Hi Tim,
Hm, so what vectors is this supposed to mitigate? Leaking through the
> generated public keys? Anything else?
The main thing it’s protecting against is the stealing of your funds by
malicious hardware & software. There are some side benefits as well though.
- What are you trying to
Hi Dustin,
That sounds interesting but I can't follow your email to be honest.
On Mon, 2020-03-23 at 07:38 -0700, Dustin Dettmer via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> This mitigates, I believe, all leak vectors besides k/R hacking and
> prechosen entropy.
Hm, so what vectors is this supposed to mitigate?
Excellent write up, thanks for putting it together.
On Tue, Mar 3, 2020 at 1:47 PM Pieter Wuille wrote:
> When both the HW and the SW are compromised, clearly no security is
> possible,
> as all entities are controlled by the same party in that case.
>
While all SW being compromised can’t be
On Sun, 2020-03-22 at 11:30 -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> Your claim is that if we don't fix the pubkey issue there is no point
> in fixing the signature issue. I disagree. While I think both
> issues need to be fully addressed, the issues around the original
> proposed non-deterministic
On Sun, Mar 22, 2020 at 5:43 AM Tim Ruffing wrote:
> On Sat, 2020-03-21 at 12:59 -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> > Public keys are deterministic and can be spot checked. In fact,
> > AFAIU if hardened HD key derivations are not used, then spot checking
> > is very easy.
> >
> > While spot
On Sat, 2020-03-21 at 12:59 -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> Public keys are deterministic and can be spot checked. In fact,
> AFAIU if hardened HD key derivations are not used, then spot checking
> is very easy.
>
> While spot checking isn't ideal, my original concern with the
> synthetic none
Practically speaking, most hardware wallets allow you to import your own
BIP39 seed, so you can work around key generation attacks today, with a one
time inconvenience at the start. However, with the signing nonce attacks, a
user today has no protection.
Mitigating key generation attacks would be
On Sat, Mar 21, 2020 at 12:46 PM Tim Ruffing via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi Pieter,
>
> Let's take a step back first. If we believe that malicious hardware
> wallets are big enough of a concern, then signing is only part of the
> problem. The other issue is
Hi Pieter,
That's a really nice overview.
Let's take a step back first. If we believe that malicious hardware
wallets are big enough of a concern, then signing is only part of the
problem. The other issue is key generation. The PRG from which the seed
is derived can be malicious, e.g., just
Hi all,
Given the recent activity and attention [1,2] around anti-covert channel
signing schemes, I decided to create this overview of the various techniques
that I know of, their trade-offs, and the various issues they protect against.
Most of this is based on various schemes by a number of
10 matches
Mail list logo