Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Package Mempool Accept and Package RBF

2021-09-29 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
re only allowed to use confirmed inputs > and have many channels (and a limited number of confirmed inputs). > Otherwise you'll need node operators to pre-emptively split their > utxos into many small utxos just for fee bumping, which is inefficient... > > Bastien &

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Package Mempool Accept and Package RBF

2021-09-26 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Gloria, Thanks for your answers, > In summary, it seems that the decisions that might still need > attention/input from devs on this mailing list are: > 1. Whether we should start with multiple-parent-1-child or 1-parent-1-child. > 2. Whether it's ok to require that the child not have

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Package Mempool Accept and Package RBF

2021-09-23 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> Correct, if B+C is too low feerate to be accepted, we will reject it. I > prefer this because it is incentive compatible: A can be mined by itself, > so there's no reason to prefer A+B+C instead of A. > As another way of looking at this, consider the case where we do accept > A+B+C and it sits

Re: [bitcoin-dev] TAPLEAF_UPDATE_VERIFY covenant opcode

2021-09-22 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> Hmm, I'm reading C5 as "If an oracle says X, and Alice and Carol agree, > they can distribute all the remaining funds as they see fit". Should be read as an OR: IF 2 2 CHECKMULTISIG ELSE 2 2 CHECKMULTISIG ENDIF <> 2 IN_OUT_AMOUNT The empty vector is a

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Package Mempool Accept and Package RBF

2021-09-19 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Gloria, > A package may contain transactions that are already in the mempool. We > remove > ("deduplicate") those transactions from the package for the purposes of > package > mempool acceptance. If a package is empty after deduplication, we do > nothing. IIUC, you have a package A+B+C

Re: [bitcoin-dev] TAPLEAF_UPDATE_VERIFY covenant opcode

2021-09-18 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
logically equivalent subtree embedded in the modifying tapscript. If you have multiple modifying scripts and you can't predict the order, I think the tree complexity will be quickly too high and grafroot-like approaches are likely better Le mer. 15 sept. 2021 à 02:51, Anthony Towns a écrit :

Re: [bitcoin-dev] TAPLEAF_UPDATE_VERIFY covenant opcode

2021-09-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Sorry for the lack of clarity, sometimes it sounds easier to explain ideas with code. While MERKLESUB is still WIP, here the semantic. If the input spent is a SegWit v1 Taproot output, and the script path spending is used, the top stack item is interpreted as an output position of the spending

Re: [bitcoin-dev] TAPLEAF_UPDATE_VERIFY covenant opcode

2021-09-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi AJ, Thanks for finally putting the pieces together! [0] We've been hacking with Gleb on a paper for the CoinPool protocol [1] during the last weeks and it should be public soon, hopefully highlighting what kind of scheme, TAPLEAF_UPDATE_VERIFY-style of covenant enable :) Here few early

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Note on Sequence Lock Upgrades Defect

2021-09-09 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Jeremy, Answering here from #22871 discussions. I agree on the general principle to not blur mempool policies signaling in committed transaction data. Beyond preserving upgradeability, another good argument is to let L2 nodes update the mempool policies signaling their pre-signed transactions

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Removing the Dust Limit

2021-08-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> As developers, we have no control over prevailing feerates, so this is a problem LN needs to deal with regardless of Bitcoin Core's dust limit. Right, as of today, we're going to trim-to-dust any commitment output of which the value is inferior to the transaction owner's `dust_limit_satoshis`

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Removing the Dust Limit

2021-08-09 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
I'm pretty conservative about increasing the standard dust limit in any way. This would convert a higher percentage of LN channels capacity into dust, which is coming with a lowering of funds safety [0]. Of course, we can adjust the LN security model around dust handling to mitigate the safety

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-07-11 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
overlapping though you might still have to be careful about siphoning ? Something you should already care about if you use SIGHASH_SINGLE and your x's amount > y's value. Le ven. 9 juil. 2021 à 21:47, Anthony Towns a écrit : > On Fri, Jul 09, 2021 at 09:19:45AM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitco

