reposted due to wrong email address:
I'd just like to repeat something I said years ago but is undoubtedly lost
now:
>
> ### Today's low cost for sybil attacks
>
> A paper on JoinMarket [Möser, Malte and Rainer Böhme. “Join Me on a
> Market for Anonymity.” (2016).] calculates the requirement of s
ZmnSCPxj, thanks, responses inline.
On 28. 01. 19 5:14, ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> Good morning Ryan and Adam,
>
>> [UIH2 snipped]
>
> Perhaps I am being naive, but I seem, the B2EP and similar do not need to
> worry about UIH2.
>
> From the github discussion:
>
>> "UIH2": one input is larger than any
do this; whether it's
feasible in that specific wallet situation or not is up to them; whether
they want to go hog wild and control percentages of UIH1 and UIH2 and
whatnot is there business, or they can totally ignore it - but without
it being mentioned in the BIP, they may not even think of it.
A
Ryan and list,
I want to add some commentary to this (BIP79) to see if we can get
further in standardizing this idea.
When I first mulled it over I thought it too impractical, but its virtue
of steganographic hiding means only minimal uptake is still enormously
interesting and worth pursuing; that
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In case it helps:
The elements alpha sidechain uses a different address format, which
includes an ECDH pubkey used for creating an ECDH shared secret.
That shared secret is used to seed a RFC6979 prng, which allows both
sides to generate the blinding f
