Hello list,
>>Hello centralisation. Might as well just have someone sign miner keys, and get
>>rid of PoW entirely...
>>No, it is not centralization -
>
> No, it is not centralization, as:
>
> (a) different miners could use different standards / certifications for
> 'green' status, there are
> @befreeandopen I guess I misunderstood your selfish minting attack. Let me
> make sure I understand it. You're saying it would go as follows?:
>
> 1. The malicious actor comes across an opportunity to mint the next 3 blocks.
> But they hold off and don't release their blocks just yet.
> 2.
> FYI, proof of stake can be done without the "nothing at stake" problem. You
> can simply punish people who mint on shorter chains (by rewarding people who
> publish proofs of this happening on the main chain). In quorum-based PoS, you
> can punish people in the quorum that propose or sign
Comments inline.
> > Could you explain what am I missing here, because this actually does not
> > seem better, but rather worse than some PoS schemes?
>
> Given your example, if !BTC is needed to burn, that's a $50k
> investment in an ASIC needed to mine a block. That's not anywhere
> near
Erik, thanks for the link. So referring to
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_burn, I do not really understand how this
is supposed to be that much better over many proof of stake proposals. If there
is more research on PoB, please note I'm not commenting on that as I only read
this wiki
Erik, I am sorry, I have little knowledge about proof-of-burn, I never found it
interesting up until now. Some of your recent claims seem quite strong to me
and I'd like to read more.
Forgive me if this has been mentioned recently, but is there a full
specification of the concept you are
> @befreeandopen " An attacker can calculate whether or not she can prolong
> this chain or not and if so with what timestamp."
>
> The scenario you describe would only be likely to happen at all if the
> malicious actor has a very large fraction of the stake - probably quite close
> to 50%. At