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-07-09 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, May 27, 2021 at 04:14:13PM -0400, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote: > This overhead could be smoothed even further in the future with more advanced > sighash malleability flags like SIGHASH_IOMAP, allowing transaction signers to > commit to a map of inputs/outputs [2]. In th

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Full-RBF in Bitcoin Core 24.0

2021-06-25 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
course of a year or two seems fine, no need to rush. But I > suppose it would depend on how often 0-conf is used in the bitcoin > ecosystem at this point, which I don't have any data on. > > On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 10:00 AM Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxf

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Waiting SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT and Packing Packages

2021-06-24 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Michael, > Browsing quickly through Greg's piece, a lot of the reasoning is based on FOSS experience from Linux/Juniper, which to the best of my knowledge are centralized software projects ? > That is Greg's point. If Linux doesn't look further than the current > version and the next version

[bitcoin-dev] On the recent softforks survey, forget to fulfill my answer!

2021-06-21 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, I was super glad to see the recent survey on potential softforks for the near-future of Bitcoin! I didn't have time to answer this one but will do so for the future. I wanna to salute the grassroots involvement in bitcoin protocol development, that's cool to see :) Though softforks are what

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] Waiting SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT and Packing Packages

2021-06-21 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Dave, > That might work for current LN-penalty, but I'm not sure it works for eltoo. Well, we have not settled yet on the eltoo design but if we take the later proposal in date [0], signing the update transaction with SIGHGASH_ANYPREVOUT lets you attach non-interactively a single-party

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Waiting SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT and Packing Packages

2021-06-18 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> That's a question I hope we'll gather feedback during next Thursday's transaction relay workshops. As someone kindly pointed out to me, workshop is happening Tuesday, June 22th. Not Thursday, mistake of mine :/ Le ven. 18 juin 2021 à 18:11, Antoine Riard a écrit : > Hi, > > It's a big

[bitcoin-dev] Waiting SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT and Packing Packages

2021-06-18 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, It's a big chunk, so if you don't have time browse parts 1 and 2 and share your 2 sats on the deployment timeline :p This post recalls some unsolved safety holes about Lightning, how package-relay or SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT can solve the first one, how a mempool hardening can solve the second

[bitcoin-dev] Proposal: Full-RBF in Bitcoin Core 24.0

2021-06-15 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, I'm writing to propose deprecation of opt-in RBF in favor of full-RBF as the Bitcoin Core's default replacement policy in version 24.0. As a reminder, the next release is 22.0, aimed for August 1st, assuming agreement is reached, this policy change would enter into deployment phase a year

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-14 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Thanks for this analysis of a sponsor-like mechanism. For sure, "watchtower friendly" and "post hoc" are really good point towards sponsorship, at least other proposals are struggling with watchtower support, at least in way where your watchtower policy doesn't leak to your counterparties (which

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-14 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
>>> OP_CHECKSIGADD(p2-fee-bump-key, ) OP_2 >>> OP_NUMEQUALVERIFY >>> >>> where <...> indicates the thing comes from the witness stack. >>> So to bump the fee of the commit tx after it has been signed either >>> party takes the and adds a signature

[bitcoin-dev] Reminder: Transaction relay workshop on IRC Libera - Tuesday 15th June 19:00 UTC

2021-06-14 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, A short reminder about the 1st transaction relay workshop happening tomorrow on #l2-onchain-support Libera chat (!), Tuesday 15th June, from 19:00 UTC to 20:30 UTC Scheduled topics are: * "Guidelines about L2 protocols onchain security design" * "Coordinated cross-layers security

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
fee bumping without DoS or pinning attacks but hopefully I > have demonstrated that this class of solutions also exists. > > [1] https://github.com/ajtowns/bips/blob/bip-anyprevout/bip-0118.mediawiki > > Cheers, > > LL > > > > On Fri, 28 May 2021 at 07:13, Antoi

