Hi Andrew,
Ok, I will go ahead and write the amendment and make a PR.
Thanks!
Jon
2019年7月10日(水) 5:26 Andrew Chow :
> This was the original intent of the sighash field. Either the sighash is
> acceptable to the signer and the signer signs with it, or they do not sign
> at all.
>
> On 7/9/19
This was the original intent of the sighash field. Either the sighash is
acceptable to the signer and the signer signs with it, or they do not sign at
all.
On 7/9/19 11:58 AM, Jonathan Underwood via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Just to be brief, I'll kick off with an attack scenario.
>
>
Good morning ZmnSCPxj,
thank you very much for sharing your BCAN idea and thought process in detail.
I add some thoughs that very likely occured to you, but not formulated
explicitelly:
1. The unique feature of such advertisement network is that it has no owner,
just like the Bitcoin network.
Hi all,
Just to be brief, I'll kick off with an attack scenario.
1. I am a signer, I get a PSBT that is ready to sign. I parse. I sign
according to the PSBT as-is.
2. I notice my UTXO was stolen by a hacker because they changed my PSBT
input's sighashtype to SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY | SIGHASH_NONE
Good morning all,
I will attempt to restart my thinking from initial principles regarding my
proposed "Bitcoin Classified Ads Network".
Nodes behave this way:
* Nodes in this network gossip advertisements.
* These advertisements refer to a UTXO that must be unspent at the chain tip
considered
If you make ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT signature not the only signature that
controls this UTXO, but use it solely for restricting the spending
conditions such as the set of outputs, and require another signature
that would commit to the whole transaction, you can eliminate
malleability, for the price of
