Re: [bitcoin-dev] SAS: Succinct Atomic Swap

I made a version of the TLA+ spec according to the suggested variant, as I understood it from your description. This version is in the separate branch in the SASwap repo, 'variant_ZmnSCPxj' [1] If I understood and specified your variant correctly, there is a deadlock possible after step 9, if Bob

[bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin Core 0.20.0 released

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 0.20.0 Release Notes Bitcoin Core version 0.20.0 is now available from: Or through BitTorrent:

[bitcoin-core-dev] Bitcoin Core 0.20.0 released

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 0.20.0 Release Notes Bitcoin Core version 0.20.0 is now available from: Or through BitTorrent:

[bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

Hi! I and Antoine Riard explored time-dilation attacks on Lightning. We have a blogpost, which is probably too long to include in the email in full. You can read it here: https://discrete-blog.github.io/time-dilation/ There’s also a paper we wrote: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.01418 We believe

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Design for a CoinSwap implementation for massively improving Bitcoin privacy and fungibility

Good morning Chris again, > For the avoidance of theft, it is probably better for Bob to wait for > Alice-side funding tx to confirm, probably deeply because reorgs suck. Over in Lightning-land, we have a concept called "irrevocably committed". This is a state where a newly-created contract

Re: [bitcoin-dev] SAS: Succinct Atomic Swap

Good morning Dmitry, > I made a version of the TLA+ spec according to the suggested variant, > as I understood it from your description. This version is in > the separate branch in the SASwap repo, 'variant_ZmnSCPxj' [1] > > If I understood and specified your variant correctly, there is a >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

Good morning Gleb and Antoine, This is good research, thank you for your work. > **Targeting Per-Hop Packet Delay** is based on routing via the victim, and > the victim should have at least two channels with the attacker. The existence of offchain-to-onchain swap services means that the