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-06-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> So something like `or(and(pk(FB),pk(A)),and(pk(FB),pk(B)),and(pk(FB),pk(C)))` with each `or` in their own leaf? I think it works, but only if the keys `A`, `B`, `C` are "hot", as in available to the fee-bumper. For Revault it means introducing a key for each watchtower in the vaults descriptors,

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Improvement on Blockbuilding

2021-05-29 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Mark and Clara, Great research, thanks for it! Few questions out of mind after a first read. > This approach enables block building to consider Child Pays For Parent (CPFP) constellations. I think that's a really interesting point, it's likely that such transaction graphs with multiple

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-05-28 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> Unfortunately, ACP | SINGLE is trivially pinable [0] (TL;DR: i can just attach an output paying immediately to me, and construct a tx chain spending it). We are using ACP | ALL for Revault, > which is the reason why we need a well laid-out pool of fee-bumping UTXOs (as you need to consume them

[bitcoin-dev] A Stroll through Fee-Bumping Techniques : Input-Based vs Child-Pay-For-Parent

2021-05-27 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, This post is pursuing a wider discussion around better fee-bumping strategies for second-layer protocols. It draws out a comparison between input-based and CPFP fee-bumping techniques, and their apparent trade-offs in terms of onchain footprint, tx-relay bandwidth rebroadcast, batching

[bitcoin-dev] L2s Onchain Support IRC Workshop : Agenda & Schedule

2021-05-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, Following-up on the workshop announcement [0], I'm proposing today's early agenda and schedule. Dates have been picked up 2 weeks after the end of the Miami's conference as the american crowd will travel around and won't be necessary on their keyboards. Also, if folks from Asia/Pacific

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Full Disclosure: CVE-2021-31876 Defect in Bitcoin Core's bip125 logic

2021-05-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
r. 11 mai 2021 à 17:51, Luke Dashjr a écrit : > Is there a list of software impacted by this CVE, and the versions it is > fixed > in? > > (Note this isn't a vulnerability in Bitcoin Core; BIP125 is strictly a > policy > matter, not part of the consensus rules and never safe to r

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Full Disclosure: CVE-2021-31876 Defect in Bitcoin Core's bip125 logic

2021-05-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Ruben, Thanks for raising awareness about spacechains/BMM, I didn't have knowledge it was relying on a fee-based English auction to mine side-blocks. IIUC, it's another type of dynamic membership multi-party signature where parties are block-signing with a fee proposal instead of a PoW ?

[bitcoin-dev] Full Disclosure: CVE-2021-31876 Defect in Bitcoin Core's bip125 logic

2021-05-06 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, I'm writing to report a defect in Bitcoin Core bip125 logic with minor security and operational implications for downstream projects. Though this defect grieves Bitcoin Core nodes 0.12.0 and above, base layer safety isn't impacted. # Problem Bip 125 specification describes the following

Re: [bitcoin-dev] L2s Onchain Support IRC Workshop

2021-04-27 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
policy, > but perhaps it could be helpful to expose a configurable RPC (e.g. #21413 > <https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21413>) to test a range of > scenarios? > > Anyway, looking forward to discussions :) > > Best, > Gloria > > On Fri, Apr 23, 2021 at 8:51 AM

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposed BIP editor: Kalle Alm

2021-04-23 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Luke, For the records and the subscribers of this list not following #bitcoin-core-dev, this mail follows a discussion which did happen during yesterday irc meetings. Logs here : http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-core-dev/2021-04-22.log I'll reiterate my opinion expressed during the meeting. If this

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] L2s Onchain Support IRC Workshop

2021-04-23 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Jeremy, Yes dates are floating for now. After Bitcoin 2021, sounds a good idea. Awesome, I'll be really interested to review again an improved version of sponsorship. And I'll try to sketch out the sighash_no-input fee-bumping idea which was floating around last year during pinnings

