> I and some number of Lightning devs consider this to be sufficient
disincentive to Bob not attacking in the first place.
An additional disincentive could be introduced in the form of bribery
proofs for failed attempts.
If we assume that "honest" users of the LN protocol won't reveal their
timel
Hi ZmnSCPxj,
You are of course correct. I had considered the effect of reorgs, but the
email seemed to be getting too lengthy to mention that too.
You would need a few spare blocks in which Bob won't be accused of bribery
as a safety margin, which does reduce the time frame in which Alice can get
Good morning list,
This is an interesting and simple idea, thanks for sharing this paper!
However I think there are a couple of important issues (but it could be me
misunderstanding):
* the assumption that the mempool is a shared resource is flawed: it's
entirely possible
to have very differen
Hi everyone,
I am hoping to get a critique on a proposal of how to
construct childchains "on-top" of Bitcoin without requiring any changes to
Bitcoin itself nor requiring any user or miner to be aware of them.
The childchain is Bitcoin-aware and simulates the properties of Proof of
Work by requir
Good morning CS,
The difficulty is not so much the proof-of-whatever, but rather, the peg itself.
My understanding of your pegout from sidechain to mainchain is that this pegout
is very low-bandwidth, i.e. only a tiny amount can be pegged out at each
mainchain block.
This suggests to me that the
