Re: [bitcoin-dev] Lamport scheme (not signature) to economize on L1

2023-12-21 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
Does this affect the security model WRT chain reorganizations? In the classic doublespend attack, an attacker can only redirect UTXOs that they spent. With this proposal, if I understand it correctly, an attacker could redirect all funds that have "matured" (revealed the previous preimage in the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trustless 2-way-peg without softfork

2023-09-11 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
Any chance of a quick tldr to pique our interest by explaining how exactly this works "and the protocol will reach consensus on whether the state reported by the oracle is correct" in presumably a permissionless, anonymous, decentralized fashion, and what caveats there are? Regards, Andrew On

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Ark: An Alternative Privacy-preserving Second Layer Solution

2023-05-23 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
Do you have any write up that presents a fully detailed architecture, including mechanisms like bitcoin scripts, transactions and L2 protocols, and then derives claims from that base? On Tue, May 23, 2023, 5:59 AM Burak Keceli via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] brickchain

2022-10-19 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
Consider that a miner can also produce transactions. So every miner would produce spam tx to fill their bricks at the minimum allowed difficulty to reap the brick coinbase reward. You might quickly respond with a modification that changes or eliminates the brick coinbase reward, but perhaps that

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Generalizing feature negotiation when new p2p connections are setup

2020-08-24 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
Since discussion around allowing unknown messages or not allowing them seems contentious, I'd like to offer up another possibility: create a single new message, XVERSION, (and bump the protocol rev) which is a key-value array of arbitrary data. Any protocol extension can then choose a new key

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Better MMR Definition

2017-02-28 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
I can understand how Bram's transaction double sha256 hashed UTXO set patricia trie allows a client to quickly validate inputs because the inputs of a transaction are specified in the same manner. So to verify that an input is unspent the client simply traverses the patricia trie. It also makes

Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Better MMR Definition

2017-02-23 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
Can an insertion ordered MMR allow an efficient nonexistence proof? On Feb 23, 2017 1:20 PM, "Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 09:53:58AM -0800, Chris Priest wrote: > > On 2/22/17, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev > >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Services bit for xthin blocks

2016-03-09 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
of Bitcoin history. Andrew On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:19 PM, Luke Dashjr <l...@dashjr.org> wrote: > On Tuesday, March 08, 2016 2:35:21 AM G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > Not an unreasonable request, however while I personally respect the many > > great accomplishments

[bitcoin-dev] Services bit for xthin blocks

2016-03-07 Thread G. Andrew Stone via bitcoin-dev
The Bitcoin Unlimited client needs a services bit to indicate that the node is capable of communicating thin blocks. We propose to use bit 4 as AFAIK bit 3 is already earmarked for Segregated Witness. Andrew ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list