On Sat, Jun 2, 2018, 22:56 Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Lighter but SPV secure nodes (filter committed) would help the network
> (esp. Layer 2) to grow mesh like, but add more user that blindly follow POW.
>
> On longer term most users' security w
Lighter but SPV secure nodes (filter committed) would help the network (esp.
Layer 2) to grow mesh like, but add more user that blindly follow POW.
On longer term most users' security will be determined by either trusted hubs
or POW.
I do not know which is worse, but we should at least offer the
On Sat, Jun 2, 2018 at 10:02 PM, Tamas Blummer via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> Years of experience implementing wallets with BIP 37
pretty much us that all these filter things are a total waste of time.
BIP37 use is nearly dead on the network-- monitor your own nodes to
see the actual use of the filters
Without block commitment mobiles would have to use trusted filter provider or
implement a complex data hungry algorithm and still remain as insecure as with
BIP 37.
Years of experience implementing wallets with BIP 37 taught us that an outpoint
+ output script filter is useful. Committing such
On Fri, Jun 01, 2018 at 07:02:38PM -0700, Jim Posen via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Without the ability to verify filter validity, a client would have to stop
> syncing altogether in the presence of just one malicious peer, which is
> unacceptable.
I'm confused about why this would be the case. If Alice