[bitcoin-dev] L2s Onchain Support IRC Workshop

2021-04-23 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, During the lastest years, tx-relay and mempool acceptances rules of the base layer have been sources of major security and operational concerns for Lightning and other Bitcoin second-layers [0]. I think those areas require significant improvements to ease design and deployment of higher

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal for new "disabletx" p2p message

2021-03-03 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> I believe this is what BIP 60 does, or did you have something else in > mind? Right, it achieves the first goal of dissociating `fRelay` from BIP37 but it doesn't document Core specific behavior of disconnecting peers for raw TX messages reception from outbound block-relay-only peers, as

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal for new "disabletx" p2p message

2021-03-01 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi John, > I think a good counter-argument against simply using `fRelay` for this > purpose is that we shouldn't reuse a protocol feature designed for one > function to achieve a totally different aim. However, we know that nodes > on the network have been using `fRelay` to disable transaction

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal to stop processing of unrequested transactions in Bitcoin Core

2021-02-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Jeremy, If I understand correctly your concern, you're worried that change would ease discovery of the node's tx-relay topology ? I don't scope transaction origin inference, if you suppose the unrequested-tx peer sending is the attacker it must have learnt the transaction from somewhere else

[bitcoin-dev] Proposal to stop processing of unrequested transactions in Bitcoin Core

2021-02-10 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, I'm proposing to stop the processing of unrequested transactions in Bitcoin Core 22.0+ at TX message reception. An unrequested transaction is one defined by which a "getdata" message for its specific identifier (either txid or wtxid) has not been previously issued by the node [0]. This

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hardware wallets and "advanced" Bitcoin features

2021-01-16 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hello Kevin, Thanks for starting this thread, that's a really relevant discussion ecosystem-wise ! > * Proposed improvement: The HW should display the Bitcoin Script itself when possible (including the unlock conditions). What level of script literacy are you assuming on your users ? I can see

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-22 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hello AC, Yes that's a real issue. In the context of multi-party protocols, you may pre-signed transactions with the feerate of _today_ and then only going to be broadcast later with a feerate of _tomorrow_. In that case the pre-signed feerate may be so low that the transaction won't even

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-21 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
I think this is a worthy idea as the funding outpoint of any off-chain protocols is an invariant known by participants. Thus by sponsoring an outpoint you're requiring from network mempools to increase the feerate of the package locally known without assuming about the concrete state as any of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-20 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Right, I was off the shot. Thanks for the explanation. As you mentioned, if the goal of the sponsor mechanism is to let any party drive a state N's first tx to completion, you still have the issue of concurrent states being pinned and thus non-observable for sponsoring by an honest party. E.g,

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-19 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
EDIT: I misunderstood the emplacement of the sponsor vector, please disregard previous review :( Beyond where the convenient place should live, which is still accurate I think. > The > Sponsor Vector TXIDs must also be > in the block the transaction is validated in, with no restriction on >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Replacement for RBF and CPFP: Non-Destructive TXID Dependencies for Fee Sponsoring

2020-09-19 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Jeremy, This is a really interesting proposal to widen the scope of fee mechanisms. First, a wider point on what this proposal brings with regards to pinning, to the best of my knowledge. A pinning may have different vectors by exploiting a) mempools limits (e.g descendants) or b) mempools

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Detailed protocol design for routed multi-transaction CoinSwap

2020-09-05 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Zeeman, I think one of the general problems for any participant in an interdependent chain of contracts like Lightning or CoinSwap is to avoid a disequilibrium in its local HTLC ledger. Concretely sending forward more than you receive backward. W.r.t, timelocks delta aim to enforce order of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Detailed protocol design for routed multi-transaction CoinSwap

