-08-08 Thread Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 5:09 PM, Andy Schroder via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I have mixed feelings about strictly tying the identity-public-keys with a [...] > guaranteed static IP address. The second reason is because the DNS PTR I don't see any reason that it

[bitcoin-dev] BIP Number Request: Addresses over Audio

2016-08-08 Thread Daniel Hoffman via bitcoin-dev
This is my BIP idea: a fast, robust, and standardized for representing Bitcoin addresses over audio. It takes the binary representation of the Bitcoin address (little endian), chops that up into 4 or 2 bit chunks (depending on type, 2 bit only for low quality audio like american telephone lines),

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Aug 08, 2016 at 09:41:27PM +, James MacWhyte via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Wouldn't you lose the ability to assume transactions in the blockchain are > verified as valid, since miners can't see the details of what is being > spent and how? I feel like this ability is bitcoin's greatest

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread James MacWhyte via bitcoin-dev
Wouldn't you lose the ability to assume transactions in the blockchain are verified as valid, since miners can't see the details of what is being spent and how? I feel like this ability is bitcoin's greatest asset, and by removing it you're creating an altcoin different enough to not be connected

[bitcoin-dev] BIP Number Request: Addresses over Audio (fixed link)

2016-08-08 Thread Daniel Hoffman via bitcoin-dev
Sorry about the last email, I deleted the repository to get rid of the BIP number to prevent confusion. The correct address is https://github.com/Dako300/BIP This is my BIP idea: a fast, robust, and standardized way for representing Bitcoin addresses over audio. It takes the binary representation

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Number Request: Addresses over Audio

2016-08-08 Thread Daniel Hoffman via bitcoin-dev
I wouldn't worry about payment requests until I built a decoder and made the transmission a lot faster (probably adding tones and making it 5 bits wide), which shouldn't be hard On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 5:06 PM, Justin Newton via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Number Request: Addresses over Audio

2016-08-08 Thread Trevin Hofmann via bitcoin-dev
Would it be feasible to transmit an entire BIP21 URI as audio? If you were to encode any extra information (such as amount), it would be useful to include a checksum for the entire message. This checksum could possibly be used instead of the checksum in the address. Trevin On Aug 8, 2016 3:06

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Authentication BIP

2016-08-08 Thread Andy Schroder via bitcoin-dev
On 08/08/2016 01:42 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 5:09 PM, Andy Schroder via bitcoin-dev wrote: I have mixed feelings about strictly tying the identity-public-keys with a [...] guaranteed static IP address. The second reason is

Re: [bitcoin-dev] *Changing* the blocksize limit

2016-08-08 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Sat, Aug 06, 2016 at 07:15:22AM -0700, Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev wrote: > If the blocksize limit is to be changed to a block output limit, the > number the limit is set to should be roughly the amount of outputs > that are found in 1MB blocks today. This way, the change should be The

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread Tony Churyumoff via bitcoin-dev
The whole point is in preventing every third party, including miners, from seeing the details of what is being spent and how. The burden of verification is shifted to the owners of the coin (which is fair). In fact we could have miners recognize spend proofs and check that the same spend proof

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP draft: HTLC transactions

2016-08-08 Thread Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 06:17:39AM +, Luke Dashjr wrote: > On Wednesday, July 20, 2016 5:46:54 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 10:35:39PM -0600, Sean Bowe via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > I'm requesting feedback for Hash Time-Locked Contract (HTLC) transactions > >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread James MacWhyte via bitcoin-dev
One more thought about why verification by miners may be needed. Let's say Alice sends Bob a transaction, generating output C. A troll, named Timothy, broadcasts a transaction with a random hash, referencing C's output as its spend proof. The miners can't tell if it's valid or not, and so they

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hiding entire content of on-chain transactions

2016-08-08 Thread James MacWhyte via bitcoin-dev
That is a good point. As you said, it puts a lot more burden on the coin holders. One big downside would be data management. Instead of simply backing up a single HD private key, the user would have to back up entire histories of every output that has been sent to them if they want to secure their

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

2016-08-08 Thread Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
I'm not convinced you need to hold people's funds to provide those features. Maybe the millisecond thing. But 99 out of 100 traders would accept a 100 millisecond latency in exchange for 0 counterparty risk. ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

2016-08-08 Thread Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 1:48 AM, Matthew Roberts wrote: > Not everyone who uses centralized exchanges are there to obtain the > currency though. A large portion are speculators who need to be able to > enter and exit complex positions in milliseconds and don't care about >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

2016-08-08 Thread Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev
With channels and the exchange acting as hub, you can do instant trades between altcoins. This doesn't work with fiat accounts. A "100% reserve" company could issue fiat tokens. The exchange could then trade those tokens. This eliminates the counter-party risk for the exchange. If the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

2016-08-08 Thread Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev
Not everyone who uses centralized exchanges are there to obtain the currency though. A large portion are speculators who need to be able to enter and exit complex positions in milliseconds and don't care about decentralization, security, and often even the asset that they're buying. Try telling