https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/4w016b/use_of_payment_channels_to_mitigate_exchange_risk/
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:53 AM, Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future
>
"This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future
block. Don't sign any transaction that isn't nLockTime'd at least N blocks
beyond the present tip."
This would have prevented the Bitfinex hack if BitGo did this, but it
wouldn't have helped if the Bitfinex offline key had
>This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future
block. Don't sign any transaction that isn't nLockTime'd at least N blocks
beyond the present tip.
The problem with nLockTimed transactions is a centralized exchange isn't
going to know ahead of time where those locked
This would honestly work. It forces the attacker to go through with the
clearing phase which simultaneously makes it possible to "cancel" the TX
through another logic branch before the timeout occurs. I'd say that would
meet the needs of a clearing mechanism / fraud prevention system for an
