On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 4:33 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 6:07 AM, Wladimir J. van der Laan wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 07, 2015 at 10:02:17PM +, Gregory Maxwell via
> bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >> TL;DR: I propose we work
On the -dev IRC I asked the same question and people seem don't like it.
I would like to further elaborate this topic and would like to consult
merchants, exchanges, wallet devs, and users for their preference
Background:
People will be able to use segregated witness in 2 forms. They either
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 11:35 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
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> On 20 December 2015 08:30:45 GMT-08:00, Chris Pacia
> wrote:
> >On Dec 20, 2015 6:34 AM, "Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev" <
>
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 12:21 PM, joe2015--- via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Remember this is proposed as an alternative to hardforks, which is also a
> "nuclear option". Hardforks carry significant risks such as permanently
> splitting Bitcoin into two chains
On 2015-12-21 11:39, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 12:21 PM, joe2015--- via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
Current hard fork implementations include / will include miner
lock-in, just like any soft fork. They will not activate if global
consensus is
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On 2015/12/20 20:50, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> I am fully in support of the plan laid out in "Capacity increases
> for the bitcoin system".
>
> This plan provides real benefit to the ecosystem in solving a
> number of longstanding
On 12/20/2015 3:34 AM, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Ideally we should start having wallets generate those proofs now, and
> then introduce the max-age as a second step as a planned hard fork a
> couple years down the line.
>
> However,
> 1) There is also the open question of
On 2015-12-21 02:17, Bryan Bishop wrote:
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:56 AM, joe2015--- via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
An Arbitrary Block-size Increase Via a Generalized Softfork
This seems conceptually similar to "extension blocks":
I am fully in support of the plan laid out in "Capacity increases for the
bitcoin system".
This plan provides real benefit to the ecosystem in solving a number of
longstanding problems in bitcoin. It improves the scalability of bitcoin
considerably.
Furthermore it is time that we stop
There's quite a bit of confusion in this thread.
Peter is referring to block withholding attacks. Ittay Eyal (as sole
author -- I was not involved in this paper [1]) was the first
to analyze these attacks and to discover a fascinating, paradoxical
result. An attacker pool (A) can take a certain
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:24 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> What I proprosed is that a consensus-critical maximum UTXO age be part
> of the protocol; UTXO's younger than that age are expected to be cached.
> For UTXO's older than that age, they
On Dec 20, 2015 6:34 AM, "Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 2) This reverses the useful minimization attribute of HD wallets - "just
backup the seed"
It would be nice if the bip37 filter matching algorithm was extended to
serve up the proof.
And if
On 2015-12-20 23:50, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev wrote:
This is essentially the "nuclear option".
Remember this is proposed as an alternative to hardforks, which is also
a "nuclear option". Hardforks carry significant risks such as
permanently splitting Bitcoin into two chains if global
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:56 AM, joe2015--- via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> An Arbitrary Block-size Increase Via a Generalized Softfork
>
This seems conceptually similar to "extension blocks":
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
writes:
> On Dec 18, 2015, at 10:30 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
>> 1) The risk of an old full node wallet accepting a transaction that is
>> invalid to the new rules.
Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-12-19 23:14 寫到:
Jonathan Toomim via bitcoin-dev
writes:
On Dec 18, 2015, at 10:30 AM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
1) The risk of an old full node wallet accepting a
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 5:12 AM, Emin Gün Sirer <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> An attacker pool (A) can take a certain portion of its hashpower,
> use it to mine on behalf of victim pool (B), furnish partial proofs of work
> to B, but discard any full blocks it discovers.
>
I
What will be the actual effect over wallets?
Say I have the private key for a dormant UTXO older than the
consensus-critical maximum UTXO age. The UTXO is not part of the cache.
So I setup a full node and import my old private key (wallet.dat). Will
I even see the correct balance (where will it
This is a draft.
--joe
Introduction
It is generally assumed that increasing the blocksize limit requires a
hardfork. Instead we show that a increasing the limit can be achieved
using a
"generalized" softfork. Like standard softforks, generalized softforks
need a
mere miner
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Natanael wrote:
> If total difficulty is X and the ratio for full blocks to candidate blocks
> shared with the pool is Y, then the candidate block PoW now has to meet X/Y
> while hashing the candidate block PoW + the pool's commitment hash
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 12:12:49AM -0500, Emin Gün Sirer via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> There's quite a bit of confusion in this thread.
>
> Peter is referring to block withholding attacks. Ittay Eyal (as sole
> author -- I was not involved in this paper [1]) was the first
Ah, thanks for the
Wouldn't block withhold be fixed by not letting miners in pools know which
block candidates are valid before the pool knows? (Note: I haven't read any
other proposals for how to fix it, this may already be known)
As an example, by having the pool use the unique per-miner nonces sent to
each miner
Den 20 dec 2015 12:38 skrev "Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 5:12 AM, Emin Gün Sirer <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> An attacker pool (A) can take a certain portion of its hashpower,
>> use it to mine on
Link to better formatted version for web-users:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1296628.0
--joe
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On 20 December 2015 08:30:45 GMT-08:00, Chris Pacia wrote:
>On Dec 20, 2015 6:34 AM, "Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev" <
>bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> 2) This reverses the useful minimization attribute of HD
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 8:28 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> There are a number of techniques that can be used to detect block
> withholding attacks that you are not aware of. These techniques usually
> have the characteristic that if known they can be avoided, so obviously
> those
This is essentially the "nuclear option". You are destroying the current
chain (converting it to a chain of coinbases) and using the same POW to
start the new chain. You are also giving everyone credit in the new chain
equal to their credit in the old chain.
It would be better if the current
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