Hey Everyone, A lot of pressure rides on AttemptToEvictConnection() because it is used to limit the impact of eclipsing attacks. With continued centralization, fair connection formation becomes a bigger concern. I am curious how other members of the community feel about the preferential treatment
Good morning Mr. Lee, > Lightning network is not much an option because they do not have > inbound balance to get paid. Why not? Your company can open a channel with each employee that has insufficient inbound liquidity. The employee is incentivized to reveal their node to your company so you
Lets pretend that I have a company. I'll call it cut throat industries. We are a box cutter testing firm. HR pays the employees biweekly Fridays. In the current way. Cut throat industries pays a single transaction with the company's treasury as the input and each employee payroll as an output.
Good morning Chris, > > Looking at these equations, I realize that the incentives against > post-coinswap-theft-attempt still work even if we set K = 0, because the > extra miner fee paid by Bob could be enough disincentive. This made me pause for a moment, but on reflection, is correct. The
Hello list, This email is an appendium or modification of the earlier CoinSwap protocol published on this list. It is intended to fix the problems found in review. (Original email quoted here too) On 11/08/2020 13:05, Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev wrote: > I'm currently working on implementing