Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
On 04/09/2017 05:20 PM, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Have you read the cuckoo cycle paper? Finding cycles in massive graphs > is just about the worst thing to use an ASIC for. It's actually the best thing to use an ASIC tightly coupled with DRAM for - for example, HBM and HBM2 which reduce latency and increase throughput by placing the DRAM on an interposer with the ASIC die, or even putting the logic on the DRAM die itself. It would need at least proof that existing chips using HBM are ideal for Cuckoo Cycle (unlikely) and that no DRAM manufacturer could ever be coaxed into making an ASIC (even harder to guarantee). I think any long term PoW change is irrelevant to the review or adoption of the covert ASICBOOST BIPs, given the many unresolved problems of such a change. ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
Have you read the cuckoo cycle paper? Finding cycles in massive graphs is just about the worst thing to use an ASIC for. It might be a hitherto before unknown emergent property of cryptocurrencies in general that POW *must* change every 7-9 years. Could bake that into the protocol too... On Apr 9, 2017 7:51 PM, "David Vorick"wrote: > > > On Apr 9, 2017 7:00 PM, "Jared Lee Richardson via bitcoin-dev" < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > I can speak from personal experience regarding another very prominent > altcoin that attempted to utilize an asic-resistant proof of work > algorithm, it is only a matter of time before the "asic resistant" > algorithm gets its own Asics. The more complicated the algorithm, the more > secretive the asic technology is developed. Even without it, > multi-megawatt gpu farms have already formed in the areas of the world with > low energy costs. I'd support the goal if I thought it possible, but I > really don't think centralization of mining can be prevented. > > On Apr 9, 2017 1:16 PM, "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW change is not on >> the table as a part of a longer-term roadmap. >> >> Done right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of >> the proven, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would >> keep Bitcoin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized >> manufacturing for many years. >> >> Clearly a level-playing field is critical to keeping centralization from >> being a "defining feature" of Bitcoin over the long term. I've heard the >> term "level playing field" bandied about quite a bit. And it seems to me >> that the risk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than >> state-actor manipulation of specialized manufacturing of "SHA-256 forever" >> hardware. Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and >> less likely a "feature" and more of a baggage. >> >> Perhaps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as >> a part of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general. Killing the >> existing POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW >> field to flip-flop between the current and the "next one" every 8 years or >> or so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year A stub function that >> is guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected within 7 >> years. >> >> Something like that? >> >> Haven't thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would >> respond well to a well known cutover date. This would enable >> rapid-response to quantum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... >> because the mechanisms would be in-place and ready to switch as needed. >> >> Lots of people seem to panic over POW changes as "irresponsible", but >> it's only irresponsible if done irresponsibly. >> >> ___ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > ___ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > The real bottleneck today is the amount of capex required to achieve > optimal mining. I am strongly in favor of PoW research that investigates > better PoW, but I do not think that any obvious strategies are known yet to > improve substantially on computation heavy hashcash. > ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
On Apr 9, 2017 7:00 PM, "Jared Lee Richardson via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: I can speak from personal experience regarding another very prominent altcoin that attempted to utilize an asic-resistant proof of work algorithm, it is only a matter of time before the "asic resistant" algorithm gets its own Asics. The more complicated the algorithm, the more secretive the asic technology is developed. Even without it, multi-megawatt gpu farms have already formed in the areas of the world with low energy costs. I'd support the goal if I thought it possible, but I really don't think centralization of mining can be prevented. On Apr 9, 2017 1:16 PM, "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev"wrote: > Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW change is not on the > table as a part of a longer-term roadmap. > > Done right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of > the proven, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would > keep Bitcoin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized > manufacturing for many years. > > Clearly a level-playing field is critical to keeping centralization from > being a "defining feature" of Bitcoin over the long term. I've heard the > term "level playing field" bandied about quite a bit. And it seems to me > that the risk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than > state-actor manipulation of specialized manufacturing of "SHA-256 forever" > hardware. Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and > less likely a "feature" and more of a baggage. > > Perhaps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as a > part of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general. Killing the > existing POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW > field to flip-flop between the current and the "next one" every 8 years or > or so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year A stub function that > is guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected within 7 > years. > > Something like that? > > Haven't thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would > respond well to a well known cutover date. This would enable > rapid-response to quantum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... > because the mechanisms would be in-place and ready to switch as needed. > > Lots of people seem to panic over POW changes as "irresponsible", but it's > only irresponsible if done irresponsibly. > > ___ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev The real bottleneck today is the amount of capex required to achieve optimal mining. I am strongly in favor of PoW research that investigates better PoW, but I do not think that any obvious strategies are known yet to improve substantially on computation heavy hashcash. ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
