On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 1:49 PM Itay Tsabary
wrote:
> Note the required token amount for the collateral contract is low and
> independent of the required deposit tokens -- only a relatively small
> incentive is required to make "acting honestly" Bob's preferred choice.
> So, this is basically a
On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 12:17 PM ZmnSCPxj wrote:
>
> > In fact, one rule of thumb might be that wherever watchtowers are
> required, a timelocked bribe might be possible.
>
> I think a better heuristic is that, if the logic of the construction
> assumes "transaction with earlier locktime
On Thu, Jul 2, 2020 at 6:06 PM ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> At fee spikes, this x will go higher, and thus (f - x) / (b - x) will be
> far smaller than f / b and might even become negative, in which case the
> Alice transaction will not be confirmed even by myopic miners, because the
> Alice transaction
On Wed, Jul 1, 2020 at 6:58 PM ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> And your paper posits that if a miner is weak, its best strategy is to
> take the myopic strategy and include the currently-valid Alice transaction.
>
Yes. The proof is quite trivial and follows from the definition of weak: if
the myopic miner's
On Wed, Jul 1, 2020 at 6:58 PM ZmnSCPxj wrote:
> Another analysis, similar but a little off-tangent to yours, would be to
> consider miners as a breeding group with various strategies, and see which
> one is able to gain more utilons (with which it creates more miners) and
> outbreed the other
Hello ZmnSCPxj (as there would be no better way to start an email to you
:-),
I posted a reply to Dave in the other sub-thread of this main thread. We
have a paper about something similar to what you have said - where we look
at "weak" and "strong" miners, and how even if there are a few weak
On Sun, Jun 28, 2020 at 2:16 PM David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> So, if I understand correctly, even a small amount of "myopic" hashrate
> and long timeouts---or modest amounts of hashrate and short
> timeouts---makes this attack unlikely to
