Hi,
> I would also highly advise finding a simple and robust difficulty adjustment
> that occurs every block instead of bitcoin/litecoin's 2016 block use.
I also thought about this some time ago. But note that this implies
that forks grow with the same block frequency as the main chain. Thus
the
that same flag.
This is fairly decent privacy but the problem is you still need filter
matches on outgoing transactions to build a functioning wallet. So it might
not be an improvement over standard bloom filters but at least you can do
stealth if you want.
On May 4, 2017 9:00 AM, "Hennin
Hi all,
Recently I think a lot about combining Stealth addresses with SPV but
I did not come to a satisfying conclusion, so I post this as a
challenge to the wider community. Maybe you have an idea.
## Explanation of SPV
In SPV a thin client puts his public keys in a bloom filter
and asks a full
Hi all,
I did not follow the whole discussion, but wanted to throw in some
literature on the failure of crypto primitives in Bitcoin.
There is a paper which discusses the problems, but does not give any
remedies: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/167.pdf
And there are also contingency plans on the wi
Hi Ben,
not sure if this is the right mailing list for that. I think it rather
belongs to bitcoin-discuss.
And I am also not sure if I understand your question. What you may
mean is the private key of a user. If you find this, you can spend his
funds and also prove that you own the funds.
Depend
Hi all,
I totally agree with the assessment of the situation. Previously I
learned a lot about bitcoin on this list. There were a lot of great
ideas regarding the protocol and the surrounding ecosystem. Now there
is mainly talk about code and BIPs, which is the main purpose of a
developer list.
I
Hi Tony,
> > Regarding the blinding factor, I think you could just use HMAC.
> How exactly?
I am not entirely sure if this works. You wrote:
> There is one technical nuance that I omitted above to avoid distraction.
> Unlike regular bitcoin transactions, every output in a private payment
> must
Hi Tony,
I see some issues in your protocol.
1. How are mining fees handled?
2. Assume Alice sends Bob some Coins together with their history and
Bob checks that the history is correct. How does the hash of the txout
find its way into the blockchain?
Regarding the blinding factor, I think you c
On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 11:21:10AM +0200, Jannes Faber via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On 11 May 2016 at 05:14, Timo Hanke via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > There is no way to tell from a block if it was mined with AsicBoost or
> > not. So you don’t know what percent
Hi,
> However, I think it could actually increase
> confidence in the system if the community is able to demonstrate a good
> process for making such decisions, and show that we can separate the
> meaningful underlying principles, such as the coin limit and overall
> inflation rate, from what is m
Hi,
I think there is no need to do a hardfork for this. Rather it should
be implemented as a safety-mechanism in the client. Perhaps a warning
can pop up, if one of your conditions A) or B) is met.
All the best
Henning Kopp
On Thu, Mar 03, 2016 at 05:02:11AM -0800, Alice Wonder via bitcoin-dev w
e protected from outside
> examination via some form of shared secret generation... Although that would
> require the sender to know the recipient's unhashed public key; I don't know
> of any shared secret schemes that will work on hashed keys.
>
> Jeremy Papp
>
&
Hi all,
I am trying to fully grasp confidential transactions.
When a sender creates a confidential transaction and picks the blinding
values correctly, anyone can check that the transaction is valid. It
remains publically verifiable.
But how can the receiver of the transaction check which amount
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