Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

Not everyone who uses centralized exchanges are there to obtain the currency though. A large portion are speculators who need to be able to enter and exit complex positions in milliseconds and don't care about decentralization, security, and often even the asset that they're buying. Try telling

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

With channels and the exchange acting as hub, you can do instant trades between altcoins. This doesn't work with fiat accounts. A "100% reserve" company could issue fiat tokens. The exchange could then trade those tokens. This eliminates the counter-party risk for the exchange. If the

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

I'm not convinced you need to hold people's funds to provide those features. Maybe the millisecond thing. But 99 out of 100 traders would accept a 100 millisecond latency in exchange for 0 counterparty risk. ___ bitcoin-dev mailing list

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 1:48 AM, Matthew Roberts wrote: > Not everyone who uses centralized exchanges are there to obtain the > currency though. A large portion are speculators who need to be able to > enter and exit complex positions in milliseconds and don't care about >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

I still feel like you're better off getting rid of "hot wallets" and use lightning-esqe networks to route orders. I don't think either speed or flexibility is an issue there. IMO, the point of Bitcoin is to avoid the centralization that seems to be happening on the network now. By making "hot

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

I'm wondering if we're fully on the same page here. What I was thinking was that this protection mechanism would be applied to the coins in the hot wallet (I wasn't talking about moving coins from the cold wallet to the hot wallet -- though such a mechanism is also needed.) With the hot wallet

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/4w016b/use_of_payment_channels_to_mitigate_exchange_risk/ On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:53 AM, Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

"This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future block. Don't sign any transaction that isn't nLockTime'd at least N blocks beyond the present tip." This would have prevented the Bitfinex hack if BitGo did this, but it wouldn't have helped if the Bitfinex offline key had

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

>This is already possible. Just nLockTime your withdrawls for some future block. Don't sign any transaction that isn't nLockTime'd at least N blocks beyond the present tip. The problem with nLockTimed transactions is a centralized exchange isn't going to know ahead of time where those locked

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

This would honestly work. It forces the attacker to go through with the clearing phase which simultaneously makes it possible to "cancel" the TX through another logic branch before the timeout occurs. I'd say that would meet the needs of a clearing mechanism / fraud prevention system for an

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

On Wednesday, August 03, 2016 6:16:20 PM Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev wrote: > In light of the recent hack: what does everyone think of the idea of > creating a new address type that has a reversal key and settlement layer > that can be used to revoke transactions? This isn't something that

Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP clearing house addresses

On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 7:16 PM, Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > The reason why I bring this up is existing OP codes and TX types don't > seem suitable for a secure clearing mechanism; > I think reversing transactions is not likely to be