Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap

2020-06-11 Thread nopara73 via bitcoin-dev
Thank you all for your replies, I think everyone agrees here how it "should be" and indeed I risked my post and my used terminology to further legitimize the thinking of adversaries. I'd have one clarification to my original post. It may not be clear why I put PJ/CS to the same box. One way of

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap

2020-06-10 Thread Mr. Lee Chiffre via bitcoin-dev
Thought provoking. In my opinion bitcoin should be designed in a way to where there is no distinction between "clean" bitcoins and "dirty" bitcoins. If one bitcoin is considered dirty then all bitcoins should be considered dirty. Fungibility is important. And bitcoin or its users should not be

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap

2020-06-10 Thread ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
Good morning nopara73 and Chris, > One way to resist a likely taint analysis attack is to involve other > parts of the bitcoin economy in your transactions. For example our > exchange thief could deposit and then withdraw his stolen coins through > a Bitcoin Casino or other bitcoin service hot

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap

2020-06-10 Thread Chris Belcher via bitcoin-dev
Hello nopara73, On 10/06/2020 13:32, nopara73 via bitcoin-dev wrote: > The problem with CoinJoins is that desire for privacy is explicitly > signalled by them, so adversaries can consider them "suspicious." PayJoin > and CoinSwap solve this problem, because they are unnoticeable. I think > this

Re: [bitcoin-dev] Tainting, CoinJoin, PayJoin, CoinSwap

2020-06-10 Thread Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev
A major point of defeating the common input heuristic and others is to make "super-clusters". A small number of users that "don't care" about possibly touching tainted coins can render many chain analysis techniques unworkable in practice for enforcement. You don't need 100% coverage to defeat the