2020-09-05 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Chris, I forgot to underscore that contract transaction output must be grieved by at least a CSV of 1. Otherwise, a malicious counterparty can occupy with garbage both the timelock-or-preimage output and its own anchor output thus blocking you to use the bumping capability of your own anchor

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Detailed protocol design for routed multi-transaction CoinSwap

2020-08-24 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hello Chris, I think you might have vulnerability issues with the current design. With regards to the fee model for contract transactions, AFAICT timely confirmation is a fund safety matter for an intermediate hop. Between the offchain preimage reveal phase and the offchain private key handover

[bitcoin-dev] Advances in Bitcoin Contracting : Uniform Policy and Package Relay

2020-07-29 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi list, Security and operations of higher-layer protocols (vaults, LN, CoinJoin, watchtowers, ...) come with different assumptions and demands with regards to tx-relay and fee models. As the Bitcoin stack is quite young, it would be great to make those ones more understood and what p2p/mempool

[bitcoin-dev] Pinning : The Good, The Bad, The Ugly

2020-06-28 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
(tl;dr Ideally network mempools should be an efficient marketplace leading to discovery of best-feerate blockspace demand by miners. It's not due to current anti-DoS rules assumptions and it's quite harmful for shared-utxo protocols like LN) Hello all, Lightning security model relies on the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] CoinPool, exploring generic payment pools for Fun and Privacy

2020-06-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi ZmnSCPxj, > I have not studied the proposal in close detail yet, but anyway, my main takeaway roughly is: > > * The core of CoinPool is some kind of multiparticipant (N > 2) offchain update mechanism (Decker-Wattenhofer or Decker-Russell-Osuntokun). > * The output at each state of the update

Re: [bitcoin-dev] CoinPool, exploring generic payment pools for Fun and Privacy

2020-06-12 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Jeremy, For the records, I didn't know between Greg and you was at the origin of payment pools. Thanks for your pioneer work here, obviously this draws inspiration from OP_CTV use cases and Channel Factories works, even if we picked up different assumptions and tried to address another set of

[bitcoin-dev] CoinPool, exploring generic payment pools for Fun and Privacy

2020-06-11 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi list, We (Gleb Naumenko + I) think that a wide range of second-layer protocols (LN, vaults, inheritance, etc) will be used by average Bitcoin users. We are interested in finding and addressing the privacy issues coming from the unique fingerprints these protocols bring. More specifically, we

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

2020-06-11 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi ZmnSCPxj Well your deeclipser is already WIP ;) See my AltNet+Watchdog proposals in Core: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18987/https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18988 It's almost covering what you mention, a driver framework to plug alternative transports protocols : radio,

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network

2020-06-07 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi ZmnSCPxj, > (Of note as well, is that the onchain contract provided by such services is the same in spirit as those instantiated in channels of the Lightning Network, thus the same attack schema works on the onchain side.) If you onchain contract uses a timelock and has concurrent

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-17 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> * At the same time, it retains your-keys-your-coins noncustodiality, because every update of a Lightning channel requires your keys to sign off on it. Yes I agree, I can foresee an easier step where managing low-value channel and get your familiar with smooth key management maybe a first step

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-13 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
dev wrote: > > On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 9:01 PM Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev < > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > >> On Tuesday 05 May 2020 10:17:37 Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote: > >>> Trust-minimization of Bitcoin security

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-09 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Christopher, Thanks for Blockchain Commons and Learning Bitcoin from the Command Line! > If there are people interested in coordinating some proposals on how to defining different sets of wallet functionality, Blockchain Commons would be interested in hosting that collaboration. This could

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-09 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi Igor, Thanks for sharing about what it's technically possible to do for a full-node on phone, specially with regards to lower grade devices. I do see 2 limitations for sleeping nodes: - a lightning specific one, i.e you need to process block data real-time in case of incoming HTLC you need to

