>> Good point.
>> I have mentioned this now in the BIP but I think the BIP should allow
>> message > 16 MiB.
>> I leave the max. message length up to the implementation while keeping
>> the 4 byte length on the protocol level.
>
> I expect the implementation defined max size to work (SSH 2.0
On Wed, 18 May 2016 10:00:44 +0200
Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> Hi Lee
>
> Thank you very much for the valuable input.
> I'm still processing your feedback
[...]
> > Why have a fixed MAC length? I think the MAC length should be
> >
Hi Lee
Thank you very much for the valuable input.
I'm still processing your feedback
>
> *Key Revocation*
> This is probably too complicated, but an additional public key would
> allow for cold-storage key revocation. Spreading the knowledge of such
> an event is always painful, but it
On Fri, 1 Apr 2016 23:09:47 +0200
Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> > I have just PRed a draft version of two BIPs I recently wrote.
> > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/362
>
> Hi.
> I just updated the PR above with another overhaul of the BIP.
> I guess my question didn't get across.
>
> Why would you want to make your usecase do connections over the
> peer2peer
> (net.cpp) connection at all?
>
> Mixing messages that are being sent to everyone and encrypted
> messages is
> asking for trouble.
> Making
> I guess my question didn't get across.
>
> Why would you want to make your usecase do connections over the peer2peer
> (net.cpp) connection at all?
First, because there _are_ a hight amount of SPV wallets in the field.
SPV wallets are "dumb-clients" with only a tiny value for the bitcoin
On Friday 25 Mar 2016 19:43:00 Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> An encrypted channel together with a trusted full node would finally
> allow to have a secure and save SPV communication.
I guess my question didn't get across.
Why would you want to make your usecase do connections over the
On Thursday 24 Mar 2016 13:20:48 Chris via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> As far as the use cases others mentioned, connecting and SPV wallet to
> your full node is certainly one. It would make it easy to, say, connect
> the android bitcoin-wallet to your own node. I've hacked on that wallet
> to make it
On Wed, 23 Mar 2016 16:24:12 +0100
Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> Hi
>
> I have just PRed a draft version of two BIPs I recently wrote.
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/362
>
> Two BIPs that addresses the problem of decoupling
Thanks for doing some work on this Jonas. It's something I've been
interested in for a while. I haven't had an opportunity to read the bips
but I will do so soon and comment.
As far as the use cases others mentioned, connecting and SPV wallet to
your full node is certainly one. It would make it
It seems that every message must be signed (the protocols lacks MACs). This
can be very resource consuming in terms of CPU and bandwidth since most p2p
messages are small.
On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 5:36 PM, Tom via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wednesday 23 Mar
>> I have just PRed a draft version of two BIPs I recently wrote.
>> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/362
>
> I suggest running a spellchecker ;)
Thanks. Will do.
> * why would you not allow encryption on non-pre-approved connections?
The encryption should be optional.
The proposed
On 03/23/2016 01:36 PM, Tom via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> On Wednesday 23 Mar 2016 16:24:12 Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> * why would you not allow encryption on non-pre-approved connections?
Agree
> * we just removed (ssl) encryption from the JSON interface, how do you
> suggest
> this
On Wednesday 23 Mar 2016 16:24:12 Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Hi
>
> I have just PRed a draft version of two BIPs I recently wrote.
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/362
I suggest running a spellchecker ;)
Some questions;
* why would you not allow encryption on
There is probably not much loss due to per message encryption. Even if a
MITM determined that a message was an inv message (or bloom filter
message), it wouldn't be able to extract much information. Since the
hashes in those messages are fixed size, there is very little leakage.
You could make
15 matches
Mail list logo