Re: [bitcoin-dev] Scaling by Partitioning

2015-12-09 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
Hi Akiva I sketched out a similar proposal here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1083345.0 It's good to see people talking about this :). I'm not quite convinced with segregated witness, as it might mess up some things, but will take a closer look. On Dec 9, 2015 7:32 AM, "Loi Luu via

[bitcoin-dev] Multisig with hashes instead of pubkeys

2016-12-22 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
Hi Is there a worked out scriptPubKey for doing multisig with just hashes of the participants? I think it is doable and it is more secure to a compromised ECDSA. I'm thinking something like this for the scriptPubKey: 2 OP_SWAP OP_SWAP OP_SWAP OP_DUP OP_HASH160 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_DUP OP_HASH160

[bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention

2018-09-03 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
As I understand, selfish mining is an attack where miners collude to mine at a lower hashrate then with all miners working independently. What are the current strategies used to prevent this and what are the future plans? One idea I have is to let the block reward get "modulated" according to

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention

2018-09-19 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
@ Eric: Yes I forgot to mention that cost (in addition to price) also determines the profitability of mining and thus the total hashpower. I disagree with your assessment of merge mining as really what matters is opportunity cost of honestly mining vs attacking, and one reason we are currently

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention

2018-09-14 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
lock by including the > suggested transactions and giving the associated transaction fees to a > payment address specified in the Helper Block. Miners who do not use a > Helper Block must satisfy a 25% higher difficulty. > > On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 9:56 AM Andrew via bitcoin-dev >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention

2018-09-15 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
> From: bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org > on behalf of Andrew via > bitcoin-dev > Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM > To: Bitcoin Dev > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention > > I discussed this more at bitcointalk: > https

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention

2018-09-14 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
I discussed this more at bitcointalk: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0 The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding, and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in order

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention

2018-09-17 Thread Andrew via bitcoin-dev
> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "And > this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually > happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls? In general, a target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more than the peak