Re: [bitcoin-dev] Design for a CoinSwap implementation for massively improving Bitcoin privacy and fungibility

2020-06-05 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning a third time Chris, Now unrelated to the funding order, but one of the reasons why timeliness is desirable for CoinSwap is that if possible, we want to ensure that sends from a user wallet are not correlatable with receives into that wallet. Thus, there is the strong suggestion

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Design for a CoinSwap implementation for massively improving Bitcoin privacy and fungibility

2020-06-05 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning again Chris, I am uncertain if you are aware, but some years ago somebody claimed that 2p-ECDSA could use Scriptless Script as well over on lightning-dev. * https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20180426/fe978423/attachment-0001.pdf *

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Design for a CoinSwap implementation for massively improving Bitcoin privacy and fungibility

2020-06-05 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Chris, > I think I'm having trouble understanding this, does it work like this: > > Say we're in the 2-party coinswap case (Alice and Bob) > > We have Alice's funding transaction: > Alice UTXO ---> 2of2 multisig (Alice+Bob) > > And we have the regular contract transaction > 2of2

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Design for a CoinSwap implementation for massively improving Bitcoin privacy and fungibility

2020-06-05 Thread Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev
Good day ZmnSCPxj, >>> But S6 has the mild advantage that all the funding transactions paying to >>> 2-of-2s can appear on the same block, whereas chaining swaps will have a >>> particular order of when the transactions appear onchain, which might be >>> used to derive the order of swaps. >>

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

2020-06-05 Thread Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
Hi, As far as I understand your answer is "let's try to use what exists", this is not what I am proposing and not the Tor network, no "standard" exit nodes, different hidden services, decentralized anonymizer network unlike the Tor network, nodes are anonymizing themselves Comments below, please

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

2020-06-05 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Aymeric, > The issue each time there are discussions/research linking to Tor is that it > is biased since the beginning because based on a wrong postulate: using the > Tor network > Well, in the interest of using the wrong tool for a highly important job, let me present this

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

2020-06-05 Thread Aymeric Vitte via bitcoin-dev
Le 04/06/2020 à 04:58, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev a écrit : >> [Tor is tricky](https://arxiv.org/abs/1410.6079) too > Since the issue here is that eclipsing of Bitcoin nodes is risky, it strikes > me that a mitigation would be to run your Bitcoin fullnode on clearnet while > running your