Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP-0322 (generic signmessage) improvements

2020-12-21 Thread Andrew Poelstra via bitcoin-dev
On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 12:22:37AM +, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> 
> Re-reading your proposed text, I'm wondering if the "consensus-only 
> validation" extension is intended to replace the 
> inconclusive-due-to-consensus-and-standardness-differ state. If so, I don't 
> think it does, and regardless it doesn't seem very useful.
> 
> What I'm suggestion could be specified this way:
> * If validator understands the script:
>   * If signature is consensus valid (as far as the validator knows):
> * If signature is not known to trigger standardness rules intended for 
> future extension (well-defined set of rules listed in BIP, and revisable): 
> return valid
> * Otherwise: return inconclusive
>   * Otherwise: return invalid
> * Otherwise: return inconclusive
> 
> Or in other words: every signature has a well-defined result (valid, invalid, 
> inconclusive) + validators may choose to report inconclusive for anything 
> they don't understand.
> 
> This has the property that as long as new consensus rules only change things 
> that were covered under for-future-extension standardness rules, no two 
> validators will ever claim valid and invalid for the same signature. Only 
> valid+inconclusive or invalid+inconclusive.
>

I like it!

My thinking regarding standardness vs consensus rules was essentially that
I wanted to enforce the included standardness rules for anti-malleability
reasons, i.e. the hope that for "normal scripts" we would get strong signatures,
which may be important for anti-DoS reasons. (What I mean by this is that
if you can easily create mutations of signatures, it may confuse software
in similar ways to the Gox-era malleability attacks on wallet software of
the time.) But conversely, it is hard to enforce these rules as an
implementor, because libbitcoinconsensus does not expose them. So allowing
both forms of validation, to me, was an attempt to encourage adoption
rather than anything principled.

I didn't even consider the idea that validators should be able to signal "this
signature appears to use future consensus rules", although I should have been
clued in by your "upgradeable rules" language that this was your goal. Now that
you say this, it's obvious that this is desireable, and also obvious that using
the "inconclusive" state is an elegant way to achieve this.

I also agree that "confirming validators should never disagree on valid vs
invalid" is a good design goal and we should make that explicit.


I'll add a commit to my PR at https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1048 which
adds these thoughts.

-- 
Andrew Poelstra
Director of Research, Blockstream
Email: apoelstra at wpsoftware.net
Web:   https://www.wpsoftware.net/andrew

The sun is always shining in space
-Justin Lewis-Webster



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Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP-0322 (generic signmessage) improvements

2020-12-21 Thread Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
On Monday, December 21, 2020 2:57 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev 
 wrote:

> On Sunday, December 20, 2020 9:37 PM, Karl-Johan Alm via bitcoin-dev 
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
>
> > Thanks a lot for taking the time to brush up the BIP. For what it's
> > worth, I am all for these changes, and I see them as clear
> > improvements all around.
> > IIRC Pieter was the one who originally suggested the two-checks
> > approach (invalid, inconclusive, valid) which is being modified here,
> > so would be good if you chimed in (or not -- which I'll assume means
> > you don't mind).
>
> I agree with the idea of permitting incomplete validators to return 
> inconclusive as well. That doesn't really reduce the functionality (given 
> that "inconclusive" was already a potential result), and it obviously makes 
> it much more accessible to a variety of software.
>
> This suggestion breaks the original use of inconclusive though: the ability 
> to detect that future features are used in the signature. The idea was to use 
> divergence between "consensus valid" and "standardness valid" as a proxy for 
> future extensions to be detected (e.g. OP_NOPn, future witness versions, 
> ...). I think it's undesirable that these things now become unconditionally 
> invalid (until the BIP is updated, but once that happens old validators will 
> give a different result than new ones).
>
> Since the BIP no longer relies on a nebulous concept of standardness, and 
> instead specifically defines which standardness features are to be 
> considered, this seems easy to fix: whenever validation fails due to any of 
> those, require reporting inconclusive instead of invalid (unless of course 
> something actually invalid also happens). In practice I guess you'd implement 
> that (in capable validators) by still doing validation twice, once with all 
> features enabled that distinguish between valid/invalid, and if valid, again 
> but now with the features enabled that distinguish between valid and (invalid 
> or inconclusive).

Re-reading your proposed text, I'm wondering if the "consensus-only validation" 
extension is intended to replace the 
inconclusive-due-to-consensus-and-standardness-differ state. If so, I don't 
think it does, and regardless it doesn't seem very useful.

What I'm suggestion could be specified this way:
* If validator understands the script:
  * If signature is consensus valid (as far as the validator knows):
* If signature is not known to trigger standardness rules intended for 
future extension (well-defined set of rules listed in BIP, and revisable): 
return valid
* Otherwise: return inconclusive
  * Otherwise: return invalid
* Otherwise: return inconclusive

Or in other words: every signature has a well-defined result (valid, invalid, 
inconclusive) + validators may choose to report inconclusive for anything they 
don't understand.

This has the property that as long as new consensus rules only change things 
that were covered under for-future-extension standardness rules, no two 
validators will ever claim valid and invalid for the same signature. Only 
valid+inconclusive or invalid+inconclusive.

Cheers,

--
Pieter

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP-0322 (generic signmessage) improvements

2020-12-21 Thread Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
On Sunday, December 20, 2020 9:37 PM, Karl-Johan Alm via bitcoin-dev 
 wrote:

> Thanks a lot for taking the time to brush up the BIP. For what it's
> worth, I am all for these changes, and I see them as clear
> improvements all around.
>
> IIRC Pieter was the one who originally suggested the two-checks
> approach (invalid, inconclusive, valid) which is being modified here,
> so would be good if you chimed in (or not -- which I'll assume means
> you don't mind).

I agree with the idea of permitting incomplete validators to return 
inconclusive as well. That doesn't really reduce the functionality (given that 
"inconclusive" was already a potential result), and it obviously makes it much 
more accessible to a variety of software.

This suggestion breaks the original use of inconclusive though: the ability to 
detect that future features are used in the signature. The idea was to use 
divergence between "consensus valid" and "standardness valid" as a proxy for 
future extensions to be detected (e.g. OP_NOPn, future witness versions, ...). 
I think it's undesirable that these things now become unconditionally invalid 
(until the BIP is updated, but once that happens old validators will give a 
different result than new ones).

Since the BIP no longer relies on a nebulous concept of standardness, and 
instead specifically defines which standardness features are to be considered, 
this seems easy to fix: whenever validation fails due to any of those, require 
reporting inconclusive instead of invalid (unless of course something actually 
invalid also happens). In practice I guess you'd implement that (in capable 
validators) by still doing validation twice, once with all features enabled 
that distinguish between valid/invalid, and if valid, again but now with the 
features enabled that distinguish between valid and (invalid or inconclusive).

Cheers,

--
Pieter

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