"Alice runs an Ark service provider. Every 5 seconds, she broadcasts a new unconfirmed onchain transaction"Is that means each such instance adding ~15k vB to single block, i.e. every 10 minutes?In such case only 200 of such nodes - would utilize the whole tx throughput of Bitcoin?RegardsJaroslaw
W
W dniu 2023-05-11 13:57:11 użytkownik Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev
napisał:
> The current fees we are experiencing are still significantly lower than they
> need to be if Bitcoin is going to survive in a post-subsidy era. If our
> layered protocols can't survive the current fee
Ok, I need to highlight one important thing well proven by this discussion
(like it or not)...
Not the spam itself is the real reason of feeling: "something must be done"
The reason is: $30 fee per transaction (I hope you all agree)
Let me paraphrase some quotes used in this discussion,
> to bring the equilibrium
The important thing to highlight is that's not equilibrium between active users
and miners.
This needed in the future equilibrium is between:
Active Users (transactional tax) vs Passive Users (i.e. stakeholders: inflation
tax)
And miners will only earn as much as
'only' in this sentence: "only two orders of magnitude higher"
- is just like in this one:
"We're raising $100,000 for the Tesla S and we're not short of $99,900, we're
only short of $99,000..."
W dniu 2023-01-22 16:13:42 użytkownik John Tromp via bitcoin-dev
napisał:
> > Right now the
This is the phrase that should be recalled very often:
"the total reward per transaction is Three Orders of Magnitude
higher than typical fees. Sufficient fee increases to bring back hashing power
in a scenario like that would cause Enormous Disruption to many things,
including Lightning
> Anyways if it turns out that fees alone don't look like they're supporting
> enough security, we have a good amount of time to come to that conclusion and
> do something about it.
The worst-case scenario is that the first global hashrate regression may take
place in 2028.
Instead of the
hat more or less total fees are collected
each block to attract more or less miners.
On Tue, Dec 27, 2022, 09:41 Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
It seems like the more elegant solution could be by using a chainwork parameter
instead.
i.e. comparison just before halving - if the last 210,000 b
Is a storage fee averaged out over many future blocks - but not hardcoded value
and regulated by a free market?
The problem with demurrage I see is that the fee is taken when you spend. There
is no additional income for miners if people are still hoarding.
In tail emission even if people are
re or less miners, or it could adjust the block size up or
down to change the fee market such that more or less total fees are collected
each block to attract more or less miners.
On Tue, Dec 27, 2022, 09:41 Jaroslaw via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
It seems like the more elegant solution could be
that income from transactions
will takeover security support from block subsidy - accepting such proposal is
like putting the money where the mouth is: this safety measure will never be
triggered, then (no risk of fork)
Best Regards
Jaroslaw
W dniu 2022-12-23 20:29:20 użytkownik Jaroslaw via
Necessary or not - it doesn't hurt to plan the robust model, just in case. The
proposal is:
Let every 210,000 the code calculate the average difficulty of 100 last
retargets (100 fit well in 210,000 / 2016 = 104.166)
and compare with the maximum of all such values calculated before, every
Fortunately halving in 2020 will be non destructive because it looks like we
will have higher difficulty in 2024 than in 2020.
Let's assume the worst case scenario: after halving in 2024, we have regression
of difficulty in 2028. Annual inflation rate in 2028 is 0.81%. Removal of
halvings in
On one scale you puts the Trust to the large stakeholders (why we avoid plenty
of small stakeholders, btw),
and on the other side I put game theory and well defined Prisoner's Dilemma.
Again: large stakeholders WILL NOT incentivised to mine, they will have the
hundreds excuses why not to
Hi, Peter
Thanks to human nature, still:
1. Bitcoin large holders are able to communicate with each other...
- and as a large bitcoin holder someone will very well understand that he
should run his Antminers at loss for goodness of Bitcoin network security.
But he won't communicate that - due
> New blog post:
> https://petertodd.org/2022/surprisingly-tail-emission-is-not-inflationary
Tail emission is inevitable, Milton Friedman says...
The key thing here in my opinion is to properly understand the seriousness of
the situation.
"There is no such thing as a free lunch" - is
Let's assume fees don't compensate low block reward.
And for example every 10 BTC holding needs to be secured by one Antminer S19
running.
In an ideal world every large bitcoin holder will run proper amount of ASICs
and run it at loss.
The holders of less than 10 BTC - will organize "group
"large holders who perform zero transactions will still mine in order to
preserve the value of the network"
let me slightly modify the sentence below:
"The Prisoner's Dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory
that shows why completely rational large holders might not
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