Andrew Johnson wrote:
> "You miss something obvious that makes this attack actually free of cost.
> Nothing will "cost them more in transaction fees". A miner can create
> thousands of transactions paying to himself, and not broadcast them to
> the network, but hold them and include them in the blo
The assumption you're making is incorrect. There is not an infinite number
of low-fee transactions.
Yes, the average fee will go down compared to today with Block75, but this
will balance itself between demand and the minimum fee miners are willing
to accept (not zero).
For example, add 200kb to
I think the main thing you're missing is that there will always be
transactions available to mine simply because demand for blockspace is
effectively unbounded as fees approach 0. Nodes generally have a
static mempool size and dynamic minrelaytxfee nowadays so as
transactions get mined lower fee tr
On Sun, Dec 11, 2016 at 1:40 PM, t. khan via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Block75 is not exponential scaling. It's true the max theoretical increase
> in the first year would be 7x, but the next year would be a max of 2x, and
> the next could only increase by 50%
On Sun, Dec 11, 2016 at 3:31 PM, James Hilliard
wrote:
> What's most likely to happen is miners will max out the blocks they
> mine simply to try and get as many transaction fees as possible like
> they are doing right now(there will be a backlog of transactions at
> any block size). Having the b
"You miss something obvious that makes this attack actually free of cost.
Nothing will "cost them more in transaction fees". A miner can create
thousands of transactions paying to himself, and not broadcast them to
the network, but hold them and include them in the blocks he mines. The
fees are col
What's most likely to happen is miners will max out the blocks they
mine simply to try and get as many transaction fees as possible like
they are doing right now(there will be a backlog of transactions at
any block size). Having the block size double every year would likely
cause major problems and
On Sun, Dec 11, 2016 at 12:11 PM, s7r wrote:
>
> This is an incentive, if few miners agree to create a large conglomerate
> that will ultimately control the network.
>
> You miss something obvious that makes this attack actually free of cost.
> Nothing will "cost them more in transaction fees". A
t. khan wrote:
> Miners 'gaming' the Block75 system -
> There is no financial incentive for miners to attempt to game the
> Block75 system. Even if it were attempted and assuming the goal was to
> create bigger blocks, the maximum possible increase would be 25% over
> the previous block size. And
On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 9:41 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote:
> On Saturday, December 10, 2016 9:29:09 PM Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Any new merkle algorithm should use a sum tree for partial validation and
> > fraud proofs.
>
> PR welcome.
>
Fair enough. It is pretty basic.
https://github.co
Good Afternoon
I'm writing this to ask the other bitcoin developers to carry the torch of a project/bip I have been working on more specifically a set of new op_codes to allow data efficient quantum proof transactions on the bitcoin network.
Sadly due to unforeseen circumstances my skills a
Well I think empirical game-theory observed on the network involves more
types of strategy than honest vs dishonest. At least 4, maybe 5 types of
strategy and I would argue lumping the strategies together results in
incorrect game theory conclusions and predictions.
A) altruistic players (protoco
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