On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 05:08:05PM -0700, Matthieu Riou via bitcoin-dev wrote:
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 12:32 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
In a Sybil attack the attacker subverts the reputation system of a
peer-to-peer network by creating a large number of pseudonymous
minrelaytxfee setting proposed in the 0.11.0 release notes
my guess, he is talking about this
https://bitcoin.org/en/glossary/minimum-relay-fee
https://bitcoin.org/en/glossary/minimum-relay-fee - slam dunk technique for
doublespend
Related: is there somewhere a chart that plots
Simon - tx hashes or it didn't happen
Kidding aside, would be great if you could share the confirmed and
double-spent hashes so the rest of us can dive in and learn from this.
On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Me via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
minrelaytxfee
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 12:32 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
In a Sybil attack the attacker subverts the reputation system of a
peer-to-peer network by creating a large number of pseudonymous
identities, using them to gain a disproportionately large influence.
Our identities
You perform a valuable service with your demonstration, but you
neglected to include the txid's to show that you actually did it.
Your advice is must-follow for anyone relying on an unconfirmed tx: it
must pay a good fee and be highly relayable/minable.
On 7/14/2015 8:29 PM, simongreen--- via
Thank you Simon for sharing your tests, if possible can you share TX hashes
please. I would recommend to send them money post-mortem. What you did is
really valuable information, however it can be classified as fraud. I really
don’t want open this topic here, just suggesting to keep your record
On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 5:49 PM, Me via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
Blockcypher's confidence factor model(1)
under the hood - yet another one of those sybil attacking network
monitoring things
Peter, I noticed on your twitter you have a lot of bad things to
With my black hat on I recently performed numerous profitable
double-spend attacks against zeroconf accepting fools. With my white hat
on, I'm warning everyone. The strategy is simple:
tx1: To merchant, but dust/low-fee/reused-address/large-size/etc.
anything that miners don't always accept.
