Re: [bitcoin-dev] Statechain coinswap: assigning blame for failure in a two-stage transfer protocol.

2020-09-21 Thread Karl via bitcoin-dev
Coinswap has been a struggling goal for many years now. Consider that bitshares' dexbot just recently lost their funding. Please make your projects usable before you announce you are working on them, to keep your work safe from distraction or harm. On Sun, Sep 13, 2020, 7:11 PM Tom Trevethan via

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-21 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
I think this is a worthy idea as the funding outpoint of any off-chain protocols is an invariant known by participants. Thus by sponsoring an outpoint you're requiring from network mempools to increase the feerate of the package locally known without assuming about the concrete state as any of them

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Statechain coinswap: assigning blame for failure in a two-stage transfer protocol.

2020-09-21 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Tom, > Hi ZmnSCPxj, > > > I think the entire point of non-custodiality ***is*** trust minimization. > > There are also legal and regulatory implications. It is much easier for a > service to operate without requiring its users to be KYCed if it is > non-custodial and funds cannot be

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Statechain coinswap: assigning blame for failure in a two-stage transfer protocol.

2020-09-21 Thread Tom Trevethan via bitcoin-dev
Hi ZmnSCPxj, > I think the entire point of non-custodiality ***is*** trust minimization. There are also legal and regulatory implications. It is much easier for a service to operate without requiring its users to be KYCed if it is non-custodial and funds cannot be frozen/seized. > The main objec

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-21 Thread Jeremy via bitcoin-dev
Responses Inline: Would it make sense that, instead of sponsor vectors > pointing to txids, they point to input outpoints? E.g.: > > 1. Alice and Bob open a channel with funding transaction 0123...cdef, >output 0. > > 2. After a bunch of state updates, Alice unilaterally broadcasts a >com

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-21 Thread David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev
On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 07:10:23PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote: > As you mentioned, if the goal of the sponsor mechanism is to let any party > drive a state N's first tx to completion, you still have the issue of > concurrent states being pinned and thus non-observable for sponsoring