Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-05 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 01:08:29PM +0200, Christian Decker wrote: > > * anyprevout signatures make the address you're signing for less safe, > >which may cause you to lose funds when additional coins are sent to > >the same address; this can be avoided if handled with care (or if you > >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-03 Thread Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev
Anthony Towns writes: > On Mon, Sep 30, 2019 at 03:23:56PM +0200, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev > wrote: >> With the recently renewed interest in eltoo, a proof-of-concept >> implementation >> [1], and the discussions regarding clean abstractions for off-chain protocols >> [2,3], I thought

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-03 Thread Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev
ZmnSCPxj writes: >> That is very much how I was planning to implement it anyway, using a >> trigger transaction to separate timeout start and the actual >> update/settlement pairs (cfr. eltoo paper Section 4.2). So for eltoo >> there shouldn't be an issue here :-) > > My understanding is that a

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning lists, Let me propose the below radical idea: * `SIGHASH` flags attached to signatures are a misdesign, sadly retained from the original BitCoin 0.1.0 Alpha for Windows design, on par with: * 1 RETURN * higher-`nSequence` replacement * DER-encoded pubkeys * unrestricted

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Sep 30, 2019 at 03:23:56PM +0200, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev wrote: > With the recently renewed interest in eltoo, a proof-of-concept implementation > [1], and the discussions regarding clean abstractions for off-chain protocols > [2,3], I thought it might be time to revisit the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning aj, > On Mon, Sep 30, 2019 at 11:28:43PM +, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > Suppose rather than `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`, we created a new opcode, > > `OP_CHECKSIG_WITHOUT_INPUT`. > > I don't think there's any meaningful difference between making a new > opcode and making a new

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning Christian, > > - A standard MuSig 2-of-2 bip-schnorr SegWit v1 Funding Transaction > > Output, confirmed onchain > > - A "translator transaction" spending the above and paying out to a > > SegWit v16 output-tagged output, kept offchain. > > - Decker-Russell-Osuntokun update

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev
On Mon, Sep 30, 2019 at 11:28:43PM +, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Suppose rather than `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`, we created a new opcode, > `OP_CHECKSIG_WITHOUT_INPUT`. I don't think there's any meaningful difference between making a new opcode and making a new tapscript public key type; the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread Chris Stewart via bitcoin-dev
I do have some concerns about SIGHASH_NOINPUT, mainly that it does introduce another footgun into the bitcoin protocol with address reuse. It's common practice for bitcoin businesses to re-use addresses. Many exchanges [1] reuse addresses for cold storage with very large sums of money that is

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-10-01 Thread Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev
ZmnSCPxj writes: > To elucidate further --- > > Suppose rather than `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`, we created a new opcode, > `OP_CHECKSIG_WITHOUT_INPUT`. > > This new opcode ignores any `SIGHASH` flags, if present, on a > signature, but instead hashes the current transaction without the > input references,

[bitcoin-dev] Continuing the discussion about noinput / anyprevout

2019-09-30 Thread Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev
With the recently renewed interest in eltoo, a proof-of-concept implementation [1], and the discussions regarding clean abstractions for off-chain protocols [2,3], I thought it might be time to revisit the `sighash_noinput` proposal (BIP-118 [4]), and AJ's `bip-anyprevout` proposal [5]. (sorry