I didn't trust myself and verify. In fact the  is the real .
Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 06:28, Andrés G. Aragoneses a
> Hey Antoine, just a small note,  is missing in your footnotes, can you
> add it? Thanks
> On Tue, 5 May 2020 at 18:17, Antoine Riard
> The choice between whether we offer them a light client technology that
is better or worse for privacy and scalability.
And offer them a solution which would scale in the long-term.
Again it's not an argumentation against BIP 157 protocol in itself, the
problem I'm interested in is how
I do see the consensus capture argument by miners but in reality isn't this
attack scenario have a lot of assumptions on topology an deployment ?
For such attack to succeed you need miners nodes to be connected to clients
to feed directly the invalid headers and if these ones are connected to
> As a result, the entire protocol could be served over something like
HTTP, taking advantage of all the established CDNs and anycast serving
Yes it's moving the issue of being a computation one to a distribution one.
But still you need the bandwidth capacities. What I'm concerned
Consensus capture by miners isn't the only concern here. Consensus capture
by any subset of users whose interests diverge from the overall consensus
is equally damaging. The scenario I can imagine here is that the more light
clients outpace full nodes, the more the costs of security