Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-04-17 Thread Natanael via bitcoin-dev
Den 17 apr. 2017 16:14 skrev "Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>: It's too bad we can't make the POW somehow dynamic so that any specialized hardware is impossible, and only GPU / FPGA is possible. Maybe a variant of Keccak where the size of the sponge is i

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-04-17 Thread Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
It's too bad we can't make the POW somehow dynamic so that any specialized hardware is impossible, and only GPU / FPGA is possible. Maybe a variant of Keccak where the size of the sponge is increased along with additional zero bits required. Seems like this would either have to resist specializ

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-04-17 Thread Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
On Apr 16, 2017 6:28 PM, wrote: On 2017-04-16 17:04, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote: > This is a great solution. > > 8 or more secure hashes, each of which can be implemented on GPU/CPU, > but rotate through them - per block round robin. > > Hardware, infrastructue investment is protected

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-04-16 Thread bfd--- via bitcoin-dev
On 2017-04-16 17:04, Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev wrote: This is a great solution. 8 or more secure hashes, each of which can be implemented on GPU/CPU, but rotate through them - per block round robin. Hardware, infrastructue investment is protected. ASIC is not. The write time for confi

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-04-16 Thread Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev
This is a great solution. 8 or more secure hashes, each of which can be implemented on GPU/CPU, but rotate through them - per block round robin. Hardware, infrastructue investment is protected. ASIC is not. Each pow has different tracking metrics and difficulty adjustments. This means the diff

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-22 Thread John Hardy via bitcoin-dev
linuxfoundation.org on behalf of Nick ODell via bitcoin-dev Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 6:02:52 PM To: Andrew Johnson; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners Chain work currently means

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-22 Thread Andrew Johnson via bitcoin-dev
op in hashing security. -- *From:* Andrew Johnson *Sent:* Monday, March 20, 2017 3:38:01 PM *To:* Bitcoin Protocol Discussion; John Hardy *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners By doi

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread John Hardy via bitcoin-dev
ocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners It's possible to switch PoW algorithms with a soft fork rather than a hard fork. You make it so that there are two different PoWs, the old one and the new one,

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread David Vorick via bitcoin-dev
I am in support of having multiple PoW forks to choose from, but it is indeed problematic to have one chain running a rotation of algorithms. The reason I support multiple algos is because we don't want an attacker secretly making asics ahead of time in the event of an emergency PoW fork. We want

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread Nick ODell via bitcoin-dev
Chain work currently means the expected number of sha256d evaluations needed to build a chain. Given that these hash functions are not equally hard, what should the new definition of chain work be? On Mon, Mar 20, 2017 at 9:38 AM, Andrew Johnson via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread Bram Cohen via bitcoin-dev
It's possible to switch PoW algorithms with a soft fork rather than a hard fork. You make it so that there are two different PoWs, the old one and the new one, and each old-style block has to reference a new-style block and contain the exact same transactions. The new work rule is that the weighted

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread Marcos mayorga via bitcoin-dev
Hi, Just a thought, Bitcoin developers shouldn't care about miners business model, they can always sell their hw and close the bz as soon as bitcoin hardforks to better ways of doing. Just focus on making a better cryptocurrency, the more decentralized the best. M > By doing this you're significa

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread John Hardy via bitcoin-dev
Andrew Johnson Sent: Monday, March 20, 2017 3:38:01 PM To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion; John Hardy Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners By doing this you're significantly changing the economic incentives be

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread Andrew Johnson via bitcoin-dev
By doing this you're significantly changing the economic incentives behind bitcoin mining. How can you reliably invest in hardware if you have no idea when or if your profitability is going to be cut by 50-75% based on a whim? You may also inadvertently create an entirely new attack vector if 50-7

[bitcoin-dev] Malice Reactive Proof of Work Additions (MR POWA): Protecting Bitcoin from malicious miners

2017-03-20 Thread John Hardy via bitcoin-dev
I’m very worried about the state of miner centralisation in Bitcoin. I always felt the centralising effects of ASIC manufacturing would resolve themselves once the first mover advantage had been exhausted and the industry had the opportunity to mature. I had always assumed initial centralisatio