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-07 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
may have multiples options: >> * halt the wallet, wait for human intervention >> * fallback connection to a trusted server, authoritative on your chain >> view >> * invalidity proofs? >> >> Now I agree you need a wide-enough, sane backbone network to build on >> to

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-06 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> As a result, the entire protocol could be served over something like HTTP, taking advantage of all the established CDNs and anycast serving infrastructure, Yes it's moving the issue of being a computation one to a distribution one. But still you need the bandwidth capacities. What I'm concerned

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-06 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> The choice between whether we offer them a light client technology that is better or worse for privacy and scalability. And offer them a solution which would scale in the long-term. Again it's not an argumentation against BIP 157 protocol in itself, the problem I'm interested in is how

Re: [bitcoin-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-06 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
foster node adoption as much as we can. Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 09:01, Luke Dashjr a écrit : > On Tuesday 05 May 2020 10:17:37 Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > Trust-minimization of Bitcoin security model has always relied first and > > above on running a full-node. This curre

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-06 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
I didn't trust myself and verify. In fact the [3] is the real [2]. Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 06:28, Andrés G. Aragoneses a écrit : > Hey Antoine, just a small note, [3] is missing in your footnotes, can you > add it? Thanks > > On Tue, 5 May 2020 at 18:17, Antoine Riard > wrote: > >> Hi, >> >>

[bitcoin-dev] On the scalability issues of onboarding millions of LN mobile clients

2020-05-05 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Hi, (cross-posting as it's really both layers concerned) Ongoing advancement of BIP 157 implementation in Core maybe the opportunity to reflect on the future of light client protocols and use this knowledge to make better-informed decisions about what kind of infrastructure is needed to support

Re: [bitcoin-dev] RBF Pinning with Counterparties and Competing Interest

2020-04-22 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> In that case, would it be worth re-implementing something like a BIP61 reject message but with an extension that returns the txids of any conflicts? That's an interesting idea, but an attacker can create a local conflict in your mempool and then send the preimage tx to make hit recentRejects

Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] RBF Pinning with Counterparties and Competing Interest

2020-04-22 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Personally, I would have wait a bit before to go public on this, like letting some implementations increasing their CLTV deltas, but anyway, it's here now. Mempool-pinning attacks were already discussed on this list [0], but what we found is you can _reverse_ the scenario, where it's not the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] LN & Coinjoin, a Great Tx Format Wedding

2020-02-25 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Morning Zeeman, > I proposed before to consider splicing as a form of merged closing plus funding, rather than a modification of channel state; in particular we might note that, for compatibility with our existing system, a spliced channel would have to change its short channel ID > and channel

Re: [bitcoin-dev] LN & Coinjoin, a Great Tx Format Wedding

2020-02-24 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> I notice your post puts little spotlight on unilateral cases. > A thing to note, is that we only use `nSequence` and the weird watermark on unilateral closes. > Even HTLCs only exist on unilateral closes --- on mutual closes we wait for HTLCs to settle one way or the other before doing the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] LN & Coinjoin, a Great Tx Format Wedding

2020-02-24 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
chnorr happen we don't have to wait another period to start enjoying the privacy enhancement (worst-case we can fallback on 2p-ecdsa). Le sam. 22 févr. 2020 à 07:10, AdamISZ a écrit : > ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐ > On Friday, 21 February 2020 22:17, Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev <

[bitcoin-dev] LN & Coinjoin, a Great Tx Format Wedding

2020-02-21 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
Coinjoins interceptions seem to raise at an increasing pace. Their onchain fingerprint (high-number of inputs/outputs, lack of anti-fee snipping, script type, ...) makes their detection quite easy for a chain observer. A ban of coinjoin'ed coins or any other coins linked through a common ownwer

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Taproot (and graftroot) complexity

2020-02-09 Thread Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev
> In particular, you care more about privacy when you are contesting a > close of a channel or other script path because then the miners could be more > likely to extract a rent from you as "ransom" for properly closing your channel > (or in other words, in a contested close the value of the