I can speak from personal experience regarding another very prominent altcoin that attempted to utilize an asic-resistant proof of work algorithm, it is only a matter of time before the "asic resistant" algorithm gets its own Asics. The more complicated the algorithm, the more secretive the asic technology is developed. Even without it, multi-megawatt gpu farms have already formed in the areas of the world with low energy costs. I'd support the goal if I thought it possible, but I really don't think centralization of mining can be prevented. On Apr 9, 2017 1:16 PM, "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW change is not on the > table as a part of a longer-term roadmap. > > Done right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of > the proven, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would > keep Bitcoin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized > manufacturing for many years. > > Clearly a level-playing field is critical to keeping centralization from > being a "defining feature" of Bitcoin over the long term. I've heard the > term "level playing field" bandied about quite a bit. And it seems to me > that the risk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than > state-actor manipulation of specialized manufacturing of "SHA-256 forever" > hardware. Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and > less likely a "feature" and more of a baggage. > > Perhaps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as a > part of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general. Killing the > existing POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW > field to flip-flop between the current and the "next one" every 8 years or > or so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year A stub function that > is guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected within 7 > years. > > Something like that? > > Haven't thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would > respond well to a well known cutover date. This would enable > rapid-response to quantum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... > because the mechanisms would be in-place and ready to switch as needed. > > Lots of people seem to panic over POW changes as "irresponsible", but it's > only irresponsible if done irresponsibly. > > > On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 9:48 PM, praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Jimmy Song, >> >> Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term >> owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change Bitcoin >> policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack? >> >> If anything, we would be making policy changes to prevent the use of >> patented PoW algorithms instead of making changes to enable them. >> >> Thanks, >> Praxeology Guy >> >> ___ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > > ___ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
Curious: I'm not sure why a serious discussion of POW change is not on the table as a part of a longer-term roadmap. Done right, a ramp down of reliance on SHA-256 and a ramp-up on some of the proven, np-complete graph-theoretic or polygon manipulation POW would keep Bitcoin in commodity hardware and out of the hands of centralized manufacturing for many years. Clearly a level-playing field is critical to keeping centralization from being a "defining feature" of Bitcoin over the long term. I've heard the term "level playing field" bandied about quite a bit. And it seems to me that the risk of state actor control and botnet attacks is less than state-actor manipulation of specialized manufacturing of "SHA-256 forever" hardware. Indeed, the reliance on a fairly simple hash seems less and less likely a "feature" and more of a baggage. Perhaps regular, high-consensus POW changes might even be *necessary* as a part of good maintenance of cryptocurrency in general. Killing the existing POW, and using an as-yet undefined, but deployment-bit ready POW field to flip-flop between the current and the "next one" every 8 years or or so, with a ramp down beginning in the 7th year A stub function that is guaranteed to fail unless a new consensus POW is selected within 7 years. Something like that? Haven't thought about it *that* much, but I think the network would respond well to a well known cutover date. This would enable rapid-response to quantum tech, or some other needed POW switch as well... because the mechanisms would be in-place and ready to switch as needed. Lots of people seem to panic over POW changes as "irresponsible", but it's only irresponsible if done irresponsibly. On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 9:48 PM, praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Jimmy Song, > > Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term > owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change Bitcoin > policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack? > > If anything, we would be making policy changes to prevent the use of > patented PoW algorithms instead of making changes to enable them. > > Thanks, > Praxeology Guy > > ___ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
Jorge, Why won't the attacker use asicboost too? (Please don't say because of > patents) > > We're assuming the ASIC optimization in my example is incompatible with ASICBoost. But if the new optimization were compatible with ASICBoost, you're right, the network would be in an equivalent situation whether ASICBoost was banned or not. I want to point out again that overt ASICBoost can be used on the network today. My proposal is to bring ASICBoost usage out into the open vs hiding it. Banning ASICBoost via protocol changes is another issue completely. Jimmy > On 9 Apr 2017 12:26 am, "Jimmy Song"wrote: > >> Jorge, >> >> Suppose someone figures out an ASIC optimization that's completely >> unrelated that gives X% speed boost over your non-ASICBoosted >> implementation. If you ban ASICBoost, someone with this optimization can >> get 51% of the network by adding N machines with their new optimization. If >> you allow ASICBoost and assuming this gets a 20% speed boost over >> non-ASICBoosted hardware, someone with this optimization would need 1.2N >> machines to get 51%. The network in that sense is 20% stronger against this >> attack in terms of cost. >> >> Jimmy >> >> On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 12:22 PM, Jorge Timón wrote: >> >>> To be more specific, why "being higher will secure the Bitcoin network >>> better against newer optimizations"? >>> Or, to be more clear, let's forget about future "optimizations", let's >>> just think of an attacker. Does asicboost being used by all miners >>> make the system more secure against an attacker? No, for the attacker >>> can use asicboost too. >>> What about the case when not all the miners are using asicboost? Then >>> the attacker can actually get an advantage by suing asicboost. >>> >>> Sometimes people compare asicboost with the use of asics in general as >>> both providing more security for the network and users. But I don't >>> think this is accurate. The existence of sha256d asics makes an attack >>> with general purpose computing hardware (or even more specialized >>> architectures like gpgpu) much more expensive and unlikely. As an >>> alternative the attacker can spend additional resources investing in >>> asics himself (again, making many attacks more expensive and >>> unlikely). >>> >>> But as far as I know, asicboost can be implemented with software >>> running on general purpose hardware that integrates with regular >>> sha256d asics. There is probably an advantage on having the asicboost >>> implementation "in the same box" as the sha256d, yet again the >>> attacker can invest in hardware with the competitive advantage from >>> having asicboost more intergrated with the sha256d asics too. >>> >>> To reiterate, whether all miners use asicboost or only a subset of >>> them, I remain unconvinced that provides any additional security to >>> the network (to be more precise whether that makes "tx history harder >>> to rewrite"), even if it results on the hashrate charts looking "more >>> secure". >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 6:27 PM, Jorge Timón wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > On 8 Apr 2017 5:06 am, "Jimmy Song via bitcoin-dev" >>> > wrote: >>> > >>> > Praxeology Guy, >>> > >>> >> Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short >>> term >>> >> owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change >>> Bitcoin >>> >> policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack? >>> > >>> > >>> > Certainly, if only one company made use of the extra nonce space, they >>> would >>> > have an advantage. But think of it this way, if some newer ASIC >>> optimization >>> > comes up, would you rather have a non-ASICBoosted hash rate to defend >>> with >>> > or an ASICBoosted hash rate? Certainly, the latter, being higher will >>> secure >>> > the Bitcoin network better against newer optimizations. >>> > >>> > >>> > Why? >>> >> >> ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
Why won't the attacker use asicboost too? (Please don't say because of patents) On 9 Apr 2017 12:26 am, "Jimmy Song"wrote: > Jorge, > > Suppose someone figures out an ASIC optimization that's completely > unrelated that gives X% speed boost over your non-ASICBoosted > implementation. If you ban ASICBoost, someone with this optimization can > get 51% of the network by adding N machines with their new optimization. If > you allow ASICBoost and assuming this gets a 20% speed boost over > non-ASICBoosted hardware, someone with this optimization would need 1.2N > machines to get 51%. The network in that sense is 20% stronger against this > attack in terms of cost. > > Jimmy > > On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 12:22 PM, Jorge Timón wrote: > >> To be more specific, why "being higher will secure the Bitcoin network >> better against newer optimizations"? >> Or, to be more clear, let's forget about future "optimizations", let's >> just think of an attacker. Does asicboost being used by all miners >> make the system more secure against an attacker? No, for the attacker >> can use asicboost too. >> What about the case when not all the miners are using asicboost? Then >> the attacker can actually get an advantage by suing asicboost. >> >> Sometimes people compare asicboost with the use of asics in general as >> both providing more security for the network and users. But I don't >> think this is accurate. The existence of sha256d asics makes an attack >> with general purpose computing hardware (or even more specialized >> architectures like gpgpu) much more expensive and unlikely. As an >> alternative the attacker can spend additional resources investing in >> asics himself (again, making many attacks more expensive and >> unlikely). >> >> But as far as I know, asicboost can be implemented with software >> running on general purpose hardware that integrates with regular >> sha256d asics. There is probably an advantage on having the asicboost >> implementation "in the same box" as the sha256d, yet again the >> attacker can invest in hardware with the competitive advantage from >> having asicboost more intergrated with the sha256d asics too. >> >> To reiterate, whether all miners use asicboost or only a subset of >> them, I remain unconvinced that provides any additional security to >> the network (to be more precise whether that makes "tx history harder >> to rewrite"), even if it results on the hashrate charts looking "more >> secure". >> >> >> On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 6:27 PM, Jorge Timón wrote: >> > >> > >> > On 8 Apr 2017 5:06 am, "Jimmy Song via bitcoin-dev" >> > wrote: >> > >> > Praxeology Guy, >> > >> >> Why would the actual end users of Bitcoin (the long term and short term >> >> owners of bitcoins) who run fully verifying nodes want to change >> Bitcoin >> >> policy in order to make their money more vulnerable to 51% attack? >> > >> > >> > Certainly, if only one company made use of the extra nonce space, they >> would >> > have an advantage. But think of it this way, if some newer ASIC >> optimization >> > comes up, would you rather have a non-ASICBoosted hash rate to defend >> with >> > or an ASICBoosted hash rate? Certainly, the latter, being higher will >> secure >> > the Bitcoin network better against newer optimizations. >> > >> > >> > Why? >> > > ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Small Modification to Segwit
On 8 Apr 2017 8:31 pm, "praxeology_guy via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: There is the equation: Power Cost + Captial Rent + Labor ~= block reward + fees I don't know why many people insist on calling the subsidy the blick reward. Thw block reward is both the block subsidy plus the block fees